Post by karl on May 23, 2015 15:37:09 GMT -7
To All:
Please consider this bit dated report as an Addendium to the Presentation of J.J. title: Blaim Game.
I have in self, cleaned it up for viewable presentation as an example of clarification of the past and present situation in the Gulf region in understandable terms. Although the report is through the eyes of Turkish Perspective as titled, and not through the American View point, but corresponds quite close to the German view.
Rather this presents an issue, is to the viewer to decide. It is exact though and presents the here and now what is evident and valid.
East Policy Council:
The Gulf States and Iran: A Turkish Perspective
Özden Zeynep Oktav
Summer 2011, Volume XVIII, Number 2
After the U.S. military involvement in Iraq, the traditional balance of power consisting of Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia was destroyed, producing a power vacuum in the Persian Gulf. A new triangle comprising the United States, Iran and Saudi Arabia has both enabled Iran to create a sphere of influence that instrumentalizes the Iraqi Shiites and made the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries vulnerable.
Since 2003, the longstanding structural tensions in the Persian Gulf have become more evident, increasing the divergent interests of Iran and the GCC countries. This article will focus on the reasons Iran has been increasingly perceived as a threat by the Gulf states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), with a special emphasis on the course of relations during the 1990s. In addition, to what extent can regionalism be applied in the Gulf region? This will be discussed by taking into consideration factors such as identity, definition of security challenges, and dependency on outside support. Three points will be stressed. First, it is not possible to ensure stability and peace in the region if Iran is totally excluded and identities are formulated on the basis of inclusion.
Second, Tehran’s rejection of any partnership with Washington and its assertive revisionist policies serve to promote the status quo, which makes the GCC states more dependent on the United States. Finally, because human security, grass-roots relations, and nations’ political demands and expectations are gaining importance, security challenges are no longer defined in terms of hard interstate rivalries. Therefore, the alarm bells regarding Iran’s influence over the Shiite population in the region so as to enhance the importance of grass-roots relations might have been a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy in the formation of that Shiite crescent.
A BRIEF HISTORY When the British withdrew their forces from the Gulf region in the late 1960s, Washington became alarmed at the probability of a strategic and economic power vacuum. This prompted the United States to look for suitable regional partners with which to cooperate. Thus, Iran and Saudi Arabia emerged as conservative, pro-Western countries to assume regional leadership under the Nixon doctrine during the 1970s and contain Iraq’s ambitions. However, the regime change realized by Islamic revolutionaries in Iran devastated the status quo that favored American interests.
The vulnerability of the regional order was best portrayed by the volatile relations between Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iraq throughout the Cold War period and the 1990s. For example, Saudi fears of Iraq’s pan-Arab aspirations were overshadowed by Iran’s foreign-policy credo of exporting revolution. Therefore, Saudi Arabia supported Iraq during the eight-year Iran-Iraq War. Because a war-weakened Iran was not a threat to Riyadh, the two countries restored diplomatic relations during the Kuwait crisis, since "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." During the Rafsanjani period, Tehran made tremendous efforts to keep the United States out of any regional security agreements in order to realize Gulfization and reduce the Gulf Arab countries’ dependency on foreigners, the United States in particular.
However, non-Arab Iran never ceased to be an outsider in the eyes of the Gulf Arab countries, partly because Washington gave them the message that, in the absence of Saddam Hussein, Iran was the greatest threat to the sheikhdoms. Another important reason was that "Riyadh still looked upon Tehran with suspicion both as an ideological competitor in the Muslim world and as a major regional power, due to the asymmetry between the Gulf Arab countries’ national power and that of Iran, in terms of demography, industrial capacity and military strength.
A third reason concerns the lack of mutual trust. Both Iran and Iraq appeared at different times as promoters of unrest in the Gulf Arab countries. For example, from 1978 through 1980, the revolutionary Iranian regime created a wave of unrest, concentrated mostly in the Shiite communities of Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Similarly, after the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq was another immediate military threat, moving troops up to the border of the oil-rich Eastern province of Saudi Arabia. In addition, Iraq posed both an ideological and domestic threat, since Saddam openly called for citizens in Saudi Arabia to revolt against their government.
Thus, after the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Arab Gulf countries were relieved to have the long-lasting threat of the Iraqi nationalist Baath regime removed. However, the traditional balance of power was replaced by one consisting of only Saudi Arabia and Iran, joined by the United States.
The remaining two regional actors would benefit now at the expense of Iraq, but the creation of a power vacuum in the system made both countries more vulnerable and created new security challenges in the region, such as the identity issue. IDENTITY From the GCC countries’ perspective, Iran was handed Iraq on a golden platter by the United States, enabling the Islamic Republic to aggressively pursue its claim to regional leadership and reinforce sectarian identity in Iraq. The end of Sunni domination there has brought Iraqi (Arab) and Iranian (Persian) Shiites closer, fostering sectarian identity in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and eroding nationalism.
Therefore, the growing power of Iraq’s Shiite majority, which might affect the delicate sectarian balance within the GCC, has become a major bone of contention between the Gulf countries and Iran and has made the gap between the political-security elites and the Shiite citizens of the Gulf countries more visible than ever. The ousting of Saddam Hussein led to the emergence of the Shiites, who are more conscious of their potential power and role in the region. Currently, the world Shiite population is estimated at 160-200 million.
The estimate for the Arab Shiite population is around 14 million in the Persian Gulf littoral states. Around 50 percent of the area’s oil reserves are located in the Shiite regions. Taking these factors into account, the role of Shiite identity in Middle East developments will become much more significant in the future. The 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war in Lebanon and Israel’s assault on Gaza in 2008 are keys to understanding the general fear of the ruling elites in Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf Arab countries, mainly Saudi Arabia, concerning the growing power of a Shiite revolutionary force craving change.6 From the perspective of Arab rulers, the danger emanating from this change was a potential encirclement by a domestic population whose ultimate aim is to take control of their own destiny.
In this context, Hezbollah, Hamas and Iran’s connection with those organizations are the forces driving Shiite communities to challenge the status quo by calling for the overthrow of U.S.-supported rulers. Put differently, Iran reveals the divergent interests of the ruling cadres and the masses. For example, although Saudi Arabia has managed to maintain an image of defending the rights of the Palestinians, its blaming of Hezbollah for irresponsible adventurism during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war in Lebanon damaged Saudi prestige and credibility. In addition, it created the impression that Riyadh sided with Washington and Tel Aviv in order to eliminate sources of instability. This put the Saudi kingdom under heavy pressure from negative public opinion.
The Saudi leaders sometimes distanced themselves from the United States by talking tough against Washington or cooperating with Tehran to ease, for example, the tension in Lebanon between the Hezbollah-led opposition and the Siniora government and the Saad Hariri camp.9 Tehran, aware of the rift between pro-American Arab Gulf rulers and their deeply anti-American populations, did not want to give the impression that expansionist designs on the basis of Shiism was a priority in Iranian foreign policy. On the contrary, Tehran has generally pursued an explicitly nonsectarian public diplomacy toward Arab audiences. Similarly in Iraq, according to Barzegar, Tehran has attempted to build balanced relations with all Shiite factions. For the most part, "Relations with the Shiite factions such as the Sadrists are primarily tactical and short term, mainly aiming to undermine the unilateral U.S. policy of excluding Iran from the domain of Iraqi politics.
Put differently, Tehran, in order to avoid giving a Shiite coloring to its anti-American policies, sought both to gain popularity with Arab audiences, including Shiites, and to alleviate Gulf rulers’ uneasiness about its rising popularity among Arabs. However, because the current political-security system in the region is based on the view that "Iranians’ loss is Arabs’ gain," Iran, with its nuclear program and anti-American rhetoric, has not been able to cope with the deterioration of its image.
It continues to be seen by many as the main threat to Gulf security. In addition, Obama’s engagement policy towards Iran, which could lead to a "grand bargain," increased the GCC countries’ sense of vulnerability vis-à-vis Iran and led them to redefine the security challenges in the region. REDEFINITION OF SECURITY CHALLENGES Since the 1990s, the Arab Gulf states and Iran have been sporadically discussing security arrangements to ensure the stability of the region. However, factors such as the lack of unified leadership in the GCC, the scarcity of its political options, and the power asymmetry between Iran and the Arab Gulf states have hindered the restoration of stability.
From Tehran’s perspective, the military presence of the United States is the key destabilizing factor; therefore, the removal of American influence is Iran’s sole strategic objective in the Persian Gulf. On the other hand, the Gulf states’ situation has been even more difficult. They have been increasingly uneasy about American intentions, especially since Obama has come to power. The U.S. president’s engagement policy with the Islamic Republic made the Gulf countries more vulnerable, pushing them to diversify their security relations.11 Put differently, the Obama administration’s lighter footprint in the region strengthened the belief that "the United States could acquiesce to Iranian domination of the Gulf if Tehran were to put an end to its uranium enrichment program and renounce its ambition to develop nuclear weapons.
Moreover, President Ahmadinejad’s reelection in 2009 showed that the engagement policy did not quell the Islamic Republic’s revolutionary zeal to "change the current circumstances in the world.
This exacerbated the GCC countries’ security concerns and led to an increase in their military spending. Although a strong military collaboration was reinstated between the GCC and the United States after 2003, the GCC states are still vulnerable due to their lack of military experience, modest populations and limited geographic size. In addition, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, none has strategic depth.
Iran’s army has a total manpower of more than 540,000, compared to a combined GCC total of 176,500.14 Most important, "There isn’t a GCC military alliance akin to NATO."15 The GCC countries have always been very cautious about military confrontation with Iran and reluctant to counter Iran’s nuclear program by military means. The Gulf countries fear the chaos of a U.S. strike more than the effects of Iran’s nuclear acquisition, and they want Washington to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons rather than confronting them militarily. Military force would prompt Iran to activate its networks and assets in Iraq, fueling an already highly volatile situation. In addition, the GCC countries would not be able to continue their tacit cooperation with Iran, a crucial part of the policy of diversification, to protect their interests but not challenge the United States. The GCC countries would be "hard-pressed to choose a side.
Third, Iran has the ability to block the Strait of Hormuz and cut the Gulf’s oil traffic in half, a disaster for the region as well as the West. Commercial interests also pressure both sides to be cautious about military confrontation. Most of Iran’s foreign-currency earnings derive from the export of energy through the Persian Gulf. The region is also Iran’s main route of international trade and communication and the starting point for Iran’s international relations.17 It is also noteworthy that the Saudi petrochemical industry has an ever-increasing need for natural gas, and Iran holds the world’s second-largest reserves.18 In addition, the instability from any military confrontation would hinder the flow of foreign direct investment to the Gulf countries, primarily Saudi Arabia. For example, between 2004 and 2006, Saudi inward foreign direct investments, as a percentage of gross fixed capital, rose from 4.5 percent to 32.1 percent; in Iran, it rose from 0.7 to 1.9 percent. The average in the developing world in 2006 was 13.8 percent.
Despite the existence of so many reasons for both sides to avoid military confrontation and build interdependent relations, they have not been able to reinstate mutual trust, mostly due to two factors: the U.S. policy of containing Iran and Iran’s insistence on being a nuclear power. These two factors drive the Gulf governments to continue relying on outsiders to ensure a rough balance of power that will protect their sovereignty, domestic identity and regime security. The GCC states’ increasing military dependence on the United States both exacerbates Iranian threat perceptions and limits the Gulf states’ room to maneuver vis-à-vis Iran since the U.S. military presence produces an anti-Iranian alliance that prevents normalization of relations.
Moreover, the U.S. military presence in the region, including its naval facilities in Bahrain, air-force installations in Qatar, and ground troops in Kuwait, not only promotes Arab Gulf passivity in defense and strategic thinking but also prevents the Gulf countries from "harnessing and refining their ‘soft power’ tools to counter any Iranian attempt to hurt their Islamic legitimacy and shore up their counterterrorism capabilities.
Thus, the rough balance of power based on confrontation between Iran and the United States basically hinders the Gulf countries’ transition from controlled states to more open societies. Currently, there are two parallel developments in the region: "top-down state building" and "bottom-up globalization.
The U.S. plan to develop a new security architecture and to continue its role as "external balancer" in the region ignores those two parallel developments and, therefore, not only fails to solve the primary interstate issues, but also complicates the existing ones. Abu Musa Island offers a pointed example. It emerged as a disputed area after the withdrawal of British colonial power.
For Iran, the territorial separation is an accident of a British intervention that was by nature illegitimate, as it involved an outside power. For the Arab Gulf states, external powers are default local powers. According to Michael Kraig, "The dispute is not just a legal argument, but an existential issue involving the security of the Arab and Persian sides of the Gulf.
In a nutshell, since the Cold War, the national-security environment in the Gulf has become increasingly internationalized. This has made external influence, namely that of the United States, extremely important in setting the regional-security agenda. However, it is evident that the balance of power set by Washington in the post-Iraq War period has failed to cope with new security threats, such as ethnic rivalries, Sunni extremism, religious and civil war and the probability of territorial disintegration.
IS REGIONALISM FUTILE? According to many analysts, one of the main factors hindering the transformation of the GCC into a security community is the fact that Gulf security is not only a subregional concern, but closely linked with systemic changes. Therefore, "the strategic interests of the United States in the region are directly related to the maintenance of its global hegemony.
This indicates that Gulf security is a subregional complex constructed around the position of the United States. Throughout history, different types of security regimes set up by hegemonic powers have characterized the international relations of the region. Pax Britannica lasted from 1918 to 1971, when the British forces withdrew. It was replaced by Pax Saudi-Iranica, a product of the Nixon strategy of using proxy powers to maintain U.S. influence. It lasted until the Islamic revolution of 1979, which spawned Pax Americana.
The major driving force behind it is the demonization of Iran and the transformation of Iraq into a potential model of democracy. The question is whether there can be a solution to the security dilemma in the Gulf, where, in John Mearsheimer’s words, "uncertaintity is always certain but it is not unresolvable if one responds to it offensively."26 Starting from the point that "fear on the state level in the region is the only motive driving intentions, it can be said that regionalism to create a sense of "we-ness" can be an offensive response to the problem of uncertainty and fear. However, the "Middle East presents an anti-case for the analysis of regionalism.
According to Hadley Bull and the English School, a society of states "exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another and share in the working of common institutions.
Deutsch claims that cognitive regionalism, or a sense of we-ness, and a shared regional identity are products of social learning.30 When analyzing the main motives behind the institutionalization of GCC relations, it is easily seen that identity or a sense of we-ness is not a prerequisite for cooperation. On the contrary, "normative elements of a supposed Arab or Arabian identity and culture represent obstacles to, rather than facilitators towards, the transformation of the GCC into a security community.
The main reason is that alliances and allegiances are shaped on the definition of the "other" as stated in an old Arabic proverb, "I and my brothers against my cousin; I and my cousins against the stranger."32 As Coskun notes, "The concept of the "other," such as demonized Iran, has negatively affected regionalism and in many cases blocked cooperation efforts." Regionalism generally refers to "a policy and project whereby states and non-state actors cooperate and coordinate strategy within a given region.
However, in conflict-ridden regions such as the Middle East, where regional-security regimes have remained limited and relations are constructed through the securitization of the "other," states rather than nonstate actors define their interests in terms of relative rather than absolute gains. Therefore, Alexander Wendt argues that, in the absence of positive identification, interests will be defined regardless of the other. Security interdependence between the self and the other will boil down to "enmity. In this context, an anti-Iranian security order in the Gulf has a twofold effect. It creates the "other" so as to foster securitization policies, and it enables "a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat.Thus, Iran with its anti-Israeli, anti-American rhetoric and nuclear efforts serves to continue the status quo, based on a traditional balance of power.
This legitimizes both the U.S. military presence in the Gulf and Iran’s Islamist regime, nourished by the emergency situation. In addition, it secures the Gulf countries’ rule over their subjects. Another definition of regionalism is "a comprehensive effort at cooperation by states within a region. When it comes to the Gulf, such cooperative relations have been few, due to intra-GCC rivalry and lack of a unified threat perception (Saudi Arabia and Kuwait viewed Iraq as the primary foe, while the UAE viewed Iran as its foremost threat), the over-involvement of the United States, and the unofficial but practical bilateral deals between the United States and individual Gulf states.
As Gariup notes, "the motor of the GCC is interest-driven (rationality) rather than normative; material survival and wealth do trump ideological allegiances.This brings about disagreements regarding policies and territorial disputes between the GCC states, preventing them from adopting a unified strategy. The main characteristic of the general atmosphere in the region is lack of mutual trust. For example, the smaller GCC states harbor fears that they might be manipulated and controlled by the Saudis within the GCC framework. In addition, the GCC countries are suspicious of Washington’s current Iran strategy. For example, the defense umbrella that Washington plans to extend in the region is seen by the small GCC states, such as the UAE, as cold comfort, since in the case of an Iranian attack the emirates would "disappear in five seconds.
According to the GCC states, such a defense umbrella, rather than preventing a nuclear Iran, is threatening the stability of the Gulf countries. It will only further alienate Iran, as well as public opinion in their own states. "The absence of any Gulf Arab involvement in the negotiations aimed at stopping or at least slowing Iran’s nuclear progress"39 is another factor fostering feelings of mistrust towards the United States. The U.S. tendency to shift its attention from Iran and Iraq toward Afghanistan and Pakistan gives Iran supremacy over its Arab neighbors and enhances the GCC countries’ skepticism towards Washington.
Emil Hokayem’s words express the shifting priorities of the United States and the regional countries concerning Iran: "While Iran’s Arab neighbors cannot afford contentious relations with Iran, Washington thinks otherwise. The GCC countries’ attempts to rein in Iran’s ambitions are insufficient to normalize relations with Iran and prevent it from becoming a nuclear power. Thus, it seems that the current system based on an inclusion/exclusion scheme or the confrontation of brothers and cousins will shape future relations between the GCC and Iran as well as intra-GCC relations. This clearly indicates, in the words of Aarts, that the Gulf, like the Middle East, is "a region without regionalism.
WHITHER DEMONIZED IRAN? Under current circumstances, Iran will not stop being the external enemy in the Gulf region. Although Iran has emerged as a regional and potential global power after the invasion of Iraq and is situated to connect different subsystems in a sensitive geopolitical environment, it could not cope with the image deterioration that its assertive policies have produced. Iran has not aimed to follow an active foreign policy "marked by the simultaneous adoption of security-political and economic-developmental approaches toward surrounding regions.
On the contrary, Iranian activism in foreign policy has always been security-oriented so as to foster the feeling that Iran always poses a threat to its neighbors as well as the West. This policy also strengthens the status of U.S. leadership in the Gulf. From Washington’s perspective, Iran poses a threat to American interests not only on the regional level, but also on the global level. Accordingly, in Hillary Clinton’s words, "No significant global challenge can be met without the United States, and Americans are in a race between the forces of integration and the forces of disintegration. In a world like this, American leadership isn’t needed less; it’s actually needed more.
Because it is supposed that the Gulf Arab countries are always subject to a possible Iranian assault, Iran, being one of the forces of disintegration, plays an important role in enhancing and legitimizing America’s patronage relations and military presence in the Gulf as well as the Middle East. Although Iran has land and water borders with 15 countries and is situated at the heart of the world’s most important petroleum hub, it has not been able to build coalitions and advanced cooperation based on mutual trust with its neighbors or the Arab world. This is mainly due to its power politics and ideological government, which gives priority to supporting Muslims and liberation movements. This has generated confrontational relations with the centers of science and wealth creation in the West, impeding the country’s development.
Today, Iran’s nuclear program is perceived by the neighboring countries as well as the West as a threat to international security. Iran, which has been unable to earn credibility in the eyes of many, primarily the United States and its allies, is trying to rid itself of another wave of sanctions with the help of Brazil and Turkey. However, from Washington’s perspective, Iran’s primary objective is to delay the U.S.-led move towards further UN sanctions. What is more striking is the fact that tectonic changes are taking place in the international system. These were crystallized when Iran, Turkey and Brazil signed a joint declaration on May 17, 2010, to endorse a fuel swap whereby Iran would ship 1,200 kilograms of its low-enriched uranium to Turkey in exchange for the 20-percent uranium fuel needed for Tehran’s research reactor.45 With the involvement of Turkey, a regional power and a member of NATO, and Brazil, a major emerging world power and a member of the UN Security Council, Iran has moved its initiative beyond the Iranian nuclear sphere. This appears to be the first step toward the building of a transregional global front, an alternative to the West’s hegemony.
Turkey and Brazil have been outside the framework of Washington’s world-order consensus, promoting alternative visions of international affairs. Turkey’s refusal to perceive Iran as a global threat, on the grounds that it has the right to develop nuclear capabilities for peaceful purposes, has blunted the U.S. efforts to make Iran the "enemy." The major driving force behind this initiative is concerned with Ankara’s desire to make regionalism an important element in its foreign policy and to enhance cooperation with the countries of the region, principally Iran. There are many reasons Turkey has been pursuing good-neighborly relations with Iran. First of all, Iran is Turkey’s second-largest supplier of natural gas. Second, the people of Turkey and Iran share a broad cultural and historical relationship. Third, Iranian cooperation is key to preventing crises in the region and resolving the Iraq, Afghanistan and Israel-Palestine conflicts.
Finally, Turkey suffered in a very direct way from the U.S.-led sanctions on Iraq following the first Gulf War. The GCC countries also prefer to solve Tehran’s nuclear issue through dialogue and diplomacy, as any new sanctions against Iran will lead to more unrest in the region. The Arab Gulf countries, which have openly supported Turkey’s initiative,47 expect Iran to change its arrogant and threatening rhetoric48 and put an end to the idea that "the Gulf states’ loss is Iran’s gain." However, pursuing cordial relations with Iran, in the hope that this will prevent it from menacing them, is a strategy lacking in depth and ineffective in restoring stability. Given the wide range of Gulf Arab-Iranian interactions and the nature of the region’s sensitivity to political-security issues and international energy security, the Persian Gulf must be the center point of the pursuit of regionalism in the foreign policies of both Iran and the Gulf Arabs.
According to some analysts, there are many barriers to institutionalized, sustainable cooperative relations between Iran and the Gulf Arabs. Deep cultural, social and historical divides separate Iran and its Arab neighbors. However, the securitization of foreign relations, which legitimizes the right to handle bilateral issues through extraordinary means, has been pumping up "Iranophobia." This threatens to precipitate a nuclear arms race and, most important, limit the maneuvering capability of the GCC countries towards nonregional actors such as the United States. The paranoia-driven foreign policies of both Iran and the Gulf countries serve the continuation of the established order.
Thus, securitization rather than peace-seeking shapes the fate of the region, preventing more diversified and multi-directional relations and, most important of all, the adoption of a win-win approach to relations with neighboring countries. CONCLUSION Current U.S. policies toward Iran are based on existential competition rather than constraint, as in the case of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) during the Cold War.
After September 11, 2001, a new regional order was established in the Middle East in which "the states were confronted with a contradictory package of military intervention within the framework of the ‘war on terror,’ and external democratization programs."49 Most important of all, the war on terror triggered the intense militarization of U.S.-Arab relations, and this led to a growing opposition on the public level in the Middle East and had a deep negative impact on mutual perceptions. In this context, the war on terror together with U.S.-supported initiatives such as the Broader Middle East Project generated external and internal pressure on Arab regimes to reform, simultaneously with growing public criticism of Arab regimes’ foreign policies.
For example, the situation in Iraq widened the gap between pan-Arab rhetoric and action. In this atmosphere, Iran, with its anti-Western posture, gained a great deal of credibility in the eyes of the Arab population. For example, according to an unscientific poll on the Al-Jazeera website, 73 percent of respondents did not believe that Iran’s nuclear program constituted a threat to the neighboring countries.50 However, the excessive involvement of Iran in the political and security problems of the region, such as the Israeli-Palestinian issue and Iran’s alleged efforts to create a Shiite crescent after the invasion of Iraq, complicated bilateral relations with both the West and its Arab allies and prevented it from being a reliable actor and fostering closer ties with its Gulf Arab neighbors. As a matter of fact, this foreign-relations crisis has served to legitimize the undemocratic Islamist regime in Iran. In addition, Iran, representing an existential security threat to all GCC states with its nuclear program and its hegemonic tendencies, has legitimized the rule of the monarchical regimes in the Gulf. Intra-GCC rivalry and the demonization of Iran are the pillars of the current traditional balance-of-power system in the post-Iraq War period. However, the dynamics of the region have been changing very rapidly, and the birth of a new Iraq demands a revision of the current political-security architecture. A system based on exclusion/inclusion in the Persian Gulf causes the GCC countries, especially the small ones, to be more inactive in their foreign policies, which puts them at the mercy of big players in the region.
In sum, it is to the benefit of Iran as well as the GCC countries to build interdependent relations on many levels — economic, cultural and political — so as to create a sense of we-ness. In order to be able to turn a balance of power into a balance of interests, the regional players should work toward transforming their domestic policies and balancing their regional policies with globalism, so that they can remain close to the West, a requirement of a pragmatic foreign policy.
Presenter
Karl
Please consider this bit dated report as an Addendium to the Presentation of J.J. title: Blaim Game.
I have in self, cleaned it up for viewable presentation as an example of clarification of the past and present situation in the Gulf region in understandable terms. Although the report is through the eyes of Turkish Perspective as titled, and not through the American View point, but corresponds quite close to the German view.
Rather this presents an issue, is to the viewer to decide. It is exact though and presents the here and now what is evident and valid.
East Policy Council:
The Gulf States and Iran: A Turkish Perspective
Özden Zeynep Oktav
Summer 2011, Volume XVIII, Number 2
After the U.S. military involvement in Iraq, the traditional balance of power consisting of Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia was destroyed, producing a power vacuum in the Persian Gulf. A new triangle comprising the United States, Iran and Saudi Arabia has both enabled Iran to create a sphere of influence that instrumentalizes the Iraqi Shiites and made the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries vulnerable.
Since 2003, the longstanding structural tensions in the Persian Gulf have become more evident, increasing the divergent interests of Iran and the GCC countries. This article will focus on the reasons Iran has been increasingly perceived as a threat by the Gulf states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), with a special emphasis on the course of relations during the 1990s. In addition, to what extent can regionalism be applied in the Gulf region? This will be discussed by taking into consideration factors such as identity, definition of security challenges, and dependency on outside support. Three points will be stressed. First, it is not possible to ensure stability and peace in the region if Iran is totally excluded and identities are formulated on the basis of inclusion.
Second, Tehran’s rejection of any partnership with Washington and its assertive revisionist policies serve to promote the status quo, which makes the GCC states more dependent on the United States. Finally, because human security, grass-roots relations, and nations’ political demands and expectations are gaining importance, security challenges are no longer defined in terms of hard interstate rivalries. Therefore, the alarm bells regarding Iran’s influence over the Shiite population in the region so as to enhance the importance of grass-roots relations might have been a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy in the formation of that Shiite crescent.
A BRIEF HISTORY When the British withdrew their forces from the Gulf region in the late 1960s, Washington became alarmed at the probability of a strategic and economic power vacuum. This prompted the United States to look for suitable regional partners with which to cooperate. Thus, Iran and Saudi Arabia emerged as conservative, pro-Western countries to assume regional leadership under the Nixon doctrine during the 1970s and contain Iraq’s ambitions. However, the regime change realized by Islamic revolutionaries in Iran devastated the status quo that favored American interests.
The vulnerability of the regional order was best portrayed by the volatile relations between Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iraq throughout the Cold War period and the 1990s. For example, Saudi fears of Iraq’s pan-Arab aspirations were overshadowed by Iran’s foreign-policy credo of exporting revolution. Therefore, Saudi Arabia supported Iraq during the eight-year Iran-Iraq War. Because a war-weakened Iran was not a threat to Riyadh, the two countries restored diplomatic relations during the Kuwait crisis, since "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." During the Rafsanjani period, Tehran made tremendous efforts to keep the United States out of any regional security agreements in order to realize Gulfization and reduce the Gulf Arab countries’ dependency on foreigners, the United States in particular.
However, non-Arab Iran never ceased to be an outsider in the eyes of the Gulf Arab countries, partly because Washington gave them the message that, in the absence of Saddam Hussein, Iran was the greatest threat to the sheikhdoms. Another important reason was that "Riyadh still looked upon Tehran with suspicion both as an ideological competitor in the Muslim world and as a major regional power, due to the asymmetry between the Gulf Arab countries’ national power and that of Iran, in terms of demography, industrial capacity and military strength.
A third reason concerns the lack of mutual trust. Both Iran and Iraq appeared at different times as promoters of unrest in the Gulf Arab countries. For example, from 1978 through 1980, the revolutionary Iranian regime created a wave of unrest, concentrated mostly in the Shiite communities of Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Similarly, after the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq was another immediate military threat, moving troops up to the border of the oil-rich Eastern province of Saudi Arabia. In addition, Iraq posed both an ideological and domestic threat, since Saddam openly called for citizens in Saudi Arabia to revolt against their government.
Thus, after the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Arab Gulf countries were relieved to have the long-lasting threat of the Iraqi nationalist Baath regime removed. However, the traditional balance of power was replaced by one consisting of only Saudi Arabia and Iran, joined by the United States.
The remaining two regional actors would benefit now at the expense of Iraq, but the creation of a power vacuum in the system made both countries more vulnerable and created new security challenges in the region, such as the identity issue. IDENTITY From the GCC countries’ perspective, Iran was handed Iraq on a golden platter by the United States, enabling the Islamic Republic to aggressively pursue its claim to regional leadership and reinforce sectarian identity in Iraq. The end of Sunni domination there has brought Iraqi (Arab) and Iranian (Persian) Shiites closer, fostering sectarian identity in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and eroding nationalism.
Therefore, the growing power of Iraq’s Shiite majority, which might affect the delicate sectarian balance within the GCC, has become a major bone of contention between the Gulf countries and Iran and has made the gap between the political-security elites and the Shiite citizens of the Gulf countries more visible than ever. The ousting of Saddam Hussein led to the emergence of the Shiites, who are more conscious of their potential power and role in the region. Currently, the world Shiite population is estimated at 160-200 million.
The estimate for the Arab Shiite population is around 14 million in the Persian Gulf littoral states. Around 50 percent of the area’s oil reserves are located in the Shiite regions. Taking these factors into account, the role of Shiite identity in Middle East developments will become much more significant in the future. The 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war in Lebanon and Israel’s assault on Gaza in 2008 are keys to understanding the general fear of the ruling elites in Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf Arab countries, mainly Saudi Arabia, concerning the growing power of a Shiite revolutionary force craving change.6 From the perspective of Arab rulers, the danger emanating from this change was a potential encirclement by a domestic population whose ultimate aim is to take control of their own destiny.
In this context, Hezbollah, Hamas and Iran’s connection with those organizations are the forces driving Shiite communities to challenge the status quo by calling for the overthrow of U.S.-supported rulers. Put differently, Iran reveals the divergent interests of the ruling cadres and the masses. For example, although Saudi Arabia has managed to maintain an image of defending the rights of the Palestinians, its blaming of Hezbollah for irresponsible adventurism during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war in Lebanon damaged Saudi prestige and credibility. In addition, it created the impression that Riyadh sided with Washington and Tel Aviv in order to eliminate sources of instability. This put the Saudi kingdom under heavy pressure from negative public opinion.
The Saudi leaders sometimes distanced themselves from the United States by talking tough against Washington or cooperating with Tehran to ease, for example, the tension in Lebanon between the Hezbollah-led opposition and the Siniora government and the Saad Hariri camp.9 Tehran, aware of the rift between pro-American Arab Gulf rulers and their deeply anti-American populations, did not want to give the impression that expansionist designs on the basis of Shiism was a priority in Iranian foreign policy. On the contrary, Tehran has generally pursued an explicitly nonsectarian public diplomacy toward Arab audiences. Similarly in Iraq, according to Barzegar, Tehran has attempted to build balanced relations with all Shiite factions. For the most part, "Relations with the Shiite factions such as the Sadrists are primarily tactical and short term, mainly aiming to undermine the unilateral U.S. policy of excluding Iran from the domain of Iraqi politics.
Put differently, Tehran, in order to avoid giving a Shiite coloring to its anti-American policies, sought both to gain popularity with Arab audiences, including Shiites, and to alleviate Gulf rulers’ uneasiness about its rising popularity among Arabs. However, because the current political-security system in the region is based on the view that "Iranians’ loss is Arabs’ gain," Iran, with its nuclear program and anti-American rhetoric, has not been able to cope with the deterioration of its image.
It continues to be seen by many as the main threat to Gulf security. In addition, Obama’s engagement policy towards Iran, which could lead to a "grand bargain," increased the GCC countries’ sense of vulnerability vis-à-vis Iran and led them to redefine the security challenges in the region. REDEFINITION OF SECURITY CHALLENGES Since the 1990s, the Arab Gulf states and Iran have been sporadically discussing security arrangements to ensure the stability of the region. However, factors such as the lack of unified leadership in the GCC, the scarcity of its political options, and the power asymmetry between Iran and the Arab Gulf states have hindered the restoration of stability.
From Tehran’s perspective, the military presence of the United States is the key destabilizing factor; therefore, the removal of American influence is Iran’s sole strategic objective in the Persian Gulf. On the other hand, the Gulf states’ situation has been even more difficult. They have been increasingly uneasy about American intentions, especially since Obama has come to power. The U.S. president’s engagement policy with the Islamic Republic made the Gulf countries more vulnerable, pushing them to diversify their security relations.11 Put differently, the Obama administration’s lighter footprint in the region strengthened the belief that "the United States could acquiesce to Iranian domination of the Gulf if Tehran were to put an end to its uranium enrichment program and renounce its ambition to develop nuclear weapons.
Moreover, President Ahmadinejad’s reelection in 2009 showed that the engagement policy did not quell the Islamic Republic’s revolutionary zeal to "change the current circumstances in the world.
This exacerbated the GCC countries’ security concerns and led to an increase in their military spending. Although a strong military collaboration was reinstated between the GCC and the United States after 2003, the GCC states are still vulnerable due to their lack of military experience, modest populations and limited geographic size. In addition, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, none has strategic depth.
Iran’s army has a total manpower of more than 540,000, compared to a combined GCC total of 176,500.14 Most important, "There isn’t a GCC military alliance akin to NATO."15 The GCC countries have always been very cautious about military confrontation with Iran and reluctant to counter Iran’s nuclear program by military means. The Gulf countries fear the chaos of a U.S. strike more than the effects of Iran’s nuclear acquisition, and they want Washington to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons rather than confronting them militarily. Military force would prompt Iran to activate its networks and assets in Iraq, fueling an already highly volatile situation. In addition, the GCC countries would not be able to continue their tacit cooperation with Iran, a crucial part of the policy of diversification, to protect their interests but not challenge the United States. The GCC countries would be "hard-pressed to choose a side.
Third, Iran has the ability to block the Strait of Hormuz and cut the Gulf’s oil traffic in half, a disaster for the region as well as the West. Commercial interests also pressure both sides to be cautious about military confrontation. Most of Iran’s foreign-currency earnings derive from the export of energy through the Persian Gulf. The region is also Iran’s main route of international trade and communication and the starting point for Iran’s international relations.17 It is also noteworthy that the Saudi petrochemical industry has an ever-increasing need for natural gas, and Iran holds the world’s second-largest reserves.18 In addition, the instability from any military confrontation would hinder the flow of foreign direct investment to the Gulf countries, primarily Saudi Arabia. For example, between 2004 and 2006, Saudi inward foreign direct investments, as a percentage of gross fixed capital, rose from 4.5 percent to 32.1 percent; in Iran, it rose from 0.7 to 1.9 percent. The average in the developing world in 2006 was 13.8 percent.
Despite the existence of so many reasons for both sides to avoid military confrontation and build interdependent relations, they have not been able to reinstate mutual trust, mostly due to two factors: the U.S. policy of containing Iran and Iran’s insistence on being a nuclear power. These two factors drive the Gulf governments to continue relying on outsiders to ensure a rough balance of power that will protect their sovereignty, domestic identity and regime security. The GCC states’ increasing military dependence on the United States both exacerbates Iranian threat perceptions and limits the Gulf states’ room to maneuver vis-à-vis Iran since the U.S. military presence produces an anti-Iranian alliance that prevents normalization of relations.
Moreover, the U.S. military presence in the region, including its naval facilities in Bahrain, air-force installations in Qatar, and ground troops in Kuwait, not only promotes Arab Gulf passivity in defense and strategic thinking but also prevents the Gulf countries from "harnessing and refining their ‘soft power’ tools to counter any Iranian attempt to hurt their Islamic legitimacy and shore up their counterterrorism capabilities.
Thus, the rough balance of power based on confrontation between Iran and the United States basically hinders the Gulf countries’ transition from controlled states to more open societies. Currently, there are two parallel developments in the region: "top-down state building" and "bottom-up globalization.
The U.S. plan to develop a new security architecture and to continue its role as "external balancer" in the region ignores those two parallel developments and, therefore, not only fails to solve the primary interstate issues, but also complicates the existing ones. Abu Musa Island offers a pointed example. It emerged as a disputed area after the withdrawal of British colonial power.
For Iran, the territorial separation is an accident of a British intervention that was by nature illegitimate, as it involved an outside power. For the Arab Gulf states, external powers are default local powers. According to Michael Kraig, "The dispute is not just a legal argument, but an existential issue involving the security of the Arab and Persian sides of the Gulf.
In a nutshell, since the Cold War, the national-security environment in the Gulf has become increasingly internationalized. This has made external influence, namely that of the United States, extremely important in setting the regional-security agenda. However, it is evident that the balance of power set by Washington in the post-Iraq War period has failed to cope with new security threats, such as ethnic rivalries, Sunni extremism, religious and civil war and the probability of territorial disintegration.
IS REGIONALISM FUTILE? According to many analysts, one of the main factors hindering the transformation of the GCC into a security community is the fact that Gulf security is not only a subregional concern, but closely linked with systemic changes. Therefore, "the strategic interests of the United States in the region are directly related to the maintenance of its global hegemony.
This indicates that Gulf security is a subregional complex constructed around the position of the United States. Throughout history, different types of security regimes set up by hegemonic powers have characterized the international relations of the region. Pax Britannica lasted from 1918 to 1971, when the British forces withdrew. It was replaced by Pax Saudi-Iranica, a product of the Nixon strategy of using proxy powers to maintain U.S. influence. It lasted until the Islamic revolution of 1979, which spawned Pax Americana.
The major driving force behind it is the demonization of Iran and the transformation of Iraq into a potential model of democracy. The question is whether there can be a solution to the security dilemma in the Gulf, where, in John Mearsheimer’s words, "uncertaintity is always certain but it is not unresolvable if one responds to it offensively."26 Starting from the point that "fear on the state level in the region is the only motive driving intentions, it can be said that regionalism to create a sense of "we-ness" can be an offensive response to the problem of uncertainty and fear. However, the "Middle East presents an anti-case for the analysis of regionalism.
According to Hadley Bull and the English School, a society of states "exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another and share in the working of common institutions.
Deutsch claims that cognitive regionalism, or a sense of we-ness, and a shared regional identity are products of social learning.30 When analyzing the main motives behind the institutionalization of GCC relations, it is easily seen that identity or a sense of we-ness is not a prerequisite for cooperation. On the contrary, "normative elements of a supposed Arab or Arabian identity and culture represent obstacles to, rather than facilitators towards, the transformation of the GCC into a security community.
The main reason is that alliances and allegiances are shaped on the definition of the "other" as stated in an old Arabic proverb, "I and my brothers against my cousin; I and my cousins against the stranger."32 As Coskun notes, "The concept of the "other," such as demonized Iran, has negatively affected regionalism and in many cases blocked cooperation efforts." Regionalism generally refers to "a policy and project whereby states and non-state actors cooperate and coordinate strategy within a given region.
However, in conflict-ridden regions such as the Middle East, where regional-security regimes have remained limited and relations are constructed through the securitization of the "other," states rather than nonstate actors define their interests in terms of relative rather than absolute gains. Therefore, Alexander Wendt argues that, in the absence of positive identification, interests will be defined regardless of the other. Security interdependence between the self and the other will boil down to "enmity. In this context, an anti-Iranian security order in the Gulf has a twofold effect. It creates the "other" so as to foster securitization policies, and it enables "a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat.Thus, Iran with its anti-Israeli, anti-American rhetoric and nuclear efforts serves to continue the status quo, based on a traditional balance of power.
This legitimizes both the U.S. military presence in the Gulf and Iran’s Islamist regime, nourished by the emergency situation. In addition, it secures the Gulf countries’ rule over their subjects. Another definition of regionalism is "a comprehensive effort at cooperation by states within a region. When it comes to the Gulf, such cooperative relations have been few, due to intra-GCC rivalry and lack of a unified threat perception (Saudi Arabia and Kuwait viewed Iraq as the primary foe, while the UAE viewed Iran as its foremost threat), the over-involvement of the United States, and the unofficial but practical bilateral deals between the United States and individual Gulf states.
As Gariup notes, "the motor of the GCC is interest-driven (rationality) rather than normative; material survival and wealth do trump ideological allegiances.This brings about disagreements regarding policies and territorial disputes between the GCC states, preventing them from adopting a unified strategy. The main characteristic of the general atmosphere in the region is lack of mutual trust. For example, the smaller GCC states harbor fears that they might be manipulated and controlled by the Saudis within the GCC framework. In addition, the GCC countries are suspicious of Washington’s current Iran strategy. For example, the defense umbrella that Washington plans to extend in the region is seen by the small GCC states, such as the UAE, as cold comfort, since in the case of an Iranian attack the emirates would "disappear in five seconds.
According to the GCC states, such a defense umbrella, rather than preventing a nuclear Iran, is threatening the stability of the Gulf countries. It will only further alienate Iran, as well as public opinion in their own states. "The absence of any Gulf Arab involvement in the negotiations aimed at stopping or at least slowing Iran’s nuclear progress"39 is another factor fostering feelings of mistrust towards the United States. The U.S. tendency to shift its attention from Iran and Iraq toward Afghanistan and Pakistan gives Iran supremacy over its Arab neighbors and enhances the GCC countries’ skepticism towards Washington.
Emil Hokayem’s words express the shifting priorities of the United States and the regional countries concerning Iran: "While Iran’s Arab neighbors cannot afford contentious relations with Iran, Washington thinks otherwise. The GCC countries’ attempts to rein in Iran’s ambitions are insufficient to normalize relations with Iran and prevent it from becoming a nuclear power. Thus, it seems that the current system based on an inclusion/exclusion scheme or the confrontation of brothers and cousins will shape future relations between the GCC and Iran as well as intra-GCC relations. This clearly indicates, in the words of Aarts, that the Gulf, like the Middle East, is "a region without regionalism.
WHITHER DEMONIZED IRAN? Under current circumstances, Iran will not stop being the external enemy in the Gulf region. Although Iran has emerged as a regional and potential global power after the invasion of Iraq and is situated to connect different subsystems in a sensitive geopolitical environment, it could not cope with the image deterioration that its assertive policies have produced. Iran has not aimed to follow an active foreign policy "marked by the simultaneous adoption of security-political and economic-developmental approaches toward surrounding regions.
On the contrary, Iranian activism in foreign policy has always been security-oriented so as to foster the feeling that Iran always poses a threat to its neighbors as well as the West. This policy also strengthens the status of U.S. leadership in the Gulf. From Washington’s perspective, Iran poses a threat to American interests not only on the regional level, but also on the global level. Accordingly, in Hillary Clinton’s words, "No significant global challenge can be met without the United States, and Americans are in a race between the forces of integration and the forces of disintegration. In a world like this, American leadership isn’t needed less; it’s actually needed more.
Because it is supposed that the Gulf Arab countries are always subject to a possible Iranian assault, Iran, being one of the forces of disintegration, plays an important role in enhancing and legitimizing America’s patronage relations and military presence in the Gulf as well as the Middle East. Although Iran has land and water borders with 15 countries and is situated at the heart of the world’s most important petroleum hub, it has not been able to build coalitions and advanced cooperation based on mutual trust with its neighbors or the Arab world. This is mainly due to its power politics and ideological government, which gives priority to supporting Muslims and liberation movements. This has generated confrontational relations with the centers of science and wealth creation in the West, impeding the country’s development.
Today, Iran’s nuclear program is perceived by the neighboring countries as well as the West as a threat to international security. Iran, which has been unable to earn credibility in the eyes of many, primarily the United States and its allies, is trying to rid itself of another wave of sanctions with the help of Brazil and Turkey. However, from Washington’s perspective, Iran’s primary objective is to delay the U.S.-led move towards further UN sanctions. What is more striking is the fact that tectonic changes are taking place in the international system. These were crystallized when Iran, Turkey and Brazil signed a joint declaration on May 17, 2010, to endorse a fuel swap whereby Iran would ship 1,200 kilograms of its low-enriched uranium to Turkey in exchange for the 20-percent uranium fuel needed for Tehran’s research reactor.45 With the involvement of Turkey, a regional power and a member of NATO, and Brazil, a major emerging world power and a member of the UN Security Council, Iran has moved its initiative beyond the Iranian nuclear sphere. This appears to be the first step toward the building of a transregional global front, an alternative to the West’s hegemony.
Turkey and Brazil have been outside the framework of Washington’s world-order consensus, promoting alternative visions of international affairs. Turkey’s refusal to perceive Iran as a global threat, on the grounds that it has the right to develop nuclear capabilities for peaceful purposes, has blunted the U.S. efforts to make Iran the "enemy." The major driving force behind this initiative is concerned with Ankara’s desire to make regionalism an important element in its foreign policy and to enhance cooperation with the countries of the region, principally Iran. There are many reasons Turkey has been pursuing good-neighborly relations with Iran. First of all, Iran is Turkey’s second-largest supplier of natural gas. Second, the people of Turkey and Iran share a broad cultural and historical relationship. Third, Iranian cooperation is key to preventing crises in the region and resolving the Iraq, Afghanistan and Israel-Palestine conflicts.
Finally, Turkey suffered in a very direct way from the U.S.-led sanctions on Iraq following the first Gulf War. The GCC countries also prefer to solve Tehran’s nuclear issue through dialogue and diplomacy, as any new sanctions against Iran will lead to more unrest in the region. The Arab Gulf countries, which have openly supported Turkey’s initiative,47 expect Iran to change its arrogant and threatening rhetoric48 and put an end to the idea that "the Gulf states’ loss is Iran’s gain." However, pursuing cordial relations with Iran, in the hope that this will prevent it from menacing them, is a strategy lacking in depth and ineffective in restoring stability. Given the wide range of Gulf Arab-Iranian interactions and the nature of the region’s sensitivity to political-security issues and international energy security, the Persian Gulf must be the center point of the pursuit of regionalism in the foreign policies of both Iran and the Gulf Arabs.
According to some analysts, there are many barriers to institutionalized, sustainable cooperative relations between Iran and the Gulf Arabs. Deep cultural, social and historical divides separate Iran and its Arab neighbors. However, the securitization of foreign relations, which legitimizes the right to handle bilateral issues through extraordinary means, has been pumping up "Iranophobia." This threatens to precipitate a nuclear arms race and, most important, limit the maneuvering capability of the GCC countries towards nonregional actors such as the United States. The paranoia-driven foreign policies of both Iran and the Gulf countries serve the continuation of the established order.
Thus, securitization rather than peace-seeking shapes the fate of the region, preventing more diversified and multi-directional relations and, most important of all, the adoption of a win-win approach to relations with neighboring countries. CONCLUSION Current U.S. policies toward Iran are based on existential competition rather than constraint, as in the case of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) during the Cold War.
After September 11, 2001, a new regional order was established in the Middle East in which "the states were confronted with a contradictory package of military intervention within the framework of the ‘war on terror,’ and external democratization programs."49 Most important of all, the war on terror triggered the intense militarization of U.S.-Arab relations, and this led to a growing opposition on the public level in the Middle East and had a deep negative impact on mutual perceptions. In this context, the war on terror together with U.S.-supported initiatives such as the Broader Middle East Project generated external and internal pressure on Arab regimes to reform, simultaneously with growing public criticism of Arab regimes’ foreign policies.
For example, the situation in Iraq widened the gap between pan-Arab rhetoric and action. In this atmosphere, Iran, with its anti-Western posture, gained a great deal of credibility in the eyes of the Arab population. For example, according to an unscientific poll on the Al-Jazeera website, 73 percent of respondents did not believe that Iran’s nuclear program constituted a threat to the neighboring countries.50 However, the excessive involvement of Iran in the political and security problems of the region, such as the Israeli-Palestinian issue and Iran’s alleged efforts to create a Shiite crescent after the invasion of Iraq, complicated bilateral relations with both the West and its Arab allies and prevented it from being a reliable actor and fostering closer ties with its Gulf Arab neighbors. As a matter of fact, this foreign-relations crisis has served to legitimize the undemocratic Islamist regime in Iran. In addition, Iran, representing an existential security threat to all GCC states with its nuclear program and its hegemonic tendencies, has legitimized the rule of the monarchical regimes in the Gulf. Intra-GCC rivalry and the demonization of Iran are the pillars of the current traditional balance-of-power system in the post-Iraq War period. However, the dynamics of the region have been changing very rapidly, and the birth of a new Iraq demands a revision of the current political-security architecture. A system based on exclusion/inclusion in the Persian Gulf causes the GCC countries, especially the small ones, to be more inactive in their foreign policies, which puts them at the mercy of big players in the region.
In sum, it is to the benefit of Iran as well as the GCC countries to build interdependent relations on many levels — economic, cultural and political — so as to create a sense of we-ness. In order to be able to turn a balance of power into a balance of interests, the regional players should work toward transforming their domestic policies and balancing their regional policies with globalism, so that they can remain close to the West, a requirement of a pragmatic foreign policy.
Presenter
Karl
