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Post by tuftabis on Oct 28, 2009 13:46:46 GMT -7
Today in my favourite radio station (of Poland) the evening interview was with one of the leaders of Provo movement, Roel van Duyn. It was a very interesting experience, and told a lot about the backhground of todays Dutch culute, especially to learn how strict and conservatice Dutch society was just some 40 years ago. But the range of subjects were much wider of course and embarced generally Holland's new culture, mixed mentality etc. I would welcome any comments about Provo from any of you and Pieter of course.
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Post by pieter on Oct 28, 2009 17:54:49 GMT -7
Tufta, To talk about the Dutch culture, political system and history is a difficult one, due to the Dutch heritage of Pillarisation. This pillarisation (called "verzuiling" in Dutch) marked the Netherlands for almost two centuries. The pillarisation goes farther than the segregation of the Netherlands in two mayor religious groups, because in a way the Protestants among themselves were pillarisated too. You had the main Dutch Reformed church ( a calvinist church), which was conservative ofcourse, but you also had the offspring of that after the great schisma of 1834, when very strict calvinists of that main church seperated themselves of the Dutch reformed church (de Hervormde Kerk) and started their own branches of Reformed churches (called Gereformeerde kerken). From the later the dominant Dutch reformed (Gereformeerde) political movement of the Anti-revolutionairy party, ARP, started (until today a very dominant element in the Christian-democratic party). ( en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti_Revolutionary_Partyen.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abraham_Kuyper ) The ARP was directed against the ideas of the french revolution, which they considered as secular and non-christian (in fact anti-bible). In the same time the confessional party was directed against the powerful Social democratic party, SDAP, and it's Union, NVV, it's media VARA (=Association of Workers Radio Amateurs), Het Vrije Volk (The Free People), and all the socialist organisations of the socialist pillar. Confusing is that amongst the founders of the Social democratic party were, what they called red protestant ministers. ( pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ferdinand_Domela_Nieuwenhuisen.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ferdinand_Domela_Nieuwenhuis ) (some say Dutch social-democracy has a calvinist trademark). The ARP had also it's protestant workersmovement, it's calvinist Dutch reformed newspaper and calvinist Peoples University in Amsterdam (the VU), which was financed witht he money of Protestant (Calvinist) workers. The other competitors of the ARP were the large Catholic party KVP (Catholic Peoples Party; Katholieke Volks Partij), which was very dominant in the Catholic South and the Catholic enclaves in the North. You had the Catholic workers movement, KAB, and the Dutch Catholic Union, NKV, the then Catholic newspaper (Volkskrant; Peoples newspaper; today liberal centre-left, but really left in the seventees and eightees, which was a real Roman Catholic, Vatican oriented paper before that), and the Catholic Radio and Television corporation, KRO, (Katholieke Radio Omroep, Catholic Radio Broadcasting), the then very powerful Catholic church, the seperate Catholic school system, Catholic universities and the Catholic magazine, De Tijd (The Time). The Dutch Catholic church, the KVP, the KRO and all the Catholic organisations and media were very conservative in the twentees, thirtees, fourtees, fiftees and early sixtees. ( en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catholic_People%27s_Party ) The fourth power was the power of the liberal-conservative movement, or European stile liberal Dutch branch. The centre right Dutch liberals who got support of the highclass, middle class and some moderate farmers also had it's party the VVD, newspaper, NRC Handelsblad, broadcasting corporation, AVRO and magazine, Elsevier. The four pillars were very strong and many people lived their entire lives in the pillar of their birth and their desteny. Ofcourse socialists and liberals were former Calvinists and Catholics too. And some people were both liberal or socialist and Protestant or Catholic (or jew). The three religious parties ARP, CHU (moderate protestant) and the KVP were dominant during a long time in the 20th century, they merged in 1980 in the large Chrisitan-democratic party, the CDA. The Communists of the CPN, and small left (PSP, Pascifist Socialist Party, PPR, Political Party of Radicals - offspring of the ARP and KVP, and the progressive Protestant Evangelica Peoples Party EVP) were not that dominant or succesful. In the sixtees the youth of Amsterdam, students, some intellectuals, and a few artists wanted change, because the conservative climate of the pillarisation society they lived in was suffocating to them. They started provoking the police and fellow citizens with very silly or funny happenings and annoying the police, who did not know how to react to this strange behavior. The Provo movement can not be compared witht he later Student revolution and riots in Berlin and Paris in 1968 which were on a much larger scale, more violent and more political. The Dutch Provo's were innocent compared with that. The sixtees were a time of global change, protest movements, new cultural and musical developments, new philosophies, new ideas (New Left for instance), and anti-establishment movements.
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Post by pieter on Oct 28, 2009 17:57:05 GMT -7
In the sixtees the Dutch system of Pillarisation started tumbling down, because people stepped out of their pillar. Secularisation started, the emancipation of minorities, women and the working class.
Provo (movement)
Robert J. Grootveld
Provo was a Dutch counterculture movement in the mid-1960s that focused on provoking violent responses from authorities using non-violent bait. It was preceded by the nozem movement and followed by the hippie movement. Unlike these two movements, Provo was actually founded, on May 25, 1965, by Robert Jasper Grootveld, an anti-smoking activist, and Roel van Duyn and Rob Stolk, both anarchists. Provo was officially disbanded on May 13, 1967.
Beginnings
The Provos are thought to have evolved out of the artist Robert Jasper Grootveld's anti-smoking happenings in June 1964. The following year other groups appeared as a fusion of small groups of youths around the pacifist Ban-the-bomb movement. Roel van Duyn is thought to have been the group's theorist, influenced by anarchism, Dadaism, Herbert Marcuse, and the Marquis de Sade.
The Provos borrowed their name from Wouter Buikhuisen, who, in a 1965 doctoral dissertation, talked about “young trouble-makers” as ‘provos’.
Bernhard de Vries states that the Provos comprised four groups of people:
* "The happeners": those managing happenings in Amsterdam and Antwerp, combining non-violence with absurd humour to provoking the police. The police were regarded as “essential non-creative elements for a successful happening” and “co-happeners”. * "The beatniks and hipsters". * "The thinkers": those publishing Provo ideas in magazines and pamphlets, including Provo, Revo, Eindelijk and UvA student weekly Propria Cures. * "The activists" or the “street Provos” who engaged in direct action with the intent to influence public opinion.
Harry Mulisch's book, Bericht aan de rattenkoning (Message to the Rat King, 1966), reflects upon the riots following the Telegraaf’s coverage on a worker’s death in a protest:
"While their parents, seated on refrigerators and washing machines, watched TV with their left eyes, and their cars with their right eyes, a mixer in one hand and the Telegraaf in the other, the kids left Saturday evening for the Spui square."
Magazine
12 July 1965 the first Provo magazine was published. It contained the “Provo manifesto”, written by Roel van Duyn, and reprinted recipes for bombs from a nineteenth-century anarchist pamphlet. The magazine was eventually confiscated.
In Provo#12 the magazine was described as:
“a monthly sheet for anarchists, provos, beatniks, pleiners, scissors-grinders, jailbirds, simple simon stylites, magicians, pacifists, potato-chip chaps, charlatans, philosophers, germ-carriers, grand masters of the queen’s horse, happeners, vegetarians, syndicalists, santy clauses, kindergarten teachers, agitators, pyromaniacs, assistant assistants, scratchers and syphilitics, secret police, and other riff-raff. Provo has something against capitalism, communism, fascism, bureaucracy, militarism, professionalism, dogmatism, and authoritarianism. Provo has to choose between desperate, resistance and submissive extinction. Provo calls for resistance wherever possible. Provo realises that it will lose in the end, but it cannot pass up the chance to make at least one more heartfelt attempt to provoke society. Provo regards anarchy as the inspirational source of resistance. Provo wants to revive anarchy and teach it to the young. Provo is an image.”
Actions and Ideas
The Provos gained world prominence through its protests at the royal wedding of Princess Beatrix of the Netherlands and Claus von Amsberg. The Dutch Royal Family was unpopular at the time, and Claus von Amsberg was thought to be unacceptable to many Dutch people because of his Hitlerjugend membership during World War II. The engagement was announced in June, and in July the Provos threw anti-monarchist pamphlets from a bridge into the royal boat.
In the run-up to the wedding Provo made up a fake speech, in which Queen Juliana declared she'd become anarchist and was negotiating a transition of power with Provo. The White Rumour Plan was put into action, as part of which wild rumours were spread in Amsterdam, including that the Provos were preparing to dump LSD in the city water supply. These rumours led the authorities to request 25,000 troops to help guard the parade route.
Dressed as ordinary citizens, the Provos managed to sneak sugar and nitrate smoke bombs past the police. The first bombs went off just behind the palace as the procession started. Unable to identify the Provos, the police overreacted and the wedding turned into a public relations disaster. In the week after the wedding, the police attacked and beat patrons of a photo exhibition documenting police violence at the royal wedding. Following these events a number of well-known writers and intellectuals started requesting an independent investigation into police behaviour.
Provoking the Police
The Provos thought to provoke the police in non-violent ways, aiming to shatter the self-righteousness of the authorities. Led by Grootveld, the Provos began a misinformation campaign to demonstrate the establishment's complete ignorance on the subject of cannabis. The Provos set out to get busted for "consuming" tea, hay or herbs instead of marijuana. The Provos would often call the police on themselves.
"One day a whole group of us went by bus to Belgium," says Grootveld. "Of course I had informed my friend Houweling [police officer] that some elements might take some pot along. At the border, the cops and customs were waiting for us. Followed by the press, we were taken away for a thorough search. The poor cops . . . all they could find was dogfood and some legal herbs. 'Marijuana is dogfood,' joked the papers the next day. After that, the cops decided to refrain from hassling us in the future, afraid of more blunders."
Grootveld and the artist Fred Wessels also opened the "Afrikaanse Druk Stoor," where they sold both real and fake marijuana.
* The White Plans: The political wing of the Provos won a seat on the city council of Amsterdam, and developed the "White Plans". The most famous of those is the "White Bicycle Plan", which aimed to improve Amsterdam's transport problem. Generally the plans thought to address social problems and make Amsterdam more liveable. * White bicycle plan: Initiated by Luud Schimmelpenninck, the white bicycle plan proposed the closing of central Amsterdam to all motorised traffic, including motorbikes, with the intent to improve public transport frequency by more than 40% and to save two millions guilders per year. Taxis were accepted as semi-public transport, but would have to be electrically powered and have a maximum speed of 25 m.p.h. The Provos planned for the municipality to buy 20,000 white bikes per year, which were to be public property and free for everybody to use. After the plans were rejected by the city authorities, the Provos decided to go ahead anyway. They painted 50 bikes white and left them on streets for public use. The police impounded the bikes, as they violated municipal law forbidding citizens to leave bikes without locking them. After the bikes had been returned to the Provos, they equipped them all with combination locks and painted the combinations on the bicycles. * White Chimney Plan: Proposed that air polluters be taxed and the chimneys of serious polluters painted white. * White Wives Plan: Proposed a network of clinics offering advice and contraceptives, mainly for the benefit of women and girls, and with the intention to reduce unwanted pregnancies. The plan was for girls of sixteen to be invited to visit the clinic, and advocated for schools to teach sex education. The White Wives Plan also argued that it is irresponsible to enter marriage as a virgin. * White Chicken Plan: Proposal for the reorganization of the Amsterdam police (called "kip" in Dutch slang, meaning "chicken"). Under the plan, the police would be disarmed and placed under the jurisdiction of the municipal council rather than the burgemeester (mayor). Municipalities would then be able to democratically elect their own chief of police. The Provos intended for this revised structure to transform the police from guard to social worker. * White Housing Plan: The plan sought to address Amsterdam's acute housing problem by banning speculation in house building, and the squatting of empty buildings. The plan envisioned Waterlooplein as an open-air market and advocated abandoning plans for a new town hall. * White Kids Plan: The plan proposed shared parenting in groups of five couples. Parents would take turns to care for the group's children on a different day of the week. * White Victim Plan: The Plan proposed that anyone having caused death while driving would have to build a warning memorial – memento mori – on the site of the traffic collision by carving the victim's outline one inch deep into the pavement and filling it with white mortar.
The End
Tensions with the police peaked in June 1966, when the construction worker Jan Weggelaar was killed during demonstrations. De Telegraaf reported that he had been killed by a co-worker and the official autopsy stated heart attack, but it was widely believed that Weggelaar had been killed by the police. A strike was called by construction workers and large numbers of workers and their sympathisers, including Provos, marched through Amsterdam. Demonstrators fought the police in the streets (on the Dam and Damrak) and attacked the offices and vehicles of De Telegraaf.
At the same time the Provos participated in left wing student protests against the Vietnam War. Demonstrations were banned, resulting in an increase in their size and popularity. The police responded with increasing force and by mid-1966 hundreds of arrests were made every week. Police brutality led to increasing sympathy for the Provos and the anti-war demonstrators among the general public. An official investigation into the crisis was opened.
These events eventually led to the dismissal of Amsterdam's police chief, H. J. van der Molen in 1966, and the resignation of mayor Gijsbert van Hall in 1967. After van Hall had been dismissed Grootveld and Rob Stolk (printer of Provo magazine) decided to end Provo. Stolk said: “Provo has to disappear because all the Great Men that made us big have gone”, a reference to Provo’s two arch-enemies, Van Hall and Van der Molen.
After Provo
Some members of the Provos continued in the anarchist Kabouters (Gnomes), founded by Roel van Duyn, and ex-Provos also re-appeared in the Dutch GreenLeft, a green political party.
Roel van Duijn play's Chopin (live nov 2008)
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Post by pieter on Oct 28, 2009 18:44:59 GMT -7
Provosi
Provosi (Ruch Provo, Provotariat) – ruch kontrkulturowy, aktywny w Holandii w latach 1965-1967. Jego założycielem był Roel van Duijn, student filozofii zafascynowany anarchizmem, ideami Nowej Lewicy spod znaku Herberta Marcusego i artystycznymi dokonaniami dadaistów. Ruch nabrał dynamiki w maju 1965 r., gdy przystąpił do niego uliczny artysta Robert Jasper Grootveld, znany malarz i autor licznych happeningów, aktywista występujący przeciw koncernom tytoniowym.
Provosi uchodzą za europejskich protoplastów hippisów, jednak w przeciwieństwie do nich, byli znacznie bardziej upolitycznieni, choć mimo anarchistyczno-lewicowych korzeni nie wiązali się z żadnym konkretnym ugrupowaniem. Grootveld wskazywał, że papierosy są przykładem zniewolenia społeczeństwa przez rozbuchaną konsumpcję. Duijn wzywał młodzież do wolnej ekspresji przeciw skostniałym strukturom społeczno-politycznym. W ogniu krytyki znalazła się oficjalna kultura i elity władzy, z holenderską rodziną królewską na czele. Nowy ład społeczny miał być zbudowany na poszanowaniu jednostki i współpracy, która powinna zastąpić wszechobecną konkurencję. Metodą osiągania tych celów miały być happeningi i inne "prowokacje", stanowiące "wtykanie małych szpilek w czułe miejsca systemu".
Najbardziej spektakularną akcją provosów było obrzucenie petardami orszaku ślubnego księżnej Beatrix i niemieckiego arystokraty Clausa von Amsberga, w młodości członka Hitlerjugend. Po tym wydarzeniu reakcje policji stały się coraz bardziej nerwowe, ale jej brutalność przysparzała jedynie ruchowi popularności.
W ramach ogłaszanych przez siebie tzw. Białych Planów provosi domagali się zamknięcia centrum Amsterdamu dla samochodów i wprowadzenia wysokich kar dla fabryk zatruwających powietrze, proponowali powołanie centrów zdrowia dla kobiet służących im poradami na temat antykoncepcji, chcieli ingerencji państwa w spekulacyjny rynek nieruchomości i zalegalizowania squattingu, czyli samowolnego zajmowania pustostanów. Wiele z tych postulatów zostało z czasem wprowadzonych w życie.
Od 1966 r. provosi zaczęli swoją działalność prowadzić również na niwie zinstytucjonalizowanej polityki. Zdobyli mandat w radzie miasta, co pozwoliło im na nagłaśnianie kolejnych Białych Planów. Ich akcje przyczyniły się do odwołania burmistrza Amsterdamu i miejskiego szefa policji. Jednak już wkrótce po tych sukcesach część liderów ruchu ogłosiła jego rozwiązanie: polityczna instytucjonalizacja oznaczała dla nich kres spontanicznego buntu.
Część provosów przystąpiła do Partii Krasnoludków, powołanej przez van Duijna w 1970 r. i kontynuującej tradycje wmieszania absurdu w uprawianie polityki.
Provosi i Partia Krasnoludków stały się natchnieniem dla wrocławskiej Pomarańczowej Alternatywy.
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Post by pieter on Oct 28, 2009 18:57:38 GMT -7
PillarisationPillarisation (verzuiling in Dutch, pilarisation in French) is a term used to describe the denominational segregation of Dutch and Belgian society. These societies were (and in some areas, still are) " vertically" divided in several smaller segments or " pillars" (zuilen, singular: zuil) according to different religions or ideologies. These pillars all had their own social institutions: their own newspapers, broadcasting organisations, political parties, trade unions, banks, schools, hospitals, universities, scouting organisations and sports clubs. Some companies even only hired personnel of a specific religion or ideology. This led to a situation where many people had no personal contact with people from another pillar. Austrian, Northern Irish, Israeli and Maltese societies were or are other examples of this phenomenon. Situation in the NetherlandsIn the Netherlands there were (at least) three pillars: (1) Protestant, (2) Catholic and (3) Social-democratic. Almost all Catholics were part of the Catholic pillar. Orthodox and conservative Protestants joined the Protestant pillar, while more latitudinarian Protestants, Jews, and atheists either joined the Socialist pillar or were pillarless. The Protestant party Christian Historical Union did not organise a pillar of its own but linked itself to the Protestant pillar shaped by the Anti Revolutionary Party. Pillarisation was originally initiated by the Anti Revolutionary Party, who based it on their philosophy of sphere sovereignty. People in the Socialist pillar were mainly working class. People who were not associated with one of these pillars, mainly middle and upper class latitudinarian Protestants and atheists set up their own pillar: the general pillar. Ties between general organisations were much less strong. The political parties usually associated with this pillar were the liberal Free-minded Democratic League ( VDB) and Liberal State Party ( LSP), although these parties opposed pillarisation. Communists and ultra-orthodox Protestants also set up similar organisations; however, such groups were much smaller. After World War II liberals and socialists, but also Protestants and Catholics began to doubt the pillarised system. They founded a unity movement, the People's Movement Nederlandse Volksbeweging. Progressives of all pillars (including the Catholic resistance movement Christofoor) were united in this. They wanted a breakthrough (doorbraak) of the political system. But pillarisation was ingrained in Dutch society, and could not be defeated that easily. Even the People's Movement suffered from this, it was associated with the socialistic party, SDAP, and its ideology was socialism combined with democratic principles. Only the left liberal VDB and the minor Protestant CDU joined the SDAP to form a new political party: the Labour Party, Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) in 1946. During the 1960s these pillars, particularly under political criticism from D66 ( en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democrats_66 ) and the group Nieuw Links ( New Left) in PvdA, largely broke down. For example, VPRO moved towards the general pillar in years. Television was also pillarised, but in its early years (the 1950s) it had only one station, which meant that everyone watched the same broadcasts. Young people did not want to be associated with these organisations. Because of this and increased mobility many people saw that people from the other pillar weren't that different. Increased wealth and education made people independent of many of these institutions. From 1973, ARP and CHU of the Protestant pillar united with Catholic KVP in CDA, they first entered in elections in 1977. From 1976, the Catholic trade union NKV cooperated with NVV of the Socialist pillar to merge into the FNV in 1982. By the 21st century, pillarisation has disappeared but many remnants can be seen: public television for instance is divided over several pillarised organisations, instead of being one organisation, as is the education system split between public and religious schools. Nevertheless, there are small pillars that still exist today. Usually, members of the Reformed Churches (liberated) have their own schools, a university, their own national newspaper, and several organizations such as a Labor Union, psychiatric hospitals, et cetera. " Parallel society" founded by Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands is also sometimes conceived as a contemporary vestige of pillarisation. Situation in BelgiumPillarisation in Belgium was very similar, although there wasn't a Protestant pillar. Also there was no " general" pillar but a politically well-organised liberal pillar. In both Flanders and Wallonia societies are pillarised. In Flanders Catholics were the dominant pillar, in Wallonia the Socialists. Even though the liberals are stronger in Belgium (particularly in Brussels), than in the Netherlands, they are still relatively weak, due to their rather small, bourgeois support: liberal trade unions are very small. De Tijd, a financial daily, is the paper aligned with the liberals. This is only due to its readers, not editorial policies. However, a Flemish newspaper with historical liberal roots, Het Laatste Nieuws also exists. Denominational (many Catholic and a few Jewish) schools receive some public money, although not parity of funding as in the Netherlands, so that tuition is almost completely free. Belgian universities charge more or less the same, relatively low tuition fees. As a consequence of the language struggle in the latter half of the twentieth century, the pillars split over the language issue that became the most significant divisive factor in the nation. Now every language group has three pillars of its own. The pillar system was the primordial societal divide much longer in Belgium than it was in the Netherlands. Only near the end of the Cold War did it begin to lose importance, at least at the individual level, and to this day it continues to influence Belgian society. For example, even the 1999 - 2003 " Rainbow Coalition" of Guy Verhofstadt was often rendered with the terms of pillarisation. It should be noted that political currents which rose in late 20th century ( AGaLev, the Arab European League ( AEL) and the Vlaams Blok), did not attempt to build pillars. Pillarisation was visible even in the everyday social organisations such as musical ensembles, sport clubs, recreational facilities, etc. Although weakened in the contemporary situation, many major social organisations (trade unions, cooperatives, etc.) still strictly follow the lines of pillars.
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Post by tuftabis on Oct 29, 2009 1:19:19 GMT -7
Thank you! Provosi i Partia Krasnoludków stały się natchnieniem dla wrocławskiej Pomarańczowej Alternatywy. Provo's and the Gnome party were the inspiration for the Pomarańczowa Alternatywa (Orange Alternative) movement of Wrocław. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orange_Alternative- and that's the link between Provo's and a very important mode with which late communism in Poland has been ridiculed, made fun of and attenuated. In my ignorance I had no idea this movement had an inspiration in the Netherlands. It was made clear during the broadcast that Roel van Duyn is a great fun of Chopin and plays himself. The breaks in the 1 hour long interview were filled with beautiful preludes. I wonder what are the remrants of the pillarisation in Dutch society, today.
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Post by pieter on Oct 29, 2009 3:32:47 GMT -7
Tufta,
I read your comment with interest and did not know either that the Dutch Provo movement inspired the movement of Wroclaw. I knew that the Provo's as anarchistic movement disliked Communism and Social-democracy (which rules Amsterdam).
I have not much time today to react, due to professional and social reasons. I will react later on the subject "Pillarisation in the Netherlands today", it is a complicated subject. For instance the question is there a Islamic pillar in the Netherlands today.
Cheers, Pieter
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Post by tuftabis on Oct 30, 2009 2:24:33 GMT -7
I will be looking forward 'Pillarisation in the Netherlands', Pieter! The Islamic pillar is an interesting matter indeed. Are the Muslims emancipated enough to form a whole pillar? I mean I understood each pillar contains all classes inside it, from the very bottom of social ladder to the very top. That is one of the reasons such pillar is something quite unique and different from a social class or a caste or anything else.
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Post by pieter on Oct 30, 2009 2:55:10 GMT -7
Tufta,
That is an interesting remark from you. It is difficult to determine if there is a Islamic pillar for me, as a non-Islamic Dutchman, who does not speak Maroccan Berber or Arab, Turkish, Kurd, Perisian, Somali, Iraqi Arab, Afghan Farsi and etc. You have Islamic broadcastcorporation, foundations, Mosque oranisations, an Islamic mayor of Rotterdam, Islamic politicians for several centre-left, left and centre-right parties. There is no large Islamic Newspaper or Magazine as far as I am aware of.
I don't know if you can compare the Islamic pillar with the Yiddish, Yewish pillar in Pre-war Poland, in which Polish Judaism had it's own administrative autonomy, parties, newspapers, magazines, unions, employers organisation and etc. The Polish jews had a pillar, because working, middle class and high class belonged to it in organisation, voting behaviour (Bund, Folkists and Agudat Israel), political organisation and power. There is for instance no real big Islamic political party, the Muslims vote for Dutch parties, most of them left or centre left.
But you have Muslim entrepreneurs, businessmen and conservatives who vote centre-rightwing parties like the Christian-Democrats and conservative-liberals, due to economical, social-cultural and philosophical-political reasons.
It's difficult from both sociological and ethnic cultural perspective to determine wether an Islamic pillar exist. You have Islamic schools, high schools and one university (I think).
Pieter
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Post by tuftabis on Oct 30, 2009 11:00:08 GMT -7
Thanks again. One hallmark we may want to look at is if a group actually wants to integrate and become ' a pillar' (on literal meaning) of a state and society or rather strictly wants to stay different and to most of all benefit from openess/liberty of the society. I understood the pillars in 'old Netherlands' felt 'Dutch' most of all although in different ways this "Dutchness' was realized.
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Post by pieter on Oct 30, 2009 11:16:09 GMT -7
Contemporary Review, 2006 by Roger Kershaw
Summary: The article focuses on the condition of Islam in the political sector of Netherlands. The post -Marxist Partij van de Arbeid was looking to engineer a transformation of Dutch politics from a system of sectional parties towards an Anglo-Saxon model. Either the ideology of the old system of accommodation or the unwillingness of the postverzuilde elite to address cultural difference have seemed to condemn Dutch society to a submergence below the waters of unconstrained multicultural pluralism. Excerpt from Article:
ISLAM IN THE NETHERLANDS - AND INDONESIA: WHAT KIND OF A 'PILLAR OF SOCIETY'? Roger Kershaw
The Netherlands of 1954 is 'a far country', but the memories of my first visit there, 52 years ago, are still vivid. Could it be that the interest in Dutch politics which took root at that time has helped to keep the whole experience fresh? I also muse whimsically whether the durability of the underlying political interest itself owes anything to a certain childish ditty which has proven unforgettable, about the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) and the People's Catholic Party (KVP, today CDA).
Well, perhaps not! But there was a serious background to these couplets, which I propose to take as starting-point for this essay about a Netherlands since transformed.
Frustrated Destinies of the Dutch Left
The post-Marxist Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) led by the resistance hero and national father-figure Willem Drees, was looking to engineer a transformation of Dutch politics from a system of sectional parties (especially confessional ones, and the corollary of that: coalition governments in chronic paralysis), towards a secular, Anglo-Saxon model in which, even if a permanent Labour majority should prove elusive, at least democratic Left would alternate in office with moderate Right. But by definition the unavoidable condition for such a breakthrough was an ideological revolution in Roman Catholic circles, by extension from their earlier, famous brake through from confessional exclusivism to a willingness to enter coalition governments with non-religious forces. As of the early 1950s coalition was the furthest the People's Catholic Party (Katholieke Volkspartij (KVP)) would go. In other words, the Catholic Church would not release her flock to vote freely for non-Catholic politicians. My hosts in 1954 were a sensibly devout (but by their lights not Calvinistic) Protestant family in Haarlem. The father of my pen-friend was a store manager with the grocery chain, Simon de Wit. They had recently returned from an unhappy posting in Eindhoven, at the heart of Catholic Netherlands. The experience had been especially painful for the children, who were the least equipped to handle the ostracization by the Catholics around them. Drees's ideal took only second place, in political conversations, to the betrayal of the Netherlands by the United States in Indonesia. As adherents of the established church (Hervormd Kerk = Dutch Reformed Church, the church of the Dutch Royal family) such a family could typically be expected to vote Christelijk Historische Unie (CHU), and find the radio of Nederlandse Christelijke Radio Vereniging (Dutch Christian Radio Association) (NCRV) most to their liking.
They listened with sympathetic interest to what Drees was saying. Yet the sticking-point for Protestants in the 1950s in face of his invitation to cross over to Labour (as voters if not members) was that, during the long transition from confessionalism, the PvdA was not strong enough to form governments except in coalition with other parties. Time and again the coalition partner turned out to be KVP. If the Protestants (a chronically divided entity, be it noted) were to 'secularize', while the Catholics did not, it would entirely play into the hands of the latter - the 'other nation' within a bitterly divided society. Contrary to what, in Britain, 'every schoolboy knows', the Dutch War of Independence from Spain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries did not separate a Protestant 'Holland' from a Catholic 'Flanders'. At least Noord Brabant and Limburg are predominantly Catholic. This reality had posed a special challenge for Dutch 'nation-building' from the beginning. A system of necessary if grudging toleration emerged, whereby the mass of members of each religious denomination could practise their faith without interference by the others, indeed almost without any contact between the cultural blocs except at elite level where their respective leaders would associate and negotiate as necessary for the running of the national economy and state. With reference to the twentieth-century scene, the sociologist Lijphart has employed the term 'consociationalism' to such calming interaction or camouflaged integration (in his writings in English) or 'pacificatie-democratie', etc. (in his work in Dutch). In Dutch parlance the discrete blocs as such are imagined as pillars (zuilen), while the forming and maintenance of primary allegiance to such a bloc within the nation has been called verzuiling (translated in some recent English sources as 'pillarisation'). With the rise of universal suffrage in the early twentieth century, and especially by an historic settlement in 1917, these allegiances had at first been reinforced - not only by the formation of political parties catering for each cultural allegiance, but by associated clubs and newspapers, even distinct radio stations in due course, as mentioned above. The resilience of the system was pointedly demonstrated by the fact that the trades union-based Sociaal Democratische Arbeiders Partij (S.D.A.P. - forerunner to PvdA), as it got established in the new industrialised areas, was constrained to emulate the confessional groupings by forming associated clubs and publications designed to immerse working-class families into socialist ways of thinking and group loyalty - not to mention a linked radio station, Vereniging Arbeiders Radio Amateurs (VARA). As also noted above, the post-war transformation of the party, as it abandoned the old historical vision of working-class revolution, was not paralleled by comparable ideological changes among the confessional interests. On the other hand, rather ominously for PvdA, there were signs by the 1960s of haemorrhage of the party's traditional working-class constituency itself Still,
CONTEMPORARY REVIEW
No thinking socialist would have doubted that within a decade or two a secularising rationalism would have made strong gains in Dutch society, with the corollary at last of the emancipation of Christian voters from their 'primordial allegiances'. Indeed in the course of the 1960s the confessional parties found reason for alarm as precisely such a phenomenon became visible - linked or paired with a general collapse of social taboos to a degree which was to give Dutch society a new reputation as the most permissive in Europe. But instead of succumbing to the trend and allowing PvdA the 'breakthrough' for which it yearned, the confessional groupings now got together to trounce the secular tendency with a mould-breaking achievement no less historic than any previous realignment, by forming a new progressive-conservative party for all Christians, Christen Democratisch Appel (CDA), along German CDU lines. At the same time, PvdA's Harold Wilsonesque perception of itself as 'the natural party of government' was being challenged from the new secular environment by a self-styled 'left-of centre progressive non-socialist party', namely Democraten 1966 (D66), which expressed and embodied dissatisfaction with the institutional and doctrinal rigidities of the established labour movement. The future for PvdA thus promised an endless vista of frustrating coalitions with unsympathetic partners, or exclusion from government altogether. The mould of frustration was broken, but only temporarily, with the revival of PvdA fortunes thanks to the popularity of the incumbent premier, Kok, in the election of 1998. However, there was potentially a double consolation in the situation of the 1990s, for a socialist (or ex-socialist) party cut loose from its old ideological moorings and former solid constituency. The pervasive permissiveness of the new Netherlands found part of its expression in an exceptionally liberal national policy on asylum and immigration. As a major, if not the leading, group of proponents of the Open Door among the Dutch political elite, the PvdA intelligentsia were able to find ideological vindication in the strand of post-modem thought wherein Third World peoples have to some extent taken the place of the working-class as the world's 'primary oppressed' - a status which does not require that the individual person should be literally persecuted in his country of origin and thus qualified as an authentic asylum-seeker. And paradoxically, while post-modem thought prides itself on detecting a disqualifying self-interest behind the self-descriptions of 'vested interests' and 'the powerful', the subjectivity of the narratives of the world's 'oppressed' are granted an uncritical indulgence - consistent with the general value-relativism which has permeated much of Dutch culture in the era of permissiveness, but going further by far. It follows from these twin doctrinal strands that not only would the wave of immigrants find the sluice-gates wide open, but once 'within the polder' would encounter an environment of maximum tolerance towards exotic cultures, not excluding elements such as the murder of women for breaches, real or imaginary, of a male-prescribed morality code. PvdA thereafter stood to gain electoral rewards among those able to secure citizenship, in light of both its initial encouragement of migration (helping to achieve the present total of 920,000 Muslims in a Netherlands population of merely 16 million), and its subsequent toleration of the immigrants' cultures and separate identities under the watch-word, 'multiculturalism'.
The Dutch Should Know Islam Is Different
One is not sure whether it is a sign of the health of Dutch democracy that in the end a Pim Fortuyn did arise to appeal for a 'halt to national suicide'. Alternatively, it might be taken as a token of the irreversibility of self-destruction that PvdA could get way with it for so long, by invoking the 'Dutch value of tolerance' in support of multiculturalism. What seems truly bizarre is that although PvdA had once striven to emancipate the Netheriands from the constraining yoke of 'accommodation polities', as a leading party of government dependent on amicable relationships with coalition partners it had jointly fostered a culture of the most extreme consensus-building and self-censorship on all 'sensitive' matters. It behaved as if gripped by a sentimental nostalgia for the verities of accommodation, desperately clinging to such residues of the redundant system as could be detected and salvaged. Some analysts actually see a pattern so 'accommodating' that a new cosmopolitan elite with no traditional identities, not even a national identity, now rules. At all events, either the ideology of the old system of accommodation which is assumed to guarantee the smooth integration of Muslims without any concerted engagement by the state, or the unwillingness of the postpillarised elite to address cultural difference (even their inability to conceptualise it at all), have seemed to condemn Dutch society to a slow submergence below the waters of unconstrained multicultural pluralism. In the five years since al-Qaeda's successful strike against the World Trade Center, intellectual critics of Islam, or at least its more egregiously fundamentalist manifestations, have been prolific in their writings. The Dutch Left, like their counterparts in neighbouring countries, have no reasonable excuse for not now understanding the other civilization, even if 'plausible' non-religious explanations for Muslim violence will continue to be advanced. But I would go so far as to propose that no members of the Dutch intelligentsia had any excuse for an imperfect understanding even before September 2001. The Netherlands have had a long history of contact with Islam in the colonial territories of the Dutch East Indies, now Indonesia. Having made a career in academic Southeast Asian Studies, certainly at quite an interval from my visit to Haarlem in 1954 yet marginally under the influence of what I heard there, I am in a position to affirm that the work of Dutch sociologists of Indonesia has also been prolific, often profound.
CONTEMPORARY REVIEW
The doyen of the Indonesia comer of the discipline, when I was starting out at the University of Hull in 1968, was Professor W.F. Wertheim. Apart from his own very down-to-earth social anthropology, he was quite a philosopher of the sociological calling, and had some very pertinent things to say about applications of Westem models which had turned out to be misapplied. In one salient case, this was not quite an instance of an aberration in initial classification of data, but rather a matter of social development rapidly overtaking the theory, at least because the group under consideration had reverted to non-Westem type when it realized that its theology was incompatible with the socio-economic roles and political leadership which it had begun tentatively to espouse. I refer to the would-be Westem-style entrepreneurial class of Java, heirs to the Muslim merchant society of the coastal cities, and cast by Dutch sociology to become the founders of East Indies capitalism in the spirit of Max Weber's celebrated 'Protestant Ethic'. The Islamisation of the would-be Indonesian bourgeoisie, and 'failure' of the entrepreneurial phenomenon which theory predicted but some scholars could already detect empirically, can be linked at first to stimuli in the political sphere: particularly a radicalisation of the poorer artisans, and later of the peasantry, which inhibited the incipient political cooperation between the classes on the basis of shared nationalism. However, once the preconditions in the sphere of political economy had dissipated, an explicitly religious factor came into its own. The first signs of it were seen in a form of 'religious communalism' whereby group solidarity was expressed through hostility towards Christians and Chinese, but also towards nominally Muslim Indonesians who were indifferent to religion. This caused bourgeois Islam to change in character. It was now no longer a question of demonstrating that Islam, too, had a part to play in the modern world, and had room for all kinds of up-to-date ideas. Its task now was to prove that the Islamic faith was superior to all other ideologies and was the real source of all that is good in the world. There was a heightened sensitivity to anything that could be interpreted as an 'insult to Islam' or, worse still, 'an insult to the Prophet'. There was increasing solidarity with the Islamic world beyond Indonesia and sharp reaction to any 'attack on Islam' from whichever quarter it came in the world. Just as it was asserted that Islam was pre-eminently socialist and democratic, so the Faith was now also regarded as the source of everything good and noble in the world, the source of knowledge, of progress, of the emancipation of women, of tolerance. Bourgeois Islam became less tolerant than in the early days of the Muhammadyah movement - but woe to him who dared to say so!
Leaving aside the uncanny prefiguring of familiar elements in the worldwide Islamic revival of the present day, one could logically and quickly proceed to the post-World War II scene, where democratic politics in the independent Republic of Indonesia saw the rise of a distinct Islamic party in the shape of the Masjumi.
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Post by tuftabis on Oct 30, 2009 13:00:52 GMT -7
Well, thank you very much indeed Pieter! It is much cleared now to me.
I must say the idea of pillars as almost isolated societies with just the elites talking how to keep the (peaceful) status quo has an air of voluntary apartheid to me. And indeed it resembles the situation in Eastern preWWII Poland concerning the Jewish minority (or in fact majority here and there). Thank you Pieter!
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Post by pieter on Nov 1, 2009 10:24:55 GMT -7
Islam in the Netherlands (factsheet) November 2002
This fact sheet outlines the position of Islam within the Dutch legal order and within Dutch society as a whole. Of the 15.6 million people now living in the Netherlands, more than 500,000 come from Muslim backgrounds. That is ten times as many as in 1971. Muslim shops, societies, schools and mosques are now familiar features of Dutch towns and cities.
The Dutch government does not interfere with the internal affairs of any religious community. However, it pursues policies aimed at the integration of ethnic minorities, to which the majority of Muslims belong. The objective is to enable them to participate in democratic society, to combat disadvantage and to prevent and counter discrimination and racism.
History
Fifty years ago, very few Muslims lived in the Netherlands, but Islam was the most widespread religion in the Kingdom of the Netherlands as a whole. Until 1949, the Kingdom included what is now the Republic of Indonesia, with its predominantly Muslim population, while Suriname, which has a Muslim minority of mainly Indian origin, did not gain its independence until 1975. The first Muslims to settle in the Netherlands itself were Moluccans who left Indonesia in 1951, after it had become an independent republic. A surplus of jobs created by continuing economic growth in the 1960s led the Dutch government to recruit temporary workers abroad, in particular in Turkey and Morocco, where the population is predominantly Muslim. Recruitment ceased in 1974, but this did not put a stop to migration, since many of these migrant workers settled in the Netherlands, where they were joined by their families. Shortly before Suriname became independent in 1975, a sizeable group of Surinamese immigrants also arrived in the Netherlands.
Muslims currently make up almost 4% of the total population of the Netherlands, the majority coming from Turkey (270,000), Morocco (225,000) and Suriname (50,000). Other Muslims, many arriving in the Netherlands as refugees, come from Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Ethiopia, Egypt, Afghanistan, the former Soviet Union and Bosnia. The majority are Sunni Muslims, though there are a large number of Alawites among the Turkish community.
The following figures show how the size of the Muslim population has grown in the past thirty years:
1971 - 54,000
1975 - 108,000
1980 - 225,000
1997 - 573,200
Equality
Article 1 of the Dutch Constitution states: "All persons in the Netherlands shall be treated equally in equal circumstances. Discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political opinion, race or sex or on any other grounds whatsoever shall not be permitted." This means that women have the same rights as men, and Muslims the same rights as Christians. Apart from equal rights, however, people in the Netherlands also have the same obligations, to pay taxes, for example, or to send their children to school. Under Dutch law, school attendance is compulsory for all young people up to the age of 16. It is of great importance to society that anyone settling in the Netherlands accepts this and other responsibilities, in the same way as the Dutch should accept and respect all newcomers.
The right to vote
Immigrants who have acquired Dutch nationality are entitled both to vote and stand for election. Both the Lower House of Parliament and the Provincial Councils contain some members with a Muslim background. In fact, the Netherlands even had a number of Muslim MPs before Indonesia became independent. Non-naturalised immigrants from outside the EU who have been legally resident in the Netherlands for at least five years are entitled to vote in local elections. They are also entitled to stand for election, and there are now more than a hundred municipal councillors of Muslim origin.
Freedom of religion
Freedom of religion and belief is a fundamental right in the Netherlands. This means that people are free to worship as they choose, either individually or in groups, provided they remain within the bounds imposed by the law or by consideration for others (as regards for example noise, health hazards and disturbances of the peace).
In the Netherlands, church and state are separate. The government does not interfere in the internal affairs of organisations that profess religious or philosophical beliefs, and the latter do not interfere with matters of state. There are now 300 mosques and prayer centres in the Netherlands (175 Turkish, 100 Moroccan and 20 Surinamese). Islamic burial grounds have also been established in many places. Until the early 1980s, the government provided financial assistance for the construction and furnishing of churches and mosques, but subsidies of this kind were abolished because Parliament felt that they contravened the principle of separation of church and state. Subsidies are, however, awarded to Muslim associations, provided they actively contribute towards the integration of Muslims into Dutch society.
Islamic customs
Ramadan, obligatory prayer, and dietary laws
Many Dutch employers accommodate their Muslim employees by adjusting the workload and changing working hours during Ramadan. Muslims are often prepared to work on Western public holidays, such as Christmas and New Year's Day, in return for time off on Muslim feast days. Some local authorities offer Muslim communities the opportunity to make a public call to prayer once a week or more. Many employers provide rooms for Muslim employees to pray, and company canteens often take account of their dietary laws and customs.
Circumcision
Many circumcisions are still performed privately in Muslim circles, and a number of hospitals also carry out the procedure. Most medical insurers only refund the costs if the procedure has to be performed on medical grounds. In some places, however, they have agreed to reimburse the cost of circumcision on religious grounds too. Building on local initiatives, efforts are now being made to investigate the possibility of including the procedure as part of standard medical training.
Headscarves
Women and girls wearing headscarves have become a familiar sight at universities and public-authority schools in the Netherlands. The majority of universities and schools in the Netherlands are publicly run, which means that they are not based on particular religious, philosophical or educational principles. Privately-run schools are entitled to ban headscarves under the school rules, and though the government has advised against this, it cannot take any action.
Ritual slaughter
There are statutory regulations governing the treatment of cattle and the method used for slaughter in the Netherlands. Insofar as EU legislation permits, measures have been taken to allow the slaughter of cattle in accordance with Islamic custom. The Dutch government has granted some abattoirs a permanent licence to perform ritual slaughter, provided they comply with certain strict conditions. Abattoirs may also be issued with licences to perform ritual slaughter during the annual feast of sacrifice. Of the 4,500 butchers currently registered in the Netherlands, 500 are Islamic.
Integration
The government urges all religious and church communities to help to achieve the aims of integration policy. Such a call does not conflict with the principle that the state may not interfere with religious worship or beliefs. Instead, the government feels that religious or other convictions can have a particularly beneficial influence on the integration of minorities. There are many Islamic organisations in the Netherlands, and most of those adhering to Sunni doctrine are affiliated to the four national federations of Muslim organisations.
Many immigrants are at a disadvantage when it comes to language, education and knowledge of Dutch society. As a result, their position on the labour market and in society in general is weak. Approximately 20% of the country's jobless are members of ethnic minorities, despite the fact that they account for only 5% of the workforce. It is therefore the aim of government policy to improve their starting position, and to promote integration. Legislation has been introduced to encourage employers to take on members of ethnic minorities. A taskforce drawn from industry, the trade unions and government was established in 1998 to promote the integration of ethnic minorities in industrial sectors and companies.
Municipalities offer newcomers a programme that familiarises them with Dutch society. They are taught Dutch rules and customs and are introduced to the language. Under the Newcomers Integration Act, which entered into force on 30 September 1998, those who rely on state benefits can be obliged to participate in the programme. Refusal to do so may lead to a fine. The municipalities also run programmes to help young people from ethnic minorities overcome educational disadvantages.
Pastoral work
Since all religions are equal in the Netherlands, the government believes that people who are in the army or who are detained in prison or hospitalised are entitled to receive visits from a pastoral worker of their own religion. To this end, the government is now making preparations for the establishment of Muslim and Hindu pastoral care services in the armed forces and in prisons. Imams seeking appointment to the Muslim service first have to attend a practical course set up by the government. However, the service cannot be established until a consultative body has been formed to represent the Muslim community in talks with the government. In the absence of such a platform, a temporary measure has been introduced under which the government will reimburse imams for the cost of paying pastoral visits to prisons.
Under the Care Institutions (Quality) Act, care providers are required to enable their patients to receive pastoral care in line, as far as possible, with their own religion or convictions. The need for ethnic minority pastoral workers is expected to grow considerably in the next few years. Where pastoral workers have received their religious education abroad, the government is prepared to fund extra training, on condition that the candidate has received an education at university or higher professional level, and has a reasonable knowledge of Dutch. The government is encouraging the care sector to introduce appropriate pastoral care services for every group.
Education
The Dutch education system comprises both public-authority schools, for which the government is responsible and which are open to all, and private schools that are organised on philosophical or denominational lines. The Netherlands has long had Catholic and Protestant schools, and now there are also some thirty Muslim schools. Private schools have to comply with the same statutory requirements as public-authority schools when it comes to the knowledge and skills they teach. Both categories of school are funded by the government, and are visited by the school inspectors.
The government is making an effort to ensure that young people do not drop out of school, since this severely limits their future prospects. Young people from Muslim families can take part in special programmes which are offered to all young people with educational disadvantages, whatever their background. There are teachers with Muslim backgrounds working in many schools.
Public-authority schools are free to provide religious education at the request of parents. In many primary and secondary schools, the curriculum includes "religious movements" and "environmental studies" which cover, for example, Christianity and Islam, to encourage mutual understanding and tolerance. The history and geography of Muslim countries are frequently included in secondary school examination syllabuses. Pupils at many schools can choose to study Arabic or Turkish as a second modern language. If there is enough interest, Muslim secondary schools can be established. In fact, the first will open its doors in Rotterdam in 2000.
In higher education too, attention focuses in various ways on Islam and the languages and culture of the Muslim world. Many universities have chairs of Islamic studies and of the languages and cultures of the Middle East. The Holland College of Higher Professional Education in Diemen trains students wishing to give Islamic religious instruction, and the University of Amsterdam has had an endowed chair of Islamic studies for several years. This chair, to which the government has attached a number of general conditions, is funded by a private foundation. One of its functions is to explore the scope for establishing courses to train imams and Islamic pastoral workers in the Netherlands. The Netherlands Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World, devoted exclusively to academic research into Islam, was opened in Leiden in 1998.
Last year, the government called on Hindu and Muslim organisations in particular to set up courses in the Netherlands to train their own pandits and imams. Financial support can be provided by the government. In this case, the general, academic part of the training would be provided at the university of the candidate's choice, and pastoral training would be given at a special institute established for this purpose by the religious organisation in question.
Every year, some 50 imams are recruited from abroad, from Turkey and Morocco in particular. Many of them know little, if anything, about Dutch society. The government therefore intends to require imams to attend a special course, tailored to their social role, during their first year in the Netherlands. The programme, which is geared towards integration, will comprise 600 hours of Dutch, an introduction to Dutch society, and, in consultation with national Muslim organisations, other specific subjects. On completing the course, the candidates will be examined on their command of the language, and their knowledge and skills. Imams already working in the Netherlands may also attend a course.
Religious communities are free to involve government authorities or sister organisations in other countries in their initiatives. Since foreign governments have no autonomous jurisdiction in the Netherlands, the principle of the separation of church and state does not arise. The Dutch government does not consult with the authorities in imams' countries of origin on their training, but it keeps them informed of the policies it is pursuing in relation to integration. The Dutch government assumes that people of every religion will be loyal members of Dutch society, and will make a positive contribution to it, in accordance with the civil rights and duties specified in the Constitution.
Further information
This fact sheet is produced by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs in consultation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Affairs.
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Post by pieter on Nov 1, 2009 11:08:56 GMT -7
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Post by pieter on Nov 1, 2009 12:25:25 GMT -7
EuroNews - Europeans- The Netherlands' debate on Islam
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