Jaga & Pieter: IMO Bzerzinzi’s views are brilliant. Carl:
www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/Brzezinksi%20speech%207-20web.htm AMERICAN STRATEGY AND THE MIDDLE EAST
July 20, 2006
Restaurant Nora, Washington, D.C.
The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
National Security Advisor to President Carter and
Trustee and Counselor, Center for Strategic and International StudiesPresider Steven Clemons* Sr. Fellow & Dir., American Strategy Program, New America Foundation and publisher,
www.TheWashingtonNote.com [Text in brackets unclear or inaudible]
Let me be serious now because this is a serious time which calls for serious
reflection. I have to talk for about 15 or so minutes. I will be brief. Let me
start by sharing with you what I consider to be 3 axiomatic propositions.
The first is that today, for the United States, its policy in the Middle East is
the basic test of America’s capacity to exercise global leadership. It’s become
that. I see it as in many respects similar to what transpired during the Cold
War when the ultimate test of America’s capacity to act as a defender of the
free world was its ability to conduct a meaningful policy in Europe for Europe
then was the central front and we know the outcome.
Today the Middle East is the fundamental test of American ability to lead, and
at stake is precisely that. If we do not do well, we will lose our capacity to
lead, and that concerns me greatly.
The second axiomatic proposition that I want to share with you is that the
experience of recent times--and much of the experience connected also with the
existence of the state of Israel--teaches us that neither Israel nor the United
States in the final analysis have the capacity to impose a unilateral solution.
There may be people who deceive themselves of that. We call them neo-cons in
this country and there are other equivalents in Israel as well. They may think
that either the United States or Israel can impose a solution
The United States has already learned--or at least it is in the process of
learning in Iraq-- that it does not have the capacity to impose unilateral
solutions to the problems it faces, by force, acting on its own, and neither
does Israel.
And my third proposition is that by now it should be very evident to all
concerned that the parties that are fighting now in the Middle East,
particularly the Israelis and the Palestinians can never resolve their conflict
peacefully, no matter how much they try, no matter how sincere they may be. And
when they are sincere, unfortunately it is in-synchronous to the sincerity of
the other side, and more often than not, one or the other is not sincere. Quite
often, neither is sincere. As a result, there has been no peace in the Middle
East.
Let me speak a little bit to each of these propositions. The use of force and
unilateral solution. There has been a great deal of talk recently about Israel
seeking a unilateral solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. …
How can one envisage it? One can envisage an imposition of a condition but one
should not confuse it with a legitimate, acceptable peace settlement. A
settlement based on the expansion, to some significant degree, of the state of
Israel beyond ‘67 lines without territorial compensation or accommodation is
going to be a settlement that leaves the West Bank essentially in a condition
closely approximating that of a Bantustan which had been planned in the days of
apartheid in South Africa.
A solution which is unilateral which involves the incorporation of all of
Jerusalem in the state of Israel is going to leave the roof of the Golden Dome
on top of the Temple on the Mount visible to most Palestinians in a physical
sense. Those of you who know the region know you can see it from afar, and that
will be a symbol of the illegitimacy and unacceptability of that imposed
settlement. And the failure to generate a political equilibrium will lead to
further rounds of violence.
So I do not see Israel being able to change the mindset of the peoples involved
and particularly not by use of force. Use of force can achieve certain
short-term objectives, perhaps even today in Lebanon provides Israel some modest
success in interdicting some Hezbollah military capability. But use of force
breeds its own antithesis: the mobilization of deeper resistance, the
radicalization of those around you, and a growing sense of outrage and
determination to survive.
I hate to say this but I will say it. I think what the Israelis are doing today
for example in Lebanon is in effect, in effect--maybe not in intent--the killing
of hostages. The killing of hostages. Because when you kill 300 people, 400
people, who have nothing to do with the provocations Hezbollah staged, but you
do it in effect deliberately by being indifferent to the scale of collateral
damage, you’re killing hostages in the hope of intimidating those that you want
to intimidate. And more likely than not you will not intimidate them. You’ll
simply outrage them and make them into permanent enemies with the number of such
enemies increasing.
I have been involved with this problem for thirty years or so, and my sense is
that the difficulty in resolving it is increasing rather than decreasing and
that the hostility is hardening. The number of moderates is diminishing, and the
prospects for protracted violence is growing, so that is not a solution.
The solution can only come if there is a serious international involvement that
supports the moderates from both sides, however numerous or non-numerous they
are, but also creates the situation in which it becomes of greater interest to
both parties to accommodate than to resist because both of the incentives and
the capacity of the external intervention to impose costs. That means a
deliberate peace effort led by the United States, which then doubtless would be
supported by the international community, which defines openly in a semi-binding
fashion how the United States and the international community envisages the
outlines of the accommodation. In short, the kind of adoption of the Geneva
Accords or the Taba formulations or some of the formulations by Clinton at Camp
David, and that should be the position of the international community spelled
out in black and white and accompanied by very explicit indication that
rejection by the Palestinian side will gravely affect our degree of support and
acceptance for the Palestinian regime and exactly the same vis-a-vis Israel.
We’re not prepared to do that, then we might as well kiss the prospects for
peace goodbye. Right now every indication is that we’re not prepared to do that.
Worse than that, we have abandoned our traditional position from being a
mediator and have adopted a policy of almost complete partiality and that
contributes to the intensity of the conflict.
Now that brings me to my third and last point because I know Steve doesn’t want
me to talk long, which is America’s role in the Middle East as a whole and that
goes beyond this issue regarding which I’ve already indicated what I think
America ought to be doing, but by now the problems of the Middle East, some of
them endemic and generic to the region but some of them of our making involve at
least two other issues: Iraq and potentially Iran. And it’s becoming
increasingly difficult to separate the three: the Israeli-Palestinian, the Iraq
problem, Iran.
The Iraq problem, look what Prime Minister al-Maliki said today--it’s an
indication of things to come. The notion that we’re going to get a pliant,
democratic, stable, pro-American, Israel-loving Iraq is a myth which is rapidly
eroding and which is now being contradicted by political realities.
And the problem of Iran is clearly related because of Iran’s connection to
Syria... [inaudible]…destabilize the region, while at the same time there are
people in this city and in Jerusalem who would like to make certain that there
is no compromise accommodation between the United States and Iran but, on the
contrary, that the United States undertakes military action against them. It is
mostly an extreme, lunatic fringe.
We have read I’m sure the editorial by [Bill] Kristol in The Weekly Standard,
but there are people in the U.S. government who lean that way, who think that
way, who agitate that way. And my grave concern is that within the U.S.
government today, the structure of authority is such that it is quite
conceivable for a key player in that system, especially endowed with a sense of
a divine mission as to reach a decision [inaudible]. It is not concluded that
such a person is even susceptible to such arguments because of that sense of
mission.
What of course imposes the limit are certain objective circumstances. And it is
a difficult thing to say, but in fact our failure in Iraq is saving us from
duplicating that misadventure vis-à-vis Iran and that is probably the most
important impediment to such a repetition.
And that leads me then to the proposition beforehand, namely that we have now,
we’re not only committed to what I said earlier, regarding the
Israeli-Palestinian process, but more deliberately by terminating our
involvement in Iraq. And I have put forth a four-point program which
I have discussed in one of the rare occasions within the last year
administration has talked to me, some top level people in the administration.
They listened to this:
That we start talking to the Iraqis of the day of our disengagement., We say to
them we want to set it jointly, but in the process, indicate to them that we
will not leave precipitously. I asked Khalilzad what would be his definition of
precipitous and he said four months and I said I agree. Are you saying to the
Iraqis, we intend to disengage by some period? We need to.
And then we will see what Iraqi leaders say to us and which leaders say what.
I’m convinced those who categorically say to us we don’t want you to leave are
the ones who will leave with us when we leave. And ones who will be more
prepared to entertain the proposition of us leaving are the ones who have some
basis of confidence that they have political and military roots in the country
and that they, together, the Shiites and the Kurds they will make arrangements
with the Sunnis, handle it on their own.
Once we reach an agreement with the Iraqis, I would secondly announce it as a
joint decision. Not as an American decision but as a joint American-Iraqi
decision. Because that would give greater credibility to such an Iraqi
government.
Thirdly, I would then have the Al-Maliki government convene a conference of all
of their adjoining Muslim states, perhaps some of the distant ones, such as
Pakistan, Morocco, Algeria on the subject of their potential to help stabilize
Iraq after we’re gone. Because once we’re leaving, most of them will be willing
to help and stabilize them. Because for different reasons, entirely different
reasons, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia would have their own specific stakes in
stabilizing Iraq which may not be identical stakes but complementary stakes, and
thus it would be quite worthwhile initiating this process.
And then fourth, the United States will announce a donors’ conference to help
rehabilitate Iraq’s economy and particularly its energy-producing capacity. I
believe that would help the extract us in a fashion which would not be
calamitous. It would not be quite defined or what has been defined as “victory”:
a secular, democratic, stable Iraq [but] probably an Iraq [engaged] for some
time in civil strife. But I believe an indigenous government is much more likely
to be effective in repressing domestic insurgency than the occupation army that
neither understands the culture of the country nor the language, And because of
psychological pressures conducting a counterinsurgency in civilian areas, is
itself becoming increasingly affected by the contagion of demoralization that
has, in previous history, badly damaged even the most professional of forces.
As far as Iran is concerned--and with this I’ll end--thanks to Iraq, I think we
have made an offer to the Iranians that is reasonable. I do not know that
Iranians have the smarts to respond favorably or at least not negatively. I sort
of lean to the idea that they’ll probably respond not negatively but not
positively and try to stall out the process. But that is not so bad provided
they do not reject it. Because while the Iranian nuclear problem is serious, and
while the Iranians are marginally involved in Lebanon and to a greater extent in
Syria, the fact of the matter is that the challenge they pose to us, while
serious, is not imminent. And because it isn’t imminent, it gives us time to
deal with it. And sometimes in international politics, the better part of wisdom
is to defer dangers rather than try to eliminate them altogether instantly,
because the later produces intense counter-reactions that are destructive. We
have time to deal with Iran, provided the process is launched, dealing with the
nuclear energy problem, which can then be extended to involve also security
talks about the region.
In the final analysis, Iran is a serious country, it’s not Iraq. It’s going to
be there. It’s going to be a player. And in the longer historical term, it has
all of the preconditions for a constructive internal evolution if you measure it
by rates of literacy, access to higher education, the role of women in society,
a sense of tradition and status which is real.
I’m convinced that the mullahs are part of the past in Iran, not its future. But
that process can change in Iran, not in a confrontation but through engagement.
I think if we pursue these policies, we can perhaps avert the dangers that we
face but if we do not, I fear that the region will explode, and for that matter,
Israel will be in the long run in great jeopardy.
When we accept today’s realities, American pre-eminence in Middle East affairs
is in danger and without correction, our primacy may last for a short duration.
