Dutch & German Social Democrats and Solidarność

[pieter]

Summary: Peace or freedom? Dilemmas, dialogue and misunderstandings between Dutch
and West German left-wing organizations and the Polish opposition in the 1980s


14 december 1981 – Demonstration in front of the embassy of the Communist Polish Peoples republic in The Hague against 'The Matrial law" in Poland with the Dutch politicians: Harry van den Bergh (PvDA, Dutch labour party) and miss Erica Terpstra ( of the centre right, conservative liberal VVD party).

Christie Miedema

In the 1980s the populations of Eastern and Western Europe had widely divergent views on the East-West conflict. In the West many were convinced that a stable situation in Europe was necessary to maintain peace on the continent. That amounted to the temporary acceptance of the Iron Curtain and of the existence of communist dictatorships. For the Central Europeans and Eastern Europeans who had to live in an unfree situation, it was much more difficult to consent to the status quo. This refusal to accept the current situation was expressed in periodic uprisings in Central and Eastern Europe, such as the strikes in Poland in 1980 and the subsequent creation of the independent trade union Solidarność. Throughout 1980 and 1981 the new trade union attempted to reform the country from below, until General Wojciech Jaruzelski put an end to these developments by declaring martial law on 13 December 1981.


General Wojciech Jaruzelski put an end to Solidarność's attempt to reform the country from below by declaring martial law on 13 December 1981

These kinds of uprisings challenged the East-West divide and presented the West with difficult dilemmas. Supporting the Central and Eastern European populations’ call for freedom was not easyas long as the Central European and Eastern European regimes considered Western human rights criticism and open support to their internal opponents incompatible with good relations between East and West. From the 1970s onwards many Western Europeans considered détente with the Central- and Eastern European regimes to be a condition for maintaining peace in Europe. The détente policy of the 1970s had diminished the level of distrust towards Central- and Eastern Europe. Many Western organizations had started a dialogue with the Central- and Eastern European authorities (Peoples Republic regimes) which had slowly become routine. Criticism was increasingly omitted. This happened at the same moment that the Central- and Eastern European opposition appeared as an independent conversation partner. The establishment of Solidarność raised the question in these Western organisations whether they should contact the opposition as well. Besides that, it confronted them with the choice between prioritizing peace and détente or taking the risk of undermining the good relations with the governments in Central- and Eastern Europe by openly showing solidarity with the freedom struggle of the opposition.

This study focuses on the question of how left-wing organizations dealt with these dilemmas and how they sized up the possibilities to start a transnational, independent dialogue. The context is given by the developments of the opposition in Poland between 1980 and 1989. The research focuses on left-wing organizations, because they cherished both disarmament and détente as well as solidarity and freedom struggle highly. The chosen case studies are the Interchurch Peace Council (Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad; IKV) and the West German Greens (Die Grünen) as examples for the peace movement, the social democrat parties Dutch Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid; PvdA) and the German Social Democrat Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands; SPD) and the trade union confederations Netherlands Trade Union Confederation (Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging; FNV) and the German Confederation of Trade Unions (Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund; DGB). In all six organizations Solidarność caused worries about the relationship between peace, détente, solidarity and human rights, and the dialogue with the opposition.


Walesa leading strike at Lenin shipyards in 1980

For the IKV the exceptional developments in Poland happened simultaneously with the mass mobilization against nuclear weapons in the Netherlands. For this reason it was inclined to see the strikes and reforms in Poland as the counterpart of their own struggle in the West. Martial Law led to the emerging insight that direct contact was needed for a ‘natural alliance’ with the opposition in Central- and Eastern Europe. Counteraction by the Central- and Eastern European regimes and lack of interest in the Central- and Eastern European opposition hindered the establishment of these contacts. Also anxiety existed in their own ranks that the new strategy might hurt the peace struggle and the official contacts with Central-Europe and Eastern Europe. Only in 1985, when the deployment decision was also taken in the Netherlands and the interest in the peace movement in the Central- and Eastern European opposition grew, could the IKV truly start to breathe life into its new strategy. The IKV leadership considered true peace and détente to be unattainable without involvement of the population but it also continued to cherish the institutional dialogue with the Eastern European leadership.


Poster of the the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV)


On October the 29th of 1983 more than 550,000 people took to the streets to demonstrate against the placement of 48 cruise missiles on Dutch soil (in Woensdrecht). It was the biggest demonstration in Dutch history.

To the IKV all contacts with Central-, and Eastern Europe, ‘from below’ and ‘above’, were part of the search for a political solution to the arms race and the division of Europe. Solidarity with the Central- and Eastern European opposition was an important side effect of that, but never the only goal. In the Federal Republic martial law in Poland made a split visible in the already barely homogeneous Green party. On the one side there were party members who wanted to occupy themselves only with the struggle for unilateral disarmament, as stated in the Krefeld Appeal. On the other side there were activists who wanted to address the roots of the conflict, as formulated in the European Nuclear Disarmament (END) Appeal. In 1983 the balance in the Green party shifted from a majority position for the END-activists to dominance of the Krefeld faction. This expressed itself in a decline of open solidarity with the opposition and more rapprochement towards the Central- and Eastern European authorities. In dealing with Poland’s past as a victim of the Second World War many Green politicians behaved as de facto allies of the government in Warsaw. Because large sections of the Green party were only interested in the GDR (East-Germany, DDR) and Poland as a victim of the war, the END activists could create close contact with the Central- and Eastern European opposition in the margin.


The Krefeld Appeal (November 1980) called on the federal government to withdraw its support for NATO's Dual-Track Decision and sought to provide a common platform for the various groups that were protesting the nuclear arms buildup.


Gdansk shipyard workers, August 1981

In the PvdA (Dutch Labour party) in the 1970s the Atlantic old guard was slowly replaced by a younger generation that wanted to give more priority to détente. This led to the official declaration by the party that in the short term disarmament had priority over human rights. In the long term détente would automatically lead to liberalization in Eastern Europe, because states that did not feel threatened from outside would more easily liberalize internally. Solidarność challenged this assumption, which led to fierce discussions between ‘solidarists’ and ‘détentists’ in the PvdA. The new International Secretary Maarten van Traa tried to find a middle ground between these positions with his policy of ‘dynamic’ détente policy in which human rights activism and contact with the opposition would play an important role next to the dialogue with the authorities. By successfully supporting the opposition in Czechoslovakia (Charta 77) the PvdA showed that also a party which valued peace and détente highly could support the opposition. In the end, however, these activities remained a footnote to the official détente dialogue with the communist authorities. For the SPD, which stood at the basis of European détente, the maintenance of peace and détente was even more important than for the PvdA. After the establishment of Solidarność many party members feared a repetition of the crackdown on the uprisings in Budapest in 1956 and in Prague in 1968. This would endanger the good relations with the Central- and Eastern European Communist authorities which the SPD deemed necessary to maintain peace and détente in Europe. The Social Democratic party was prepared to go a long way to prevent this. It was remarkably conciliatory after the declaration of martial law. The SPD was very eager to believe the promises of the Polish leadership that it would continue reforms, because it did not see another way to change the situation in Central- and Eastern Europe other than through gradual changes from above. It considered open protest to be counterproductive. Only diplomacy behind the scenes would be able to convince the authorities to liberalize. This way the SPD ignored the symbolic value of political positioning for the Central- and Eastern European opposition. Anxious that the official dialogue about détente could be harmed, the SPD avoided contact with the opposition. This caused long-lasting mistrust of the Central- and Eastern European opposition towards the SPD. Nonetheless many in the SPD remained convinced that its détente policy indirectly provided the most optimal support to the opposition.


Dutch Labour party, PvdA, election poster of 1981


SPD election poster 1981 in West-Berlin

Also for the Dutch Trade Union FNV during the 1970s the dialogue with the authorities had become so selfevident that it was not inclined to give that up after the establishment of Solidarność. At the same time the FNV did not consider Solidarność to be a threat for détente. It was however anxious that a careless Western reaction could prompt a Soviet invasion. Although it was obvious for the FNV that it would contact Solidarność, its first stance was reticent and genuine contact therefore started off late. After 13 December 1981 the FNV protested fiercely and refused relations with the new official Polish trade union confederation. The dialogue of the FNV with other Central- and Eastern European trade union confederations that remained loyal to their regimes, however, was hardly hindered at all by the events. Inside the organization there was remarkably little discussion about how to combine solidarity and détente.


The Federation of Dutch Trade Unions (FNV) supported Solidarność

In West Germany the DGB (Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund), which for years had loyally supported the foreign policy of the SPD just like the FNV, now considered the Western reactions, not the Polish workers, the greatest potential threat for peace and détente. West Germans in particular could too easily be branded as revanchists. The ensuing support was mainly conducted in silence, in agreement with Solidarność, in order not to provoke an anti-German propaganda campaign. This way in the West German media the idea could come into existence that DGB kept itself far from the struggle of the Polish workers out of fear of harming détente. This image was confirmed by the fact that the DGB was little interested in demonstrations and protest after the declaration of martial law. By its refusal to establish contacts with the new official Polish trade union confederation, it, however, showed it understood the importance of symbolic choices. Beyond rules and loyalty to the SPD contact with the Polish underground trade union leadership and risky actions, however, appeared possible.

The choice the six organizations made in the dilemmas and the dialogue was heavily influenced by the extent to which they considered themselves to be responsible for the maintenance of détente. The SPD, as a big political party in state at the front of the East-West conflict, considered it its duty to prevent a nuclear war. It was convinced that attempts to create change in Central- and Eastern Europe ‘from below’ would endanger the stability on the continent and it therefore refrained from open solidarity with the opposition.

Also the Dutch Labour Party, the PvdA and the labour movement in both countries felt a social responsibility for the maintenance of détente. Contrary to the SPD they were however less prepared to sacrifice the freedom of the people in Central and Eastern Europe for it. With cautious behaviour they tried to support Solidarność politically and morally without harming the Polish trade union nor détente. A part of the IKV and the Greens explicitly chose solidarity over détente. As countermovement the peace movement could more easily and with fewer consequences detach itself from the broadly felt responsibility for peace and détente in society. Many peace activists valued the traditional détente less and less. From a position of ‘equidistance’ they equally mistrusted the authorities in both blocs, and ever more frequently considered them to be interchangeable. For this reason they were little inclined to leave the solution to the problems between East and West only to high-level politicians and instead placed their hopes in détente
between movements ‘from below’.


The Hague, 19 November 1982, the Dutch Federation of Dutch Trade Unions FNV chairman Wim Kok demonstrates at the Polish Embassy for the Polish trade union Solidarność.

All organizations maintained contacts with the authorities in Central- and Eastern Europe, which throughout the majority of the 1980s the Central- and Eastern European authorities seemed to be unavoidable conversation partners. The organizations differed more in how they dealt with contact with the opposition. This also influenced the content of the dialogue. Organizations that had an unconventional, informal approach in contacting the opposition were often confronted with differences of opinion in an early stage, but that way could work to create respect and mutual understanding. Organizations that favoured a formal approach and mainly contacted the opposition in the fringes of an official programme, did not have the time nor openness to speak out and overcome the mutual mistrust and lack of understanding. Similar differences were visible in showing solidarity. The more established and formally operating SPD, DGB and FNV were also so focused on effectiveness of support that symbolic actions were subordinated to it. This was less the case for organizations such as the IKV, the Greens and surprisingly also the PvdA, that dealt with things on a more ad hoc basis. To the opposition effective material help was important, but symbolic and political recognition from the West was perhaps just as crucial. Both in the Netherlands and West Germany, Polish emigrants played a role in the discussions about the dilemmas and the establishment of a transnational dialogue. In the Netherlands very little knowledge about Poland existed. This way emigrants could become desired conversation partners in the media and organizations. In the Federal Republic (Bundesrepublik Deutschland) this was less the case because of the existence of more expertise on Poland. Polish emigrants in the Netherlands developed understanding for the Western point of view and could play a bridging role, because they were close to the decision making process. At the same time Polish emigrants in the Federal Republic remained stuck in misunderstanding.


Polish emigrants in the Netherlands developed understanding for the Western point of view and could play a bridging role, because they were close to the decision making process. In this photo you see Polish immigrants in the Netherlands organising support for the Solidarność cause.

The extent to which these emigrants were able to gain influence in organizations differed among the movements. The labour movement was willing to listen, but only to official representatives of Solidarność. The peace movement and the PvdA were open to the broader Polish community, but because of the fact that the sometimes contradictory advice and criticism did not have the authority of a direct message from Solidarność, they felt less inclined to follow up on it. The SPD tended to ignore the Polish emigrant community, which did not have the network, reputation or knowledge of the social democrat habitus needed to be heard by the SPD, almost totally. All organizations were mainly willing to listen to what suited their own point of view, wishes and doubts. For emigrants it was most effective to confront their Western conversation partners directly with the opposition in Poland itself. The misunderstandings and walls of incomprehension that they ran into in contact with the opposition, forced them to learn the lessons that they had refused to accept from the emigrants at home.

This research is part of a recent tendency to write the history of the East-West conflict on the level of civil society and transnational connections. It shows how diplomatic concepts such as détente also gained a role on the level of transnational relations between social organizations and gained a new meaning. The case of the peace movement, that is usually left out in research on the Western reaction to Solidarność, illustrated that the Western reaction to the events in Poland was not always determined by national factors, but could also have important transnational components. The research furthermore shows that reticence out of fear of harming détente was a widely existing phenomenon that did not only exist in the Federal Republic, but was more understandable there than in other countries, because of the justified fear of anti-German propaganda campaigns. However, by showing their attachment to Poland mainly through humanitarian help, West German organizations disregarded the equally crucial political symbolic support to the Polish opposition. Lastly, this thesis also shows that the way the West dealt with Solidarność often had far less to do with negative presumptions than with wishful thinking. Only the direct dialogue across the Iron Curtain was able to tackle both. In most cases the more unconventional an organization was in this dialogue, the more successful it could be in eradicating misunderstanding, myths and incomprehension. All organizations struggled with the question of whether peace or freedom had priority over the other. Only those that were prepared to nuance their own attachment to peace were able to find an answer that suited the answer of the Polish opposition. Freedom, in that answer, was not a result of peace, but a necessary condition for a peace truly worthy of that name.

[pieter]

Jan Minkiewicz 1946 – 2014



As a Pole in the Netherlands, he made the struggle of the Solidarity trade union an important issue in the West as well. He informed and mobilized, all in the service of the Polish cause.

Angela Dekker

21 mei 2014 – published in nr. 21

"Jan Minkiewicz knew like no other how to express how much we craved freedom and what Solidarność meant to us. He also convinced the West to actually do something for the freedom of the Poles. We did not feel abandoned during the state of siege, and that is why we were able to win.” Said Polish President Komorowski's letter pronounced during the funeral of the former spokesperson for Solidarność in the Netherlands who died unexpectedly on 20 April, Jan Minkiewicz.

At the end of the seventies I met him at the International Telephony department of the PTT (Dutch State-owned Postal, Telegraph and Telephony Company) head office in Amsterdam. He had continued his job as a working student here due to a lack of suitable work after studying political science. We were still in the pre-mobile era and private individuals could not automatically call to any other country. With a great sense of humor, Jan showed me the way as a newcomer and so we were obliged to listen at the start of every telephone conversation to see whether the connection had been established properly, and of course we continued to 'check' and plugged in as soon as it became interesting or exciting. During Christmas 1979 we heard the first news about the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, another time we followed the ups and downs of Beatrix who called her mother in Porto Ercole. We sympathized with people who missed each other or quarreled and who hid or shouted precious calling minutes. And of course, when the number of prepaid calling minutes ended, we left the connection open longer.

Jan was a child of a Polish officer who was involved as an engineer before the Second World War in the construction of the Polish submarine De Arend (The Eagle) on shipbuilding company De Schelde in Vlissingen, Zeeland Province, in the South-West of the Netherlands. When the Germans invaded Poland during the test run on the Baltic Sea in 1939, the crew decided to sail to Sweden. Jan was born in Stockholm in 1946. Eastern Poland, the home country, had meanwhile been changed to the Soviet Union and at the invitation of De Schelde, the family returned to Vlissingen.


A Polish submarine being built during the thirties in the shipbuilding company De Schelde in Vlissingen


The Submarine in operation for the Polish Navy

Jan regularly came to Poland during his studies and knew what was going on among the opposition. And then in August 1980 the strikes broke out at the Lenin wharf in the port city of Gdansk. His enthusiasm for the struggle for the independent trade union Solidarność turned to the International Telephony Department. Jan got his own place where he could call on the latest news from strike leader Lech Walesa to the international press. During the day his field of work lay in Europe, at night he informed the Americans. Solidarność soon appointed him as the official spokesperson in the Netherlands and Western Europe. He regularly traveled to Poland and in that same year 1980 became co-founder of the Human Rights Foundation (Merpol) in Poland, which formed a link between the Dutch trade unions, aid organizations and the Polish opposition.


Jan Minkiewicz

At the time, he met his future wife Barbara Malak, a social psychologist and member of the opposition who trained workers in debating and negotiating. An agreement was initially reached on an independent trade union, but in December 1981 General Jaruzelski announced State of emergency. The Solidarność leaders went to prison and Jan was deported. With the support of the Federation of Dutch Trade Unions FNV, he founded the Dutch information agency of the now underground trade union Solidarność (Solidarity) in the P.C. Hooftstreet in Amsterdam, a bare space full of piles of paper from which he informed and mobilized the public for the Polish cause. As a Dutchman of Polish origin, he had knowledge of East and West. Whereas dissidents from Eastern Europe mainly saw a gift for the Soviet Union in the large demonstration against the placement of nuclear weapons on Dutch territory, Jan did not deny this danger, but saw in this generation of committed young people an opportunity for a peaceful Eastern Europe. Western ratio.

When the first non-Communist Polish government took office after the 1989 elections and the union could now operate freely, it closed its office. After the collapse of communism, he remained critical. He saw the fierce criticism of Walesa after his presidency in 1995 and the rapprochement of Solidarność to the most conservative part of the Polish church. The intellectuals left the workers behind, the former Solidarność was lost. He nevertheless retained his drive. He was active in the field of cultural exchanges between Poland and the Netherlands, translated, worked for the Polish division of Radio Free Europe in London and became a correspondent for the Polish daily Gazeta Wyborzca. He kept his job at the PTT which changed to KPN, followed by reorganization with the automation of the telecommunications reorganization. As an active member of the Abva/Kabo trade union, this time he advised his colleagues on the works council and made them resilient for negotiations on the redundancy schemes.

When I met him the last time, for Albert Heijn in the Vijzelstreet in Amsterdam, he was an adviser to the Polish embassy in The Hague. After the initiative for the Poland reporting point of the Rightwing National Populist PVV (Freedom Party) leader Wilders, he acted as an informer and mediator between the Dutch municipalities, the Polish labor migrant organizations and the Polish embassy. Earlier in 2001 he received the Cross of Merit from the Republic of Poland for his work. He was happy with the official compliment, but as a friend said during his funeral: "Jan is one of the few who never did anything for his own gain. He didn't care for a position or status. He was involved but remained independent. "


The Cross of Merit from the Republic of Poland


Jan Minkiewicz, during the eigthies in the Nertherlands

P.S.- Comment Pieter: My mother knew Jan's mother miss Minkiewicz in Vlissingen. We have visited her lovely Green wooden house in the Vlissingen city centre several times. She was a nice old Polish lady, with that typical Polish mentality, sophistication, style and grandeur the old Polish generation had.

[pieter]

Wim Kok during the united FNV-CNV Sunday 19 December 1981 demonstration in Amsterdam

When humanitarian help was requested, the FNV discussed the possibility during a visit of FNV president Wim Kok and his delegation to Gdańsk on the eve of martial law(32). On Sunday 13 December the fnv delegation, returning from their Gdańsk trip, landed at Amsterdam airport and was informed martial law had been declared that night in Poland. The FNV, in cooperation with CNV, immediately staged a protest meeting on the next day – which was arranged for by Kok and Van Rens on arrival at the airport – and participated in the widely supported 19 December demonstration in Amsterdam. The food and medicine campaign for which arrangements had been made during the Gdańsk visit was postponed, because the trusted channels that Solidarność would have offered no longer existed. After securing trustworthy channels through the Roman Catholic church, the planned humanitarian action started soon afterwards.

The action was carried out in cooperation with Polish church structures, but chiefly aimed at Dutch society. To raise money the unions sold protest cards. Most activities were carried out in a strictly national context, although consultation of foreign trade union confederations on Eastern European issues was not uncommon(33). In cooperation with other Dutch organisations the Dutch Support Poland Foundation (NSHP) was established to arrange for all the practical humanitarian help being sent to Poland in the winter of 1981/1982 and the following years. The fnv collected over 200,000 guilders for Solidarność in the first months after martial law. The quarter million that Kok had hoped for was not reached due to dwindling interest. The FNV and the CNV also financially supported the Solidarność Information Office in Amsterdam led by Jan Minkiewicz. Together with this office the fnv and cnv organised an adoption campaign to support interned Polish trade unionists(34). The FNV protested against violations of labour rights in Poland, and on the instigation of the icftu and the Polish Exiles protested on several occasions in 1982 to condemn the new trade union law of that October which
outlawed Solidarność(35).


FNV union poster "Solidarity with Solidarność", Paradiso is a Rock and Pop concert hall in Amsterdam, the Netherlands[/font][/i]

In contacts with official trade unions in Eastern Europe, the FNV strived to bring up the matter of Poland. It also opposed regular continuation of multilateral contacts with the official confederations, but did not want to provoke unnecessary confrontation(36). The attention for Solidarność, however, slowly receded as the situation steadily liberalized in Poland, and a re-emergence of Solidarność remained impossible. Between 1984 and 1988 the fnv had hardly exploited any own activity for Solidarność. For practical support, FNV mainly referred to the international level of icftu and etuc and to the Dutch humanitarian organisation NSHP. The cessation of subsidy to the Dutch Solidarność office in favour of cooperation with the Brussels Coordinating Office at the end of 1983 is a clear example of this switch from the national level to transnational institutions(37).
Only the re-emergence of Solidarność in the public attention in 1988, on the eve of the revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe one year later, would slightly increase the FNV’s activity for Poland. The fnv however, mainly acted as a member of the icftu, for example as a contributor in the schooling campaign for Solidarność(38). Some patterns remained similar to the early 1980s.

For example the FNV was still bolder than the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB). Visiting a conference without official consent of the guest authorities, as the FNV did to the Solidarność human rights conference of 1988 (on the icftu’s suggestion), would have been unthinkable for the DGB. Even for the FNV representative Leo Mesman, however, it had not been easy to obtain the permission of the FNV board to visit this conference on a tourist visa. Despite this boldness, Mesman still showed typically left-wing abhorrence of the strong American rhetoric at the conference, and in his report he criticised Solidarność’s taste in friends(39). The consistent Dutch position between two extremes can be explained by national circumstances. Geopolitically and emotionally less dependent on the Eastern Bloc than the Germans and Austrians were, the Dutch FNV showed more reticence towards the official trade unions and were bolder in their support of Solidarność. Although it valued highly the processes of détente, it did not go so far as to sacrifice human rights for peace(40).

For further reading read: www.persee.fr/docAsPDF/rbph_0035-0818_2011_num_89_3_8358.pdf (pages 1315 until 1329)

The Transnationality of Dutch Solidarity with the Polish Opposition 1980-1989

This article examines Dutch solidarity with the Polish independent trade union Solidarność on the basis of three social movements: the trade unions, the peace movement, and Polish Solidarność exiles in the Netherlands. The major Dutch trade unions FNV and CNV were in touch with and in support of Solidarność much earlier and more explicitly than the peace movement IKV. The latter sided with the Polish opposition only after the proclamation of martial law and found an equal partner only after the foundation of the Polish peace movement Freedom and Peace in 1985. However, while approaching Eastern Europe, peace movements – just as exiles – had many more contacts with other Western European activists. By contrast, the trade unions’ transnational scope was limited to a bilateral collaboration with Poland.

Other Links:
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federatie_Nederlandse_Vakbeweging
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christelijk_Nationaal_Vakverbond
www.paxforpeace.nl/about-us de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interkirchlicher_Friedensrat

[pieter]

The labour movement


Solidarity was not only a trade union, but above all, an opposition movement against communist totalitarianism.

The question of whether to contact official Eastern European trade union confederations was hotly debated by the Dutch trade union confederations in the late 1960s. In the early 1970s the Dutch confederations decided to no longer ignore Eastern Europe, with the argument that contacts could have a profitable influence on détente, internal liberalisation and mutual trust(17). Although these discussions were held in these years throughout the icftu member unions and were influenced by discussions in other countries(18), the outcomes were very dependent on national factors.
The fnv itself recognised the great differences in national approaches that existed towards official unions. It distinguished two extremes. On the one hand was the line of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (afl/cio) and the French Force Ouvrière (fo)
which only wanted to fight the Eastern European system and therefore did not want any contact with official unions there. And on the other hand was the German, Austrian and Finnish position of contacting Eastern European unions “without cherishing the idea that independence of and democracy in the Eastern European labour movement could be attained”(19). It saw its own aim as somewhere in between: to discuss “each others role, place and function in society” honestly and openly. This included issues of détente, but
also trade union independence(20). Although the fnv clearly felt closer to the German Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (dgb) than the American afl/cio in politics and rhetoric, the differences were remarkable. For the FNV, dialogue
with trade unions in the Soviet Union and the gdr, important partners for theDGB, was undesirable. The dgb not only sought contact considerably earlier than the fnv, but also much more broadly(21). Also regarding Solidarność, the fnv position can be found in the middle between two extremes. Eagerness for official contacts often corresponded with reticence towards Solidarność and the positions now ranged from the strong Solidarność support and rhetoric by the afl/cio to the not very visible, silent support of the German and Austrian trade unions(22). The FNV did not approve of the hawkish language of the Americans, but on the other hand also refused to see Solidarność as a threat to détente as some in Austria did, for example. In their speeches after martial law, the FNV leadership even put it the other way around: “A positive consolidation of the democratic achievements there [in Poland] could stimulate détente between the East and the West. Martial law and the deployment of police and army could be dangerous and could harm the awakening détente”(23). The FNV was not immune to the Dutch society’s huge focus on peace and advocated an active role of trade unions in the process of détente and disarmament. However, it considered
real peace impossible without social justice and respect for human rights(24). This attitude was in contrast with some of the more hesitant attitudes on the Western European left, of which the first press release of the Socialist International after martial law, signed by Willy Brandt, is an interesting example. It warned of “unwanted advice or strongly worded declarations”, asked for the restraint and cooperation “of those wanting peace” and took note of the Polish intention not to interrupt the reform process(25). Anxiety
to preserve peace and good relations with the East seem to have driven away any reference to human rights from this declaration.

[pieter]

The Transnationality of Dutch Solidarity

with the Polish Opposition 1980-1989
Christie Miedema
Universiteit van Amsterdam


The Poles need your bread, please done. Action poster of the Dutch trade Union FNV for Solidarność

In August 1980 strikes broke out on the Lenin shipyard in Gdańsk. The resulting Gdańsk agreement of 31 August provided the revolutionary possibility of an independent trade union in a socialist country, and shortly afterwards the Independent Self-governing Trade Union Solidarność was established. For fifteen months Solidarność carved out its position in society in competition with the communist party. People in Poland and abroad held their breaths in fear of a Soviet invasion. It was the Polish authorities, however, who would intervene, and not the Soviets, when on 13 December 1981 General Jaruzelski declared martial law. The response from the West was mixed. The United States reacted particularly furiously with sanctions against Poland and the Soviet Union, while Western Europe reacted more cautiously, fearing the strong American response would risk the achievements of détente in Europe(1).

The reaction of the West to martial law in the winter of 1981 did not come out of the blue. From the beginning of Solidarność Western governments and organisations made their own assessments of the Polish developments. These ranged from outright support and strong vocal rhetoric, especially from the American side, to the more cautious concerns for the maintenance of peace and the balance of power in Social Democrat circles closer to the Iron Curtain. The aim of this article is to assess the transnationality of this contrasting Western support for Solidarność. For this purpose, the focus of this study will be on the Netherlands. As a country that was formerly seen as
a loyal ally of the United States and fiercely anti-communist, the Netherlands was increasinlgy tinted by growing anti-Americanism, neutralist tendencies and a successful anti-cruise missile movement from the 1960s onwards. The country was feared to become the breeding ground for a highly contagious form of neutralist disease: ‘Hollanditis.

The widely discussed but little defined concept of transnationality is considered here to consist of transfers, dialogues, networks and movements beyond borders. Transnational interaction distinguishes itself through its spontaneous, grassroots level and the secondary role of the national component, while international interaction is considered here to be the more institutionalised, classic interaction between well-defined national institutions. Transnationalism is also distinguished from national activity within national borders and circumstances. There are several levels of transnationalism, ranking from bilateral (the Netherlands and Poland) to multilateral.
The latter can consist of both West European cooperation and cooperation across the Iron Curtain. Social movements have often been seen as an important transnational actor. Håkan Thörn argues that the anti-apartheid movement – one of the largest solidarity movements in history – was very transnational and made a great impact on transnational political cultures up until today(5). Idesbald Goddeeris and Stefan Berger, however, showed that border-transcending solidarity activity is not inherently transnational and they consider the Western trade union solidarity with Solidarność to be of a far more national nature. According to Goddeeris, domestic factors such as religious or ideological affinity, or parallels with own national experiences were often among the main reasons to support Solidarność. The fact that Solidarność, contrary to South Africa, was a Cold War issue pur sang, stimulated these different national appreciations and hampered a common transnational approach. Also, the fact that the very institutionalised labour movement was the main carrier of solidarity with Solidarność, made this movement less flexible and transnational than the new grassroots anti-Apartheid initiatives(6).

These conclusions are based on an analysis of trade union solidarity, the most obvious Western support of Solidarność, which has to date attracted more research attention. In this article I elaborate upon the argument that the trade union’s high level of institutionalisation hampered transnational cooperation. By studying two more grassroots based movements, I would like to show that on a low level of institutionalisation personal transnational networks could come into existence which largely withdrew from national Cold War contexts and lifted the issues to a transnational level. After shortly assessing the thus far unstudied Dutch trade union case to verify Goddeeris’s thesis, I will then look beyond the labour movement to two actors in the solidarity movement: the peace movement and the exiles. The peace movement occupied itself exclusively with Cold War issues, nevertheless it has often been presumed to be an important transnational actor. Many authors, such as Patrick Burke and Benjamin Ziemann stress its transnational collective action frame and the strong informal and organisational linkage of persons and ideas across borders(8). Others emphasize the transnational character of the dialogue between intellectuals and grassroots movements that transcended the Iron Curtain in the 1980s, in which the peace movement played a key role(9). At the same time, Ziemann and Burke argue that despite its global aspirations and transnational traits, national circumstances and national identity were also of vital importance for the peace movement(10). By using the example of the Dutch peace movement, however, I would like to show that despite these different national
perceptions and contexts, solidarity in a difficult Cold War context could still lead to transnational aspirations and cooperation.

The Polish exile support represents an even more personal and spontaneous organisational structure than the peace movement, and an even more inherently transnational one. I, however, argue that only after the emergence of a peace movement in Poland in 1985 did both the peace movement and the exile support receive a real boost in transnational orientation. These three movements are of a different level of institutionalisation and ‘age’. The Dutch labour movement was the obvious traditional partner for Solidarność. In the 1970s the three main Dutch labour confederations, National Federation of Christian Trade Unions (cnv), Dutch Federation of Catholic Unions (nkv) and Dutch Association of Trade Unions (nvv) started talks about a possible merger. In the mid 1970s the latter two decided to establish the Federation of Dutch Labour Movements (fnv). The cnv granted priority to its Christian identity and left the talks. The merger was completed on 1 January 1982. At that moment fnv had almost one million
members, compared to around 300,000 members for the cnv, the second largest confederation. In this article the focus will be on the largest movement fnv. Although in many other countries such as Italy and Belgium the Christian confederation was the most active supporter of Solidarność, partly due to the shared Catholic identity(12), in the Netherlands the cnv did not play this extraordinary role. Strong Catholic overtones neither had a place in the mainly Protestant cnv, nor in the newly merged fnv. The cnv support for Solidarność was very similar to that of the fnv and was marked by extensive cooperation with the latter(13). The second social movement assessed, the Interchurch Peace Council (ikv), was established by nine Dutch churches, but largely acted independently from them, and was the chief actor in the very successful Dutch anti-cruise missile mobilisation. In 1981, the ikv assembled 400,000 demonstrators against missile deployment in the Netherlands. Two years later, in cooperation with more traditional movements like the fnv and political parties, 550,000 joined the demonstrations.

The third case, the Polish exile support, was closely intertwined with the Dutch labour and peace movement and was an intrinsic part of the general support of Dutch society for Poland. The Dutch Solidarność Information Office was established in January 1982 by Jan Minkiewicz – son of Polish post-war emigrants, and also before 1982 active in a small lobby group for Poland – and three stranded Solidarność members, Józef Szyguła and Ireneusz and Mieczysław Maligłówka. It functioned as a department of the Coordinating Office in Brussels, led by Jerzy Milewski, on instigation of the Solidarność Underground. Furthermore, Minkiewicz became the Western representative of the Polish peace movement Wolność i Pokój (Freedom and Peace) in 1985(15). Besides being the home base of one of the dominant peace movements in Western Europe(16), the Netherlands thus also became the Western base of Polish peace demands. This makes it an interesting case when studying the transnationality of the peace movement’s solidarity with the Polish opposition in contrast with that of the labour movement.

[pieter]

[kaima]

I ran across this interesting graphic that shows how the Polish domestic vote has sometimes been divided along the VERY old divisions of Poland!

These now-internal borders existed in part during the Polish partitions 1772 to 1918. It is hard to imagine that these borders would be so strongly reflected in today's values divide in Poland 100 years later!

[Jaga]

Kai, yes, this is exactly what is happening in Poland. People are split between the rural and poor East and more urbanized and liberal West. Warsaw, Wroclaw and Krakow are very liberal. My friends who died because of Covid and due to not taking vaccinations were living in very Eastern part of Poland

[Jaga]

Pieter, it is good to see Solidarity from Dutch perspective. Hard to imagine how long time ago this all happened, and now we have another war.