The Cost of Afghanistan

[kaima]

Counting the costs of America’s 20-year war in Afghanistan
By ISABEL DEBRE
today


FILE - In this Oct. 27, 2013 file photo, relatives surround the body of a 10-year-old Afghan girl who was killed by a roadside bomb, apparently targeting a group of soldiers, during her funeral on the outskirts of Kabul, Afghanistan. America’s longest war, the two-decade-long conflict in Afghanistan that started in the wake of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, killed tens of thousands of people, dogged four U.S. presidents and ultimately proved unwinnable despite its staggering cost in blood and treasure. (AP Photo/Rahmat Gul, File)
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates (AP) — America’s longest war, the two-decade-long conflict in Afghanistan that started in the wake of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, killed tens of thousands of people, dogged four U.S. presidents and ultimately proved unwinnable despite its staggering cost in blood and treasure.

This final chapter, with President Joe Biden’s decision to pull all American troops from Afghanistan by the 20th anniversary of the terrorist attacks, has prompted a reckoning over the war’s lost lives and colossal expenditure.

Here’s a look at the spiraling cost of America’s campaign — the bloodshed, wasted funds and future consequences for the war-battered nation teetering on the brink of chaos.

THE COST IN LIVES

Afghans have paid the highest price. Since 2001, at least 47,245 civilians have been killed in the war as of mid-April, according to the Costs of War project at Brown University, which documents the hidden costs of the post-9/11 wars.



Gun and bomb attacks targeting civilians surged to previously unseen heights since the intra-Afghan peace negotiations opened in Qatar last fall, according to the U.N. Watchdogs say the conflict has killed a total of 72 journalists and 444 aid workers.

The Afghan government keeps the toll among its soldiers secret to avoid undermining morale, but Costs of War estimates the war has killed 66,000 to 69,000 Afghan troops.

The war has forced 2.7 million Afghans to flee abroad, mostly to Iran, Pakistan and Europe, the U.N. said. Another 4 million are displaced within the country, which has a total population of 36 million.

Meanwhile, 2,442 U.S. troops have been killed and 20,666 wounded in the war since 2001, according to the Defense Department. It’s estimated that over 3,800 U.S. private security contractors have been killed. The Pentagon does not track their deaths.

The conflict also has killed 1,144 personnel from the 40-nation NATO coalition that trained Afghan forces over the years, according to a tally kept by the website iCasualties. The remaining 7,000 allied troops also will withdraw by Biden’s 9/11 deadline.

THE COST IN DOLLARS

The U.S. has spent a stunning total of $2.26 trillion on a dizzying array of expenses, according to the Costs of War project.

The Defense Department’s latest 2020 report said war-fighting costs totaled $815.7 billion over the years. That covers the operating costs of the U.S. military in Afghanistan, everything from fuel and food to Humvees, weapons and ammunition, from tanks and armored vehicles to aircraft carriers and airstrikes.

Although America first invaded to retaliate against al-Qaida and rout its hosts, the Taliban, the U.S. and NATO soon pivoted to a more open-ended mission: nation-building on a massive scale.



Washington has poured over $143 billion into that goal since 2002, according to the latest figures from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR).

Of that, $88 billion went to training, equipping and funding Afghan military and police forces. Another $36 billion was spent on reconstruction projects, education and infrastructure like dams and highways, the SIGAR report said. Another $4.1 billion has gone to humanitarian aid for refugees and disasters. The campaign to deter Afghans from selling heroin around the world cost over $9 billion.

Unlike with other conflicts in American history, the U.S. borrowed heavily to fund the war in Afghanistan and has paid some $530 billion in interest. It has also paid $296 billion in medical and other care for veterans, according to Costs of War. It will continue to pay both those expenses for years to come.

FOLLOWING THE MONEY

Much of the billions lavished on huge infrastructure projects went to waste, the U.S. inspector general discovered. Canals, dams and highways fell into disrepair, as Afghanistan failed to absorb the flood of aid. Newly built hospitals and schools stood empty. Without proper oversight, the U.S. money bred corruption that undermined government legitimacy.

Despite the costly counternarcotics campaign, opium exports reached record heights. Despite the billions in weapons and training to Afghan security forces, the Taliban increased the amount of territory they control. Despite vast spending on job creation and welfare, unemployment hovers around 25%. The poverty rate has fluctuated over the years, reaching 47% through 2020, according to the World Bank, compared to 36% when the fund first began calculating in 2007.

“We invested too much with too little to show for it,” said Michael Wahid Hanna, a senior fellow at the Washington-based Century Foundation.

THE COST OF LEAVING

Although few want to prolong the war interminably, many fear its final end may jeopardize Afghanistan’s modest gains in health, education and women’s rights, made in the early years as the U.S. expanded the economy and toppled the Taliban, which had imposed tough strictures on women.

Since 2001, life expectancy has increased to 64 years from 56, the World Bank says. Maternal mortality has more than halved. Opportunities for education have grown, with the literacy rate rising 8% to roughly 43%. Life in cities has improved, with 89% of residents having access to clean water, compared to 16% before the war.

Child marriage has declined by 17%, according to U.N. data. Girls’ enrollment in primary school has nearly doubled, and more women have entered college and served in Parliament. These figures still pale compared with global standards.

But more broadly, the failure of America’s ambitions to build a stable, democratic Afghanistan has left the country mired in uncertainty as U.S. forces leave. The nation’s history tells of civil war that follows foreign invasions and withdrawals.

“For better or worse, the U.S. has a serious stabilizing presence right now, and once that’s gone there’s going to be a power vacuum,” said Michael Callen, an Afghanistan economy expert at the London School of Economics. “In the 20 years’ war, there’s going to be a whole lot of scores that need to be settled.”

apnews.com/article/asia-pacific-afghanistan-middle-east-business-5e850e5149ea0a3907cac2f282878dd5

[Jaga]

At least this was a justifiable war, not like Iraq's war. I worry about the rights of the women now, after US would withdraw. Lets hope that Afghani will learn from the neighboring countries. The situation of women improved drastically during the last two years even in Saudi Arabia.

[kaima]

Former Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai
"We Afghans Are Just Being Used Against Each Other"[/b]
Former Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai, 63, on his empathy for the Taliban, his bitter disappointment with the former protective power, the United States, and why he considers the EU as his role model. He says the key to war and peace for his country, however, lies with Pakistan.

Interview Conducted by Susanne Koelbl in Kabul
22.05.2021, 16.19 Uhr



Former Afghan President Hamid Karzai: "I realized early into my tenure as president that this war is not our conflict."



Former Afghan President Hamid Karzai: "I realized early into my tenure as president that this war is not our conflict." Foto: Massoud Hossaini / AFP

DER SPIEGEL: Mr. Karzai, the Taliban are the very specter of terror in Afghanistan, threatening anyone who works with the government in Kabul with death. Yet you call the Taliban your "brothers." Why?



Karzai: I realized early into my tenure as president that this war is not our conflict, and we Afghans are just being used against each other - the republic against the Taliban and the Taliban against us. Both the Afghan Republic and the Taliban are victims of these external forces. That is why we are suffering.

DER SPIEGEL: Who is playing against whom here?

Karzai: After the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the U.S., Washington took the historic opportunity to pursue its global ambitions in Afghanistan. Just look at our position on the map. Afghanistan is the most strategically important place in today’s global contest for supremacy. At the same time, Pakistan started using the Taliban to further its own agenda in Afghanistan.

DER SPIEGEL: If the U.S. goal is not to fight radical Islam, what is it about?

Karzai: Of course there are local and regional conflicts, but definitely more important is the issue of geostrategic domination. Over the past 300 years, we have always had at least two rival superpowers in our neighborhood. In the 19th century, it was the Russians and the colonial British Empire. Then, in the second half of the 20th century, it was Russia and the United States.



Soviet troops pulling out of Afghanistan in 1989: "Over the past 300 years, we have always had at least two rival superpowers in our neighborhood."
Soviet troops pulling out of Afghanistan in 1989: "Over the past 300 years, we have always had at least two rival superpowers in our neighborhood." Foto: Tass/ picture-alliance/ dpa
And now, in the 21st century, it’s the United States and the new global superpower China, as well as Russia – all of which are playing out their rivalries in our country.


A key moment for me was a meeting with senior U.S. policymakers in Washington in 2013, including President Jimmy Carter's now-deceased former national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski. When I asked whether it was true that America was deliberately promoting radical Islamist forces in Afghanistan and the region, Brzezinski said, yes, they wanted to create as many conflict zones around the USSR as possible, a so-called "arc of crisis”, and that the Soviet invasion was a good opportunity to carry this out. I replied that Islamist extremism had been gravely strengthened as a result and had grown into the danger it is today. Brzezinski replied that from a historical perspective, the rise of a few Islamists was "irrelevant" compared to the failure of communism.




Karzai with U.S. President George W. Bush in 2007: "After the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the U.S., Washington took the historic opportunity to pursue its global ambitions in Afghanistan."
Karzai with U.S. President George W. Bush in 2007: "After the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the U.S., Washington took the historic opportunity to pursue its global ambitions in Afghanistan." Foto: Larry Downing / REUTERS
DER SPIEGEL: What does this contest of world powers have to do with the murderous struggle of the Taliban?

Karzai: When things started to go wrong in Afghanistan – around 2005, 2006, when the extremist terrorist attacks started – we talked to the U.S. about the different causes of the violence. We knew that these attacks were being organized by intelligence in Pakistan and carried out by the Taliban. The U.S. confirmed this independently, telling us: Yes, the violence is coming from Pakistan, and yes, the Taliban's sanctuaries are there. But instead of investigating the root cause of the violence and going after it, Washington started to fund Pakistan's military.

DER SPIEGEL: Officially, the U.S. compensated Pakistan for their cooperation in the war on terror and paid for the use of ports and roads for their supplies to Afghanistan. What was wrong with that?

Karzai: The U.S. was supporting both sides of the conflict at the same time. It was dropping bombs on Afghan villages in order to fight the Taliban, while at the same time, funding the very country accused of organizing Taliban terror campaigns. Former U.S. President Donald Trump once announced that America had paid $35 billion to Pakistan over these past 19 years. This contradictory policy cost thousands of Afghan lives – troops and civilians alike. Tell me, how was Afghanistan supposed to come to peace?

DER SPIEGEL: How has the U.S. responded to your reproachment?

Karzai: There has never been a satisfactory answer. Either the U.S. has really miscalculated strategically, or Pakistan, which is so closely linked to China and Great Britain, is simply more important than we are for achieving Washington's global goals.




Villagers looking for dead family members following a NATO strike in 2012 in the Logar province: "The U.S. was supporting both sides of the conflict at the same time."
Villagers looking for dead family members following a NATO strike in 2012 in the Logar province: "The U.S. was supporting both sides of the conflict at the same time." Foto: Stringer Afghanistan Admin / REUTERS


DER SPIEGEL: What is driving Pakistan to support the Taliban terror campaign in Afghanistan?

Karzai: Pakistan wants to exert strategic influence in Afghanistan through the Taliban. This traces back to fears related to the legacy of British colonial rule in the region.

DER SPIEGEL: Kabul and Islamabad still dispute the so-called Durand Line, which is the official national border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Kabul does not recognize the Durand Line, while Islamabad does. Could this issue be settled in a security agreement?

Karzai: We Afghans very much welcome the British initiative in this regard and want to have strong relations with Pakistan. There is a great opportunity in that. But a strategic partnership between Afghanistan and Pakistan can only exist if there is peace and stability in Afghanistan, if the trust deficit is eliminated, and if Pakistan shows itself to be a good neighbor.




The controversial border area called the Durand Line in the Kunar province: "We want an open exchange between people on both sides, without border controls, and with freedom of movement, similar to what Europeans have achieved today between Germany and France."
Bild vergrößern
The controversial border area called the Durand Line in the Kunar province: "We want an open exchange between people on both sides, without border controls, and with freedom of movement, similar to what Europeans have achieved today between Germany and France." Foto: Emran Feroz
DER SPIEGEL: What specifically is being asked of Afghanistan?

Karzai: Pakistan actually would like Afghanistan to break off relations with India. That is impossible. If we give in to this, we would give up our sovereignty and independence. If we want to send our police or our army or our boys and girls to India for training because it is good for our country, we should do so. Conversely, India should not complain if we have friendly relations with Pakistan.

DER SPIEGEL: Has Kabul to recognize the Durand Line as the official national border, could that alone be the price of peace?

Karzai: If we could have a relationship with Pakistan similar to the model of the European Union, perhaps a solution could be found. The Durand Line would then be a zone rather than a fixed border, and would formally continue to exist. We want an open exchange between people on both sides, without border controls, and with freedom of movement, similar to what Europeans have achieved today between Germany and France.

Karzai with DER SPIEGEL reporter Susanne Koelbl in Kabul: "After the Taliban’s agreement with America, there is no longer any religious or patriotic legitimacy for them to attack their own countrymen."
Bild vergrößern
Karzai with DER SPIEGEL reporter Susanne Koelbl in Kabul: "After the Taliban’s agreement with America, there is no longer any religious or patriotic legitimacy for them to attack their own countrymen." Foto: Said Masiullah Sadat
DER SPIEGEL: Why should Pakistan give up its fight now, with the U.S. withdrawal on the horizon and, with it, the potential to gain the desired influence in Kabul through the Taliban?

Karzai: The Pakistani offensive is in full swing right now. There is fighting going on. But Pakistan must know that it cannot win by force. They may kill us. They may send us bombs, they may send us extremists, but that does not kill our spirit. Dominating Afghanistan from the outside has never worked. It didn't work for the British, it didn't work for the Soviets, and it didn't work for the United States, even with all of its resources. And the Pakistanis will not succeed either. Right now, we are closing ranks in Afghanistan and organizing resistance. So my appeal to Pakistan is: Let's be reasonable. Let's start a civilized relationship between our two countries.






A polling station in Kabul in 2009: How do the Afghans want to live?
Bild vergrößern
A polling station in Kabul in 2009: How do the Afghans want to live? Foto: Hadi Tabrizi / dpa


DER SPIEGEL: There is talk of an upcoming conference in Pakistan, where President Ghani is to meet for the first time with the head of the Taliban, Mullah Hebatullah Akhundzadah. Do you know more?

Karzai: Nothing is official yet. We would welcome such a proposal with the utmost interest. At the same time, we have high hopes for the so-called Troika plus, a diplomatic initiative launched by Russia, which also includes China and the United States.

DER SPIEGEL: What do these three nations want to achieve?

Karzai: The Troika includes the three biggest world powers, including the U.S., which is now withdrawing but which wants to continue helping Afghanistan in the future. Pakistan has also been invited to join. The goal is to bring peace to Afghanistan, and the initial statements are really promising, stressing that Afghanistan should have good relations with its neighbors and not harbor extremists. The strength of the panel is that these countries are able to follow through on their promises. If they want to do something, they can deliver.

DER SPIEGEL: The Taliban claim to represent the majority of Afghans, but the same is claimed by the Republic of Afghanistan. How do the Afghans want to live?

Karzai: Firstly, both sides must stop claiming to have the right to represent the Afghan people while holding the guns of a foreign power in their hands. My advice is this: Let the Taliban come back. Let them participate and prove themselves in public, whether in the Loya Jirga – the traditional representation of the people – in elections or in a referendum, as is customary around the world. Only then will it become clear who truly represents the people.

DER SPIEGEL: In recent months, the Taliban have targeted and killed hundreds of officials and activists, including women. Why should the supporters of the republic still believe in a common future with radical Islamists?

Karzai: After the Taliban’s agreement with America, there is no longer any religious or patriotic legitimacy for them to attack their own countrymen or to instigate conflict here. Additionally, we cannot preserve the achievements of the last 20 years without the full participation of Afghan women. I am particularly proud and happy about their return to public life, by the way, and so are the Afghan people. We cannot allow Afghan girls not to go to school. The Taliban know that.

DER SPIEGEL: When it comes down to it, who will decide on war or peace, Pakistan's intelligence service or the Taliban?

Karzai: Ultimately, the Taliban are also Afghans, and I hope they will stand up to foreign influences where necessary, such as in Pakistan. My appeal to Afghans, including the Taliban, is that we come together and finally take our fate into our own hands against all foreign powers.

[kaima]

RESOURCE LIBRARY | ARTICLE
The Durand Line
Article. A historic, disputed border separates Afghanistan and Pakistan.

By Mary Schons

Friday, January 21, 2011
www.nationalgeographic.org/article/durand-line/

The Durand Line is the 2,640-kilometer (1,640-mile) border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. It’s the result of an agreement between Sir Mortimer Durand, a secretary of the British Indian government, and Abdur Rahman Khan, the emir, or ruler, of Afghanistan. The agreement was signed on November 12, 1893, in Kabul, Afghanistan.

The Durand Line as served as the official border between the two nations for more than one hundred years, but it has caused controversy for the people who live there.



When the Durand Line was created in 1893, Pakistan was still a part of India. India was in turn controlled by the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom ruled India from 1858 until India’s independence in 1947. Pakistan also became a nation in 1947.

Punjabis and Pashtuns

There are two major ethnic groups near the Durand Line. Those two groups are the Punjabis and the Pashtuns. Most Punjabis and Pashtuns are Sunni Muslim. Punjabis are the largest ethnic group in Pakistan. Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan.

There are also a lot of Pashtuns in northwestern Pakistan, where they ruled over 103,600 square kilometers (40,000 square miles) of territory, before being defeated by the British in 1847. At the time, the Pashtuns were fighting to prevent the Punjabis from expanding farther into the mountains of southeastern Afghanistan.

The British established the Durand Line after conquering the Pashtuns. Eighty-five percent of the Durand Line follows rivers and other physical features, not ethnic boundaries. It split the Pashtuns into two separate countries.
Afghanistan governs all the Pashtuns on one side of the Durand Line, while Pakistan governs all the Pashtuns on the other. The Pashtuns on the Pakistan side of the border made up more than half of the Pashtun population, but were now under the control of the Punjabis, which made them angry.

The Pashtuns were also angry at the British colonial government.

Throughout history, colonial forces like the British have set boundaries that cause great tension for people who lived in the colony. Because the officials who drew the Durand Line didn’t consider the ethnic groups that lived in the region, today there are many battles along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. On one side is the Pakistani army, made up mostly of Punjabis, and on the other is the Taliban, made up mostly of Pashtuns.

The Afghanistan government encourages the Pashtun people inside Pakistan to have their own separate state inside that country. For the 41 million Pashtuns in the region, support is also growing for a separate country called Pashtunistan. Pashtunistan is also the name for the area between Afghanistan and Pakistan where most Pashtuns live.

Right now, the Durand Line passes through the Pakistani provinces of North-West Frontier Province, Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and Balochistan. It also includes 10 provinces in Afghanistan.

The conflict between the Taliban, the Afghanistan government, the Pakistani government, and foreign (including American) troops in the area is often violent. The Durand Line endures suicide bombs, air strikes, or street fighting almost every day.


* * *

Pashtuns on Patrol
Two Pashtun men perch on a wall in Jaji Maidan, Khost, Afghanistan, while out on military patrol. Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, and one of the largest ethnic groups in Pakistan.

PHOTOGRAPH BY JESSE WILLIAMS, MYSHOT


Durand Line
The Durand Line serves as the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The line, established in 1893, was reached in an agreement between the Amir of Afghanistan, Abdur Rahman Khan, and the British colonial government of India. It has been disputed by Pakistan, which became an independent nation in 1947, and Afghanistan ever since.

MAP COURTESY THE NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC SOCIETY

[pieter]

Folks,

Excellent topic, excellent presentation and good reply Jaga and last post Ron (Kaima). Very factual. The Netherlands was and is military involved in Afghanistan (Uruzgan), Iraq, Mali, on the Syrian-Golan (Israel) border, in Southern Lebanon (Unifil), Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Cambodja, and before that the Netherlands New Guinea conflict with Indonesia in 1962, the Korea war, the Indonesian War of Indepenence and the Second World War. The Afghanistan conflict goes back to the British Raj (/rɑːdʒ/; from rāj, literally, "rule" in Sanskrit and Hindustani), the rule by the British Crown on the Indian subcontinent from 1858 to 1947.

By the early 19th century, the Afghan empire was under threat from the Persians in the west and the Sikh Empire in the east. Fateh Khan, leader of the Barakzai tribe, had installed 21 of his brothers in positions of power throughout the empire. After his death, they rebelled and divided up the provinces of the empire between themselves. During this turbulent period, Afghanistan had many temporary rulers until Dost Mohammad Khan declared himself emir in 1823. Punjab and Kashmir were lost to Ranjit Singh, who invaded Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in March 1823 and captured the city of Peshawar at the Battle of Nowshera. In 1837, during the Battle of Jamrud near the Khyber Pass, Akbar Khan and the Afghan army failed to capture the Jamrud Fort from the Sikh Khalsa Army, but killed Sikh Commander Hari Singh Nalwa, thus ending the Afghan-Sikh Wars. By this time the British were advancing from the east and the first major conflict during "The Great Game" was initiated.

In 1838, the British marched into Afghanistan and arrested Dost Mohammad, sent him into exile in India and replaced him with the previous ruler, Shah Shuja. Following an uprising, the 1842 retreat from Kabul of British-Indian forces and the annihilation of Elphinstone's army, and the Battle of Kabul that led to its recapture, the British placed Dost Mohammad Khan back into power and withdrew their military forces from Afghanistan. In 1878, the Second Anglo-Afghan War was fought over perceived Russian influence, Abdur Rahman Khan replaced Ayub Khan, and Britain gained control of Afghanistan's foreign relations as part of the Treaty of Gandamak of 1879. In 1893, Amir Abdur Rahman signed an agreement in which the ethnic Pashtun and Baloch territories were divided by the Durand Line. This was a standard divide and rule policy of the British and woul, especially with newly-formed state of Pakistan. Shia-dominated Hazarajat and pagan Kafiristan remained politically independent until being conquered by Abdur Rahman Khan in 1891–1896. He was known as the "Iron Amir" for his features and his ruthless methods against tribes. The Iron Amir viewed railway and telegraph lines coming from the Russian and British empires as "trojan horses" and therefore prevented railway development in Afghanistan. He died in 1901, replaced by his son Habibullah Khan.

During World War I, when Afghanistan was neutral, Habibullah Khan was met by officials of the Central Powers in the Niedermayer–Hentig Expedition, to declare full independence from the United Kingdom, join them and attack British India, as part of the Hindu–German Conspiracy. Their efforts to bring Afghanistan into the Central Powers failed, but it caused discontent among the population for keeping neutrality against the British. Habibullah was assassinated during a hunting trip in 1919, and Amanullah Khan eventually assumed power. A staunch supporter of the 1915–1916 expeditions, Amanullah Khan evoked the Third Anglo-Afghan War, entering British India via the Khyber Pass.


King Amanullah Khan invaded British India in 1919 and proclaimed Afghanistan's full independence thereafter.

After the end Third Anglo-Afghan War and the signing of the Treaty of Rawalpindi on 19 August 1919, King Amanullah Khan declared Afghanistan a sovereign and fully independent state. He moved to end his country's traditional isolation by establishing diplomatic relations with the international community, particularly with the Soviet Union and the Weimar Republic of Germany.[80][81] Following a 1927–28 tour of Europe and Turkey, he introduced several reforms intended to modernize his nation. A key force behind these reforms was Mahmud Tarzi, an ardent supporter of the education of women. He fought for Article 68 of Afghanistan's 1923 constitution, which made elementary education compulsory. The institution of slavery was abolished in 1923. Khan's wife Queen Soraya Tarzi was a figure during this period.

Some of the reforms that were put in place, such as the abolition of the traditional burqa for women and the opening of several co-educational schools, quickly alienated many tribal and religious leaders, and this led to the Afghan Civil War (1928–1929). Faced with the overwhelming armed opposition, Amanullah Khan abdicated in January 1929, and soon after Kabul fell to Saqqawist forces led by Habibullah Kalakani.[83] Prince Mohammed Nadir Shah, Amanullah's cousin, in turn defeated and killed Kalakani in October 1929, and was declared King Nadir Shah. He abandoned the reforms of Amanullah Khan in favor of a more gradual approach to modernization but was assassinated in 1933 by Abdul Khaliq, a fifteen-year-old Hazara student who was an Amanullah loyalist.

Mohammed Zahir Shah, Nadir Shah's 19-year-old son, succeeded to the throne and reigned from 1933 to 1973. The tribal revolts of 1944–1947 saw Zahir Shah's reign being challenged by Zadran, Safi, Mangal, and Wazir tribesmen led by Mazrak Zadran, Salemai, and Mirzali Khan, among others, many of whom were Amanullah loyalists. Close relations with the Muslim states Turkey, the Kingdom of Iraq and Iran/Persia were also pursued, while further international relations were sought by joining the League of Nations in 1934. The 1930s saw the development of roads, infrastructure, the founding of a national bank, and increased education. Road links in the north played a large part in a growing cotton and textile industry. The country built close relationships with the Axis powers, with Germany having the largest share in Afghan development at the time, along with Italy and Japan.

Nobody is able to control or conquer Afghanistan. Mot the Persians, Not the British Colonials, not the Sovjets and their Afghan Communist henchmen, nor the Afghan war lords (the Mujahideen), the Uzbek general Abdul Rashid Dostum, Mujahideen Leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar of the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin political party, the Uzbek warlord Abdul Malik Pahlawan (rival of Abdul Rashid Dostum), the notorious Mujahideen commander Ismatullah Muslim (Despite his military successes, Ismatullah Muslim was known for the many abuses he committed against civilians, making him a much hated figure throughout Afghanistan, except within his own tribe.), Mohammed Fahim (1957 – 2014) military commander of the Northern Alliance and as a member of Afghanistan's Tajik ethnic group affiliated with the Jamiat Islami (Shura-e Nazar) party of Afghanistan, the military Talibn leader Sirajuddin Haqqani, Mawlawi Muhammad Hussain a.k.a. Jamil al-Rahman (1939–1991), the leader of a Salafist state located in Afghanistan's Kunar Province and militia leader Pacha Khan Zadran (Pashto: پاچا خان ځدراڼ‎) who played a role in driving the Taliban from Paktia Province in the 2001 invasion, with American backing, and he subsequently assumed the governorship of the province. In 2002, he engaged in a violent conflict with rival tribal leaders in the province over the Governorship of the province, shelling Gardez City and obstructing two separate appointed governors sent by Hamid Karzai. Since 2003 the Western forces in Afghanistan (the USA, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, Poland and others) didn't managed either to control parts of Afghanstan for a long time. They did good work for a while, but their work was sabotaged, attacked and hindered by the Taliban, Local Tribes and clans, sometimes hostile elements in the Afghan army who also attacked US and European trainers, soldiers and officers and ground personel. Pakistan, India, China, the Russian Federation and present day Iran also didn't and do not manage to control Afghanistan. Afghanistan has good ties with India and bad ties with Pakistan. Afghan people don't like Pakistan due to the in the point of view of the Afghan's bad role of the Pakistani military intelligence the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence).

The ISI gained global recognition and fame in the 1980s, when it supported the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet Union during the Soviet–Afghan War in the erstwhile Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. During the war, the ISI worked in close coordination with the United States' Central Intelligence Agency and the United Kingdom's Secret Intelligence Service to run Operation Cyclone—a program to train and fund the mujahideen with support from China, Israel, Saudi Arabia and other Muslim nations.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the ISI provided strategic support and intelligence to the Afghan Taliban against the Northern Alliance during the Afghan Civil War in the 1990s.

1982–1997
ISI are believed to have had access to Osama bin Laden in the past. ISI played a central role in the U.S.-backed guerrilla war to oust the Soviet Army from Afghanistan in the 1980s. That Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-backed effort flooded Pakistan with weapons and with Afghan, Pakistani and Arab "mujahideen". The CIA relied on the ISI to train fighters, distribute arms, and channel money. The ISI trained about 83,000 Afghan mujahideen between 1983 and 1997, and dispatched them to Afghanistan. B. Raman, former RAW officer now an Indian think-tank, of South Asia Analysis Group, claims that the Central Intelligence Agency through the ISI promoted the smuggling of heroin into Afghanistan in order to turn the Soviet troops into heroin addicts and thus greatly reducing their fighting potential. The factions that were backed by the ISI were Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-i Islami, and the forces fighting for Jalaluddin Haqqani.

1990
According to Peter Tomsen, the United States Special Envoy to Afghanistan, neighboring Pakistan had tried to install Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in power in Afghanistan against the opposition of all other mujahideen commanders and factions as early as 1990. In October 1990, the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had devised a plan for Hekmatyar to conduct a mass bombardment of the Afghan capital Kabul, then still under communist rule, with possible Pakistani troop enforcements. This unilateral ISI-Hekmatyar plan came although the thirty most important mujahideen commanders had agreed on holding a conference inclusive of all Afghan groups to decide on a common future strategy. The United States finally put pressure on Pakistan to stop the 1990 plan, which was subsequently called off until 1992.

1994
The Taliban regime is widely accepted to have been supported by the ISI and Pakistani military from 1994 to 2001, which Pakistan officially denied during that time, although then Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf now admits to supporting the Taliban until 9/11. According to Pakistani Afghanistan expert Ahmed Rashid, "between 1994 and 1999, an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 Pakistanis trained and fought in Afghanistan" on the side of the Taliban. Following the 9/11 attack on the United States by Al-Qaeda, Pakistan says it felt it necessary to cooperate with the US. Others, however, maintain Pakistan continues to support the Afghan Taliban, which Pakistan rejects.

2008
The Indian Consulate General in Jalalabad was attacked by terrorists in 2007. According to Afghanistan's National Directorate of Security, individuals arrested by the Afghan government stated that the ISI was behind this attack and had given them ₹120,000 for the operation.

2001 onwards
American officials believe members of the Pakistani intelligence service are alerting militants to imminent American missile strikes in Pakistan's tribal areas.[33] In October 2009, Davood Moradian, a senior policy adviser to foreign minister Spanta, said the British and American governments were fully aware of the ISI's role but lacked the courage to confront Islamabad. He claimed that the Afghan government had given British and American intelligence agents evidence that proved ISI involvement in bombings.

2010
A new report by the London School of Economics (LSE) claimed to provide the most concrete evidence yet that the ISI is providing funding, training and sanctuary to the Taliban insurgency on a scale much larger than previously thought. The report's author Matt Waldman spoke to nine Taliban field commanders in Afghanistan and concluded that Pakistan's relationship with the insurgents ran far deeper than previously realised. Some of those interviewed suggested that the organization even attended meetings of the Taliban's supreme council, the Quetta Shura. A spokesman for the Pakistani military dismissed the report, describing it as "malicious". General David Petraeus, commander of the US Central Command, refused to endorse this report in US congressional hearing and suggested that any contacts between ISI and extremists are for legitimate intelligence purposes, in his words "you have to have contact with bad guys to get intelligence on bad guys".

Cheers,
Pieter