Post by pieter on Jan 14, 2014 12:19:45 GMT -7
The Ukrainian–Polish conflict of 1943/44 in the Volhynia-Polissia-Galicia region of contemporary Ukraine
"The Eaglets - the defence of the cemetery" by Wojciech Kossak (1926). Oil on canvas, Polish Army Museum, Warsaw. A painting depicting Polish youths in the Polish uprising against the West Ukrainian People's Republic proclaimed in Lviv.
Centuries of social conflict between the Ukrainian peasantry and Polish nobility, aggravated by ethnic and religious divisions, led to a bitter conflict in the age of nationalism and resulted in the Polish–Ukrainian war in western Ukraine in 1918/19, with the subsequent defeat and downfall of the western Ukrainian People's Republic. This conflict continued during the period of the Polish Second Republic in the 1920–1930s, and was marked by the insurrection of Ukrainian nationalist organizations against the ‘Polish occupation’. This war culminated in terrible massacres of Polish and Ukrainian civilians in the years 1943/44 that left a legacy of enduring mutual prejudice and hatred, reinforced by historical stereotypes that evolved over centuries. During the period of communist rule, this conflict was considered taboo both in Ukraine and Poland, but this changed with the end of the communist era. The controversy reached its peak in 2003, when the conflict's 60th anniversary was commemorated. The political establishments of both countries became involved in heated debates that triggered public discussion in western Ukraine and Poland, affecting relations between the two states. The historical conflict thus took on inter-ethnic and inter-state dimensions.
From the other side, since the very beginning of an independent Ukrainian state in 1991, Poland’s relations with that country have developed favourably, assuming with the passage of time the character of a strategic partnership. They have been underpinned by a skilful practice of problem-solving, based on mutual understanding, and by a concurrence of international policy priorities—especially, Kiev’s ever more vocal European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Coming as an important element of these relations have been contacts at the head-of-state level, for which the year of a presidential election in Ukraine (2004) represented a tough test indeed.
Polish President Alexander Kwasniewski (L) and Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma shake hands during a reconciliation demonstration while inaugurating a Monument to the victims of the massacre of Polish and Ukrainians in Pavlivka village, Volhynia, in Ukraine’s west, on July 11, 2003.
Polish-Ukrainian relations were established soon after Ukraine gained independence from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. They have been improving since, with Poland and Ukraine forming a strong strategic partnership. Various controversies from their shared history occasionally resurface in Polish-Ukrainian relations, but they are not having a major influence on the bilateral relations of Poland and Ukraine.
They are the second and third largest Slavic countries, after Russia. Both countries share a border of about 529 km. Poland's acceptance of the Schengen Agreement created problems with the Ukrainian border traffic. On July 1, 2009 an agreement on local border traffic between the two countries came into effect, which enables Ukrainian citizens living in border regions to cross the Polish frontier according to a liberalized procedure.
Ukraine is the country with the largest number of Polish consulates.
The Orange Revolution and beyond
The presidential election of 2004 brought Ukraine to the brink of disintegration and civil war. Cleared to seek a third term as president by the Constitutional Court, Kuchma instead endorsed the candidacy of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, who was also strongly supported by Russian Pres. Vladimir Putin. Yushchenko—running on an anticorruption, anticronyism platform—emerged as the leading opposition candidate, but his campaign was prevented from visiting Yanukovych’s stronghold of Donetsk and other eastern cities. In September Yushchenko’s health began to fail, and medical tests later revealed he had suffered dioxin poisoning (allegedly carried out by the Ukrainian State Security Service), which left his face disfigured. In the first round of the presidential election, on October 31, Yushchenko and Yanukovych both won about two-fifths of the vote.
Yushchenko and Yanukovych
In the runoff the following month, Yanukovych was declared the winner, though Yushchenko’s supporters charged fraud and staged mass protests that came to be known as the Orange Revolution. Protestors clad in orange, Yushchenko’s campaign colour, took to the streets, and the country endured nearly two weeks of demonstrations. Yanukovych’s supporters in the east threatened to secede from Ukraine if the results were annulled. Nevertheless, on December 3 the Supreme Court ruled the election invalid and ordered a new runoff for December 26. Yushchenko subsequently defeated Yanukovych by garnering some 52 percent of the vote. Although Yanukovych challenged the validity of the results, Yushchenko was inaugurated on January 23, 2005.
Lech Walesa (l) with Viktor Yushchenko at Independence Square in Kiev during the Orange Revolution.
History of relations
Polish-Ukrainian relations can be traced to the 16th-17th centuries in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the often turbulent relations between that state and the mostly polonized nobility (szlachta) and the Cossacks. And even further into the 13-14th centuries when the Kingdom of Poland and the Ruthenian Kingdom carried close ties.
The next stage would be the relations in the years 1918-1920, in the aftermath of World War I, which saw both the Polish-Ukrainian War and the Polish-Ukrainian alliance. The interwar period would eventually see independent Poland while the Ukrainians had no state of their own, being divided between Poland and the Soviet Union. This led to a deterioration of Polish-Ukrainian relations, and would result in a flare-up of ethnic tensions during and immediately after World War II (massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Operation Vistula being the most infamous).
Polish General Listowski (left) and exiled Ukrainian leader Symon Petliura (right) following the Petlura's alliance with the Poles.
Józef Piłsudski and Symon Petliura Kiev, May 1920
While this left the Polish-Ukrainian relations in the mid-20th century in a relatively poor state, there was little meaningful and independent diplomacy and contact between the People's Republic of Poland and the Ukrainian SSR. The situation changed significantly with the fall of communism, when both Poland and Ukraine became fully independent and could once again decide on foreign policies of their own.
President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych met Prime Minister of Poland Donald Tusk on Wednesday April 13 2011 in Kiev
Modern era
On October 13, 1990 Poland and Ukraine agreed to the "Declaration on the foundations and general directions in the development of Polish-Ukrainian relations". Article 3 of this declaration said that neither country has any territorial claims against the other, and will not bring any in the future. Both countries promised to respect the rights of national minorities on their territories and to improve the situation of minorities in their countries. This declaration re-affirmed the historic and ethnic ties between Poland and Ukraine, containing a reference to "the ethnic and cultural kinship of the Polish and Ukrainian peoples".
Support for Ukrainian sovereignty has become an important component of Polish foreign policy. Poland strongly supported the peaceful and democratic resolution of the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and has backed NATO-Ukraine cooperation (such as the Lithuanian–Polish–Ukrainian Brigade), as well as Ukraine's efforts to join the European Union.
The leader of the Polish conservative clerical Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS), former Prime Minister of Poland Jaroslaw Kaczynski, visited to Kiev in December 2013. He came to support those demonstrating in support of eurointegration. The irony of the situation is that in his home country Kaczynski is considered a Eurosceptic, opposed to Poland joining the Eurozone, and a protector of religious and family values. Prawo i Sprawiedliwość is supported by the Catholic Church and conservative segments of society.
"The Eaglets - the defence of the cemetery" by Wojciech Kossak (1926). Oil on canvas, Polish Army Museum, Warsaw. A painting depicting Polish youths in the Polish uprising against the West Ukrainian People's Republic proclaimed in Lviv.
Centuries of social conflict between the Ukrainian peasantry and Polish nobility, aggravated by ethnic and religious divisions, led to a bitter conflict in the age of nationalism and resulted in the Polish–Ukrainian war in western Ukraine in 1918/19, with the subsequent defeat and downfall of the western Ukrainian People's Republic. This conflict continued during the period of the Polish Second Republic in the 1920–1930s, and was marked by the insurrection of Ukrainian nationalist organizations against the ‘Polish occupation’. This war culminated in terrible massacres of Polish and Ukrainian civilians in the years 1943/44 that left a legacy of enduring mutual prejudice and hatred, reinforced by historical stereotypes that evolved over centuries. During the period of communist rule, this conflict was considered taboo both in Ukraine and Poland, but this changed with the end of the communist era. The controversy reached its peak in 2003, when the conflict's 60th anniversary was commemorated. The political establishments of both countries became involved in heated debates that triggered public discussion in western Ukraine and Poland, affecting relations between the two states. The historical conflict thus took on inter-ethnic and inter-state dimensions.
From the other side, since the very beginning of an independent Ukrainian state in 1991, Poland’s relations with that country have developed favourably, assuming with the passage of time the character of a strategic partnership. They have been underpinned by a skilful practice of problem-solving, based on mutual understanding, and by a concurrence of international policy priorities—especially, Kiev’s ever more vocal European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Coming as an important element of these relations have been contacts at the head-of-state level, for which the year of a presidential election in Ukraine (2004) represented a tough test indeed.
Polish President Alexander Kwasniewski (L) and Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma shake hands during a reconciliation demonstration while inaugurating a Monument to the victims of the massacre of Polish and Ukrainians in Pavlivka village, Volhynia, in Ukraine’s west, on July 11, 2003.
Polish-Ukrainian relations were established soon after Ukraine gained independence from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. They have been improving since, with Poland and Ukraine forming a strong strategic partnership. Various controversies from their shared history occasionally resurface in Polish-Ukrainian relations, but they are not having a major influence on the bilateral relations of Poland and Ukraine.
They are the second and third largest Slavic countries, after Russia. Both countries share a border of about 529 km. Poland's acceptance of the Schengen Agreement created problems with the Ukrainian border traffic. On July 1, 2009 an agreement on local border traffic between the two countries came into effect, which enables Ukrainian citizens living in border regions to cross the Polish frontier according to a liberalized procedure.
Ukraine is the country with the largest number of Polish consulates.
The Orange Revolution and beyond
The presidential election of 2004 brought Ukraine to the brink of disintegration and civil war. Cleared to seek a third term as president by the Constitutional Court, Kuchma instead endorsed the candidacy of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, who was also strongly supported by Russian Pres. Vladimir Putin. Yushchenko—running on an anticorruption, anticronyism platform—emerged as the leading opposition candidate, but his campaign was prevented from visiting Yanukovych’s stronghold of Donetsk and other eastern cities. In September Yushchenko’s health began to fail, and medical tests later revealed he had suffered dioxin poisoning (allegedly carried out by the Ukrainian State Security Service), which left his face disfigured. In the first round of the presidential election, on October 31, Yushchenko and Yanukovych both won about two-fifths of the vote.
Yushchenko and Yanukovych
In the runoff the following month, Yanukovych was declared the winner, though Yushchenko’s supporters charged fraud and staged mass protests that came to be known as the Orange Revolution. Protestors clad in orange, Yushchenko’s campaign colour, took to the streets, and the country endured nearly two weeks of demonstrations. Yanukovych’s supporters in the east threatened to secede from Ukraine if the results were annulled. Nevertheless, on December 3 the Supreme Court ruled the election invalid and ordered a new runoff for December 26. Yushchenko subsequently defeated Yanukovych by garnering some 52 percent of the vote. Although Yanukovych challenged the validity of the results, Yushchenko was inaugurated on January 23, 2005.
Lech Walesa (l) with Viktor Yushchenko at Independence Square in Kiev during the Orange Revolution.
History of relations
Polish-Ukrainian relations can be traced to the 16th-17th centuries in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the often turbulent relations between that state and the mostly polonized nobility (szlachta) and the Cossacks. And even further into the 13-14th centuries when the Kingdom of Poland and the Ruthenian Kingdom carried close ties.
The next stage would be the relations in the years 1918-1920, in the aftermath of World War I, which saw both the Polish-Ukrainian War and the Polish-Ukrainian alliance. The interwar period would eventually see independent Poland while the Ukrainians had no state of their own, being divided between Poland and the Soviet Union. This led to a deterioration of Polish-Ukrainian relations, and would result in a flare-up of ethnic tensions during and immediately after World War II (massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Operation Vistula being the most infamous).
Polish General Listowski (left) and exiled Ukrainian leader Symon Petliura (right) following the Petlura's alliance with the Poles.
Józef Piłsudski and Symon Petliura Kiev, May 1920
While this left the Polish-Ukrainian relations in the mid-20th century in a relatively poor state, there was little meaningful and independent diplomacy and contact between the People's Republic of Poland and the Ukrainian SSR. The situation changed significantly with the fall of communism, when both Poland and Ukraine became fully independent and could once again decide on foreign policies of their own.
President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych met Prime Minister of Poland Donald Tusk on Wednesday April 13 2011 in Kiev
Modern era
On October 13, 1990 Poland and Ukraine agreed to the "Declaration on the foundations and general directions in the development of Polish-Ukrainian relations". Article 3 of this declaration said that neither country has any territorial claims against the other, and will not bring any in the future. Both countries promised to respect the rights of national minorities on their territories and to improve the situation of minorities in their countries. This declaration re-affirmed the historic and ethnic ties between Poland and Ukraine, containing a reference to "the ethnic and cultural kinship of the Polish and Ukrainian peoples".
Support for Ukrainian sovereignty has become an important component of Polish foreign policy. Poland strongly supported the peaceful and democratic resolution of the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and has backed NATO-Ukraine cooperation (such as the Lithuanian–Polish–Ukrainian Brigade), as well as Ukraine's efforts to join the European Union.
The leader of the Polish conservative clerical Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS), former Prime Minister of Poland Jaroslaw Kaczynski, visited to Kiev in December 2013. He came to support those demonstrating in support of eurointegration. The irony of the situation is that in his home country Kaczynski is considered a Eurosceptic, opposed to Poland joining the Eurozone, and a protector of religious and family values. Prawo i Sprawiedliwość is supported by the Catholic Church and conservative segments of society.
