www.nytimes.com/2007/01/04/opinion/04scowcroft.html?_r=1&th=&oref=slogin&emc=th&pagewanted=printNY TIMES
January 4, 2007
Op-Ed Contributor
Getting the Middle East Back on Our Side
By BRENT SCOWCROFT
Washington
THE Iraq Study Group report was released into a sea of unrealistic expectations.
Inevitably, it disappointed hopes for a clear path through the morass of Iraq,
because there is no "silver bullet" solution to the difficulties in which we
find ourselves.
But the report accomplished a great deal. It brought together some of America's
best minds across party lines, and it outlined with clarity and precision the
key factors at issue in Iraq. In doing so, it helped catalyze the debate about
our Iraq policy and crystallize the choices we face. Above all, it emphasized
the importance of focusing on American national interests, not only in Iraq but
in the region.
However, the report, which calls the situation in Iraq "grave and
deteriorating," does not focus on what could be the most likely outcome of its
analysis. Should the Iraqis be unable or unwilling to play the role required of
them, the report implies that we would have no choice but to withdraw, and then
blame our withdrawal on Iraqi failures. But here the report essentially stops.
An American withdrawal before Iraq can, in the words of the president, "govern
itself, sustain itself, and defend itself" would be a strategic defeat for
American interests, with potentially catastrophic consequences both in the
region and beyond. Our opponents would be hugely emboldened, our friends deeply
demoralized.
Iran, heady with the withdrawal of its principal adversary, would expand its
influence through Hezbollah and Hamas more deeply into Syria, Lebanon, the
Palestinian territories and Jordan. Our Arab friends would rightly feel we had
abandoned them to face alone a radicalism that has been greatly inflamed by
American actions in the region and which could pose a serious threat to their
own governments.
The effects would not be confined to Iraq and the Middle East. Energy resources
and transit choke points vital to the global economy would be subjected to
greatly increased risk. Terrorists and extremists elsewhere would be emboldened.
And the perception, worldwide, would be that the American colossus had stumbled,
was losing its resolve and could no longer be considered a reliable ally or
friend - or the guarantor of peace and stability in this critical region.
To avoid these dire consequences, we need to secure the support of the countries
of the region themselves. It is greatly in their self-interest to give that
support, just as they did in the 1991 Persian Gulf conflict. Unfortunately, in
recent years they have come to see it as dangerous to identify with the United
States, and so they have largely stood on the sidelines.
A vigorously renewed effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict could
fundamentally change both the dynamics in the region and the strategic calculus
of key leaders. Real progress would push Iran into a more defensive posture.
Hezbollah and Hamas would lose their rallying principle. American allies like
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the gulf states would be liberated to assist in
stabilizing Iraq. And Iraq would finally be seen by all as a key country that
had to be set right in the pursuit of regional security.
Arab leaders are now keen to resolve the 50-year-old dispute. Prime Minister
Ehud Olmert of Israel may be as well. His nation's long-term security can only
be assured by resolving this issue once and for all. However, only the American
president can bring them to the same table.
Resuming the Arab-Israeli peace process is not a matter of forcing concessions
from Israel or dragooning the Palestinians into surrender. Most of the elements
of a settlement are already agreed as a result of the negotiations of 2000 and
the "road map" of 2002. What is required is to summon the will of Arab and
Israeli leaders, led by a determined American president, to forge the various
elements into a conclusion that all parties have already publicly accepted in
principle.
As for Syria and Iran, we should not be afraid of opening channels of
communication, but neither should we rush to engage them as negotiating
"partners." Moreover, these two countries have differing interests, expectations
and points of leverage and should not be treated as though they are
indistinguishable.
Syria cannot be comfortable clutched solely in the embrace of Iran, and thus
prying it away may be possible. Syria also has much to gain from a settlement
with Israel and internal problems that such a deal might greatly ease. If we can
make progress on the Palestinian front before adding Syria to the mix, it would
both avoid overloading Israel's negotiating capacity and increase the incentives
for Damascus to negotiate seriously.
Iran is different. It may not be wise to make Iran integral to the regional
strategy at the outset. And the nuclear issue should be dealt with on a separate
track. In its present state of euphoria, Iran has little interest in making
things easier for us. If, however, we make clear our determination, and if the
other regional states become more engaged in stabilizing Iraq, the Iranians
might grow more inclined to negotiate seriously.
WHILE negotiations on the Arab-Israel peace process are under way, we should
establish some political parameters inside Iraq that encourage moves toward
reconciliation and unified government in Iraq. Other suggested options, such as
an "80 percent solution" that excludes the Sunnis, or the division of the
country into three parts, are not only inconsistent with reconciliation but
would almost certainly pave the way to broader regional conflict and must be
avoided.
American combat troops should be gradually redeployed away from intervening in
sectarian conflict. That necessarily is a task for Iraqi troops, however poorly
prepared they may be. Our troops should be redirected toward training the Iraqi
Army, providing support and backup, combating insurgents, attenuating outside
intervention and assisting in major infrastructure protection.
That does not mean the American presence should be reduced. Indeed, in the
immediate future, the opposite may be true, though any increase in troop
strength should be directed at accomplishing specific, defined missions. A
generalized increase would be unlikely to demonstrably change the situation and,
consequently, could result in increased clamor for withdrawal. But the central
point is that withdrawing combat forces should not be a policy objective, but
rather, the result of changes in our strategy and success in our efforts.
As we work our way through this seemingly intractable problem in Iraq, we must
constantly remember that this is not just a troublesome issue from which we can
walk away if it seems too costly to continue. What is at stake is not only Iraq
and the stability of the Middle East, but the global perception of the
reliability of the United States as a partner in a deeply troubled world. We
cannot afford to fail that test.
Brent Scowcroft was national security adviser to Presidents Gerald R. Ford and
George H. W. Bush. He is now president of the Forum for International Policy.