Closure of 9/11 Mosque 'Was Long Over Due'

[karl]

The Term of: The Hamburg authorities have won praise from media...is of what it is, sugar frosting upon the cake of failure...

For some many years, Hamburg has been a port of convenience for those individual and groups that are of the criminal faction working against the wishes of society.

For this reason, society has dependent upon their government of local,regional and Federal to form departments of specialized personnel complete with skills commensurate of detection/tracking and make harmless by means of arrest for reasons of adjudication in a court of justice.

This is not occurring for various reasons related to several situations of political/government interference/funding issues and gradual degradation in loss of agents of special skills.

German port of Hamburg in as well as of Pieter's Amsterdam and French port of Mareille, are very well situated for easy entry and easy departure. In as of this, easy exchange of resources as of funding and exchange through many of these port cities facilities. For as commercial monetary exchange is very busy with commercial exchange as necessary in the business climate.

Hamburg has the added attraction of ease of air travel with the close in terminal of Hamburg Airport {Flughaven Hamburg Fuhlsbüttel}.

Detection and tracking is not the problem, for of the multitude of tools available in advanced electronics/visual and or audio. With as most reliable to the old manner of surveillance by physical presence in observation, and, the very old manner of creation of assets in-paid informants.

The above is not the issue, for this will take a live of own in self. The problem will arrive in the form of funding, for nothing moves with out funding, and as well shared issue, this has become the new problem. Generally, to remove the sigma of guilt by association, the civilian authority will in-this-stead, resort to a perifial reason of lack of action. This will usually entail as a public service such as of this presentation to make as an action of their responsibility.

But, we live in the world we have created, and shall reap our rewards from the bread we have tossed into the waters.





SPIEGEL ONLINE

08/10/2010 01:46 PM

The World From Berlin

Closure of 9/11 Mosque 'Was Long Overdue'

Monday's closure of Hamburg's Taiba mosque, where Mohammed Atta and other members of the 9/11 terror cell worshipped, was long overdue. Media commentators argue that the legal wrangling that preceded the ban highlights Germany's weakness in tackling Islamic extremism.

The Hamburg authorities have won praise from media commentators in Germany for closing the city's Taiba mosque and banning the society that operated it. The mosque where some of the 9/11 suicide pilots had prayed had been a meeting place for Islamic extremists for years, authorities said on Monday. The statement came after police sealed off the building and searched it, as well as the homes of society members, and seized its assets, computers and documents.

On Germany's editorial pages, commentators argue that the closure was long overdue and that the length of time it took for authorities to get court approval for the ban highlighted Germany's weakness in the fight against Islamic terrorism. They say the country needs to become more pro-active in dissuading young Muslims tempted by extremism, and should follow the British example of enlisting former hate preachers who have renounced violence to approach them.

Left-wing Die Tageszeitung writes:

"The authorities had good reasons to close the mosque. And it isn't an attack on 'the Muslims' in Hamburg or in Germany. The radical Taiba community didn't want anything to do with the majority of Muslims -- and vice versa. But one shouldn't expect too much of this closure. Privately, intellence agents say that they lose sight of a radical scene whenever a ban is imposed. Meeting places can act as a kind of spy hole for investigators. Besides, experts have long since registered that mosques have lost significance as contact points for young people who want to wage jihad. The Internet, private homes, fitness studios or even prisons are becoming more important in this respect."

"What Germany lacks is a comprehensive deradicalization strategy that doesn't confine itself to banning individual meeting places like the Taiba mosque. Britain is more advanced in this respect. Former radical preachers who have credibly renounced violence are talking to youths deemed in danger of succumbing to extremism. Why isn't that happening here?"

Conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung writes:

"What do violent Islamists have to do in this country to arouse enough suspicion to have their activities banned? A lot had to happen in Hamburg before the mosque where the Hamburg cell of the 9/11 suicide pilots drew their ideological weaponry was finally shut down. The imam at whose feet Mohammed Atta and his comrades once sat was still delivering his hate sermons here. The mosque, despite its name change, was still known as a main meeting point for jihadists and all other Muslim communities in Hamburg had distanced themselves from this society. A whole year had to pass for authorities to react to the fact that a group from the Taiba mosque left for the holy land of jihadists, the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region, to learn the terrorist trade."

"Given such patience, it is hard to believe Hamburg Interior Minister Christoph Ahlhaus when he says the problem has been dealt with."

Conservative Die Welt writes:

"The official reason for the ban itself shows that Germany has spent too long fighting Islamic terrorist organizations with blunt weapons. Ahlhaus said the Taiba society had 'spent years' spreading its aggressive and undemocratic ideology and its view of religion. The hurdles for banning societies are high, and there are good reasons for that. But given that this society was known to have dispatched groups of 'jihadists' to training camps in Pakistan, and that sermons held there attacked our democracy, swifter action would have been necessary."

"The aim was to deprive the Islamists of a symbol, authorities said yesterday. But in the final analysis, the last few years have been a symbol of Germany's weakness in the fight against terrorism."

-- David Crossland

URL:
www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,711098


Karl

[pieter]

Karl,

It is as if I read about the Dutch situation, only the differance is that I haven't heard of a Dutch radical "islamist" mosque which is closed. We are in the same situation. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Die Welt are exelent German newspapers I love to read as a Dutch person. I agree with their analysis.

The comment of the Left-wing Die Tageszeitung I find to political correct and cautious. Karl, sometimes I think good people from the Muslim communities themselves are the best weapon against radicalisation.

Dutch examples of this are two Maroccan Labour politicians, Ahmed Marcouch, a Amsterdam politician and Ahmed Aboutaleb, the mayor of Rotterdam. Both fought and fight radicalization in their communities and both are moderate Muslims and Social-democrats.

Ahmed Aboutaleb



Ahmed Aboutaleb (born August 29, 1961) is a Dutch-Moroccan politician of the Dutch Labour Party and since January 5, 2009 Mayor of Rotterdam. He was State Secretary for Social Affairs and Employment from February 22, 2007 until December 12, 2008 in the Cabinet Balkenende IV.


Ahmed Aboutaleb, mayor of Rotterdam

He is the first appointed mayor of a large city in the Netherlands who is of Moroccan, Muslim, and immigrant descent. Aboutaleb is a dual citizen (of the Netherlands and Morocco) and a practising Muslim.

Biography

Early life

Aboutaleb grew up as a son of an imam in small Moroccan village in the Rif region. Together with his mother and brothers he moved to the Netherlands in 1976. Aboutaleb then studied telecommunications at different schools up to the Hogere Technische School (Universities of Applied Sciences) where he obtained a Bachelor of Engineering degree. After graduating he found work as reporter for Veronica, NOS-radio and RTL Nieuws. He also worked at the public relations department of the Dutch health ministry.


Ahmed Aboutaleb in 2006, as alderman of Amsterdam next to mayor Cohen

In 1998, Aboutaleb became director of the Forum organisation, an institute dealing with multiculturalism in the Netherlands. He also obtained a post as civil servant with the municipality of Amsterdam.


Aboutaleb, the social bridge builder

Career

In January 2004, Aboutaleb succeeded the scandal-plagued Rob Oudkerk as alderman in the city. Labour Party leader Wouter Bos in his book Wat Wouter Wil (English: What Wouter Wants) said that if the Labour Party was involved in forming the next cabinet after the 2006 elections, Aboutaleb would be offered a ministerial post. Aboutaleb himself claimed at the time he wanted to focus on his work as alderman and that it was "important first that the PvdA wins the elections." When the PvdA really did become part of a new coalition, Aboutaleb was just offered the job of State Secretary for social affairs, but said that he did not mind the lesser function, and believed he could learn a lot from Piet Hein Donner, the minister of social affairs.

Along with another deputy minister, Nebahat Albayrak, of Turkish descent, Aboutaleb was criticized at the time of their announced appointments by Geert Wilders for holding dual passports. According to Wilders and his party, government ministers should not have dual citizenship, which they say implies dual allegiance.

On October 31, 2008 Aboutaleb was appointed (in the Netherlands, mayors are not elected) as the next mayor of Rotterdam. He succeeded the former mayor, Ivo Opstelten on January 5, 2009. It has been announced that Jetta Klijnsma will succeed him as State Secretary.

Links:
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Veronica_%28TV_channel%29
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nederlandse_Omroep_Stichting
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RTL_Nieuws

[pieter]

Radical Islam in The Netherlands:

A Case Study of a Failed European Policy
Manfred Gerstenfeld

* On December 23, 2004, the Dutch Ministry of the Interior published a 60-page report entitled From Dawa to Jihad. Prepared by the Dutch general intelligence service (AIVD), it describes radical Islam and examines how to meet its threat to Dutch society.

* Among the close to one million Dutch Muslims, about 95 percent are moderates. This implies that there are up to 50,000 potential radicals.

* Since September 11, 2001, phenomena such as the growth of radical Islamic groups, polarization between Muslims and the surrounding society, limitations in the process of integration, and Islamist terrorism have increased in The Netherlands.

* The capability of Dutch society to resist the threat of radical Islam is considered low, though recently a greater desire has become apparent among the Dutch population to become more resistant. Also within the Dutch Muslim community resistance against radical forces is low. The moderate organizations and individuals are not able to counterbalance the radical forces.

* An earlier AIVD report dealt with Saudi influences in The Netherlands, mentioning a number of mosque organizations that originated from Saudi missions and financing. The Amsterdam Tawheed mosque, which in the past has put extreme anti-Semitic statements on its website, is linked financially, organizationally, and personally with the Saudi Al Haramain Foundation. Several other mosques are supported financially by Saudi charities.

* The Dutch report places the blame for the origins of the problem squarely on the deeply-rooted ideology of fierce opposition to the Western way of life among certain Muslim groups. It does not claim that the problem of radical Muslims would disappear if there were peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Israel and Jews are not mentioned in the report.

Dutch Intelligence Report Examines Radical Muslim Threat

On December 23, 2004, the Dutch Ministry of the Interior published a 60-page report entitled From Dawa to Jihad.1 It was prepared by the AIVD, the Dutch general intelligence service, and examines how to meet the threat of radical Islam to Dutch society. Although the report is conceptual in nature, it is evident that to achieve even a part of its goals, substantial legal and behavioral changes in Dutch society will be necessary.

This also became clear during the parliamentary debate that followed, in the statement by Maxime Verhagen, faction chairman of The Netherlands' largest party, the middle of the road Christian Democrat party (CDA) of Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende, which has 44 of the 150 seats in the Chambers. He proposed that judges should be able to take away constitutional rights, such as freedom of speech and assembly, from radical Muslims. 2 No other party supported him.

The Minister of the Interior, Johan Remkes, observed that the prevention, isolation, and limitation of increasing radicalization is important. He added that this should be done by "all layers of Dutch society."3 There is, however, no way that this can be realized in the current societal climate of The Netherlands.

Understanding Dutch Culture

The general attitude of Dutch society over the past decades can be characterized by two Dutch words. The first is "gedoogcultuur," which literally means "a culture of permissiveness" but has become synonymous with "closing one's eyes" to multiple transgressions of the law. These include disparate matters such as soft drug use, immigration policies, safety of industrial and commercial operations, as well as many other subjects. It reflects a basic anti-authoritarian attitude that is quite common in Dutch society.

The second key word is "poldermodel," which means that efforts are made to reach a very broad national consensus on important issues. Though mainly used in the economic arena, this approach reflects Dutch society at large. The Dutch like to find solutions to problems through discussions without defining positions too sharply. This model can be explained as a legacy of Dutch history. In the past, people living behind dikes, at below sea level, had to cooperate with each other when there was danger of flooding. Both the gedoogcultuur and the poldermodel have already come under major criticism in recent years.

The AIVD report attempts to be as factual as possible. On such a problematic subject, however, this means that it cannot be politically correct as it defines part of an identifiable ethno-religious community as a danger to society. One may wonder whether the ministry would have found it politically convenient to publish the report had not Muslim radical Mohammed Boyeri cruelly murdered provocative Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in an Amsterdam street on November 2, 2004. In the following weeks there were tens of arson attempts against Muslim institutions and Christian churches. Prior to the murder, it was almost unthinkable for a government agency report to single out the Muslim community. The AIVD justified its publication by noting that it was responding to complaints by local authorities that they did not have enough information about radical Islam.

The Report's Key Elements

The AIVD report explains that the key ideological aim of radical Islamic groups is to target the Western way of life, and to confront alleged Western political, economic, and cultural domination. Such groups may be either nationalistic or religiously-oriented. The report notes:

* Among the close to one million Dutch Muslims, about 95 percent are moderates. This implies that there are up to 50,000 potential radicals.

* Recruitment in The Netherlands for the armed radical Muslim struggle - mainly among descendants of immigrants - is not incidental but rather a trend. This issue was discussed in an earlier AIVD report published in 2002,5 that mentioned that there had been at least ten recruiters at work in The Netherlands and assumed that there were several tens of Muslim youngsters in various stages of the recruitment process.

* In recent years, and in particular since September 11, 2001, phenomena such as the growth of radical Islamic groups, polarization between Muslims and the surrounding society, limitations in the process of integration, and Islamist terrorism have increased in The Netherlands.

* Of the eight categories of radical Islam defined, four aim at dawa [proselytizing], which from the report's perspective goes beyond proselytizing to the undermining of the democratic order through abusing democratic means. Four others are of a jihadic [holy war] nature, i.e., they use or promote violence. Most of these are present in The Netherlands.

* In The Netherlands one finds types of dawa in the political Arab European League Movement (AEL), in a limited number of Salafist mosques, in Islamist missions, some of which are financed by Saudi Arabia as well as among individual Muslim preachers. Other types of dawa are promoted on the websites of foreign radical Muslim scholars and in chatrooms. Teacherless autonomous radicalization takes place, inter alia, in jails, in some Muslim schools, and in mosques.

* In The Netherlands one also finds various forms of support for jihad. For example, the international radical organization Hizb ut Tahrir, which promotes jihad in a hidden way, has a presence. There are also local Muslim terrorist networks.

* The capability of Dutch society to resist the threat of radical Islam is considered low, though recently a greater desire has become apparent among the Dutch population to become more resistant.

* The resistance within the Dutch Muslim community against radical forces is low. The moderate organizations and individuals are not able to counterbalance the radical forces.

Measures Proposed

The report also indicates in broad terms how the threat of radical Islam should be combated. It suggests a continuous legal check on the activities of radical Muslims regarding discrimination, hate-promotion, and incitement. However, this kind of surveillance is largely alien to the Dutch legal and police culture of the last decades. The report also repeats earlier proposed measures such as checks on the movement of money. Furthermore, while noting that improvement in the economic situation of the Dutch Muslim population is laudable, it notes that there is no proof that this limits radicalization.

Other measures proposed are mainly medium and long-term strategies, including the distribution of better information on radical Islamic groups, collaboration with moderate forces in the Muslim community, encouraging more moderate forms of Islam, and the promotion of identity-creation among Muslims.

Other recommendations mentioned, without any concrete proposals regarding their execution, include the development of positive role models for young Muslims to replace the criminal role models that are positively viewed by some Muslim youth, as well as democracy education.

Mention is also made of the need to consider working with the authorities in those countries that send out radical Islamic missionaries, but this issue has not yet been discussed in The Netherlands.

Why is the Report Important?

While many elements in the report have appeared in the media over the years, its importance lies in being an official document of the Dutch government. In the past, the Dutch government has largely avoided confronting the overall threat of Islamic radicalization to which its predecessors' policies on immigration, integration, and neglect of law enforcement have contributed.

Equally important are some issues that the report fails to mention, which are the inevitable outcome of its conclusions. Radical Muslims can, by definition, only be found in the Muslim community and are dispersed throughout it. To be effective in the struggle against radical Islam, Dutch Muslims will have to be watched and scrutinized by the police and the intelligence services much more intensively than most other sectors of Dutch society. This singling out implies giving less priority to Dutch equality and privacy laws. In addition, since radical Muslims mainly interact with other Muslims, a crucial element of success will be the collaboration of moderate Muslims with the police in informing on suspected individuals.

The main foreign promoters of dawa and jihad who influence their Dutch disciples are not analyzed in the report in any detail, nor are the most influential foreign Muslim preachers of anti-Western hatred and violence named. There is little specific mention of the role of foreign governments and charities.

Saudi Influences

An earlier AIVD report, however, dealt with Saudi influences in The Netherlands.19 It mentioned that in The Netherlands there were a number of mosque organizations which are Salafist in nature, that originated from Saudi missions and financing. The Amsterdam Tawheed mosque, which in the past has put extreme anti-Semitic statements on its website, is linked financially, organizationally, and personally with the Saudi Al Haramain Foundation. Three other mosques are linked with the private Saudi mission, Al Waqf Al Islami, that is related to key figures in the Saudi establishment.

Though not explicitly Salafist, there are several other mosques in The Netherlands which are supported financially by Saudi charities, private philanthropists, or government bodies. Sometimes the payments are not made to the mosques directly but to the imams. The report considers both the origin and destination of this financing to be obscure.

Most of the radical imams come from Egypt, Syria, Sudan, or Somalia. Many have studied in Saudi Arabia. For a long time in a number of ultra-orthodox mosques, extremist sermons have included saying that secular people, socialists, or democrats were allies of Satan. Stoning was preached as a punishment for extra-marital relations, etc.

While it has not been proven that jihad has been openly promoted in Dutch mosques, there have been sermons with jihadic tendencies, such as requests to Allah to kill "the enemies of Islam" such as Bush and Sharon and the enemies of Islam in Kashmir and Chechnya.

The ambassador of Saudi Arabia in early 2004 promised full transparency on financing. However, since then, very little has happened on that matter. While there has been some recent moderation in the sermons, the AIVD now believes the incitement takes place elsewhere in smaller, closed meetings. The report concluded that there were no indications that the risks and size of Islamic radicalism and jihadism in The Netherlands had changed in any way recently.

Israeli Aspects

From an Israeli perspective, the report is most important for what it does not say. It places the blame for the origins of the dawa and jihad problem squarely on the deeply-rooted ideology of fierce opposition to the Western way of life among certain Muslim groups. It does not attempt to hide behind the frequent Western escapist claim that the problem of radical Muslims would disappear if there were peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Israel and Jews are not mentioned in the report.

Accepting the report's findings and conclusions means that the Dutch political system admits, de facto, that its societal model of excessive tolerance for intolerance and crime has failed. In this, it could become a European paradigm. However, whether a more realistic domestic policy in The Netherlands and a better insight into the extreme forms of Muslim culture will also mean a better understanding of the Middle Eastern reality remains to be seen.

[pieter]

Integration and radical Islam in the Netherlands


Rahmat K. Rahman, director of the Islamic school of "As-Soeffah", situated in the north-east of Amsterdam

How to integrate the new immigrants into Dutch society? Why it is so hard and how come some people on both sides become radical? Since September 11, 2001 the magic Dutch integration experiment has sparked some changes.

"On September 11, 2001, I was ten years old. I do not remember the situation of the Islamic community in The Netherlands. I only know how it is now”, admits Ugur, a 20 year old Dutch Turkish guy I meet in the subterranean hall of the Fatih Camii Turkish Mosque situated in the centre of Amsterdam.


The Fatih Camii Turkish Mosque in the centre of Amsterdam


The Fatih Camii Turkish Mosque in the centre of Amsterdam

Tall and with the typical peaceful Mediterranean face, Ugur speaks English very well, while moving his big hands in the air just in front of a brick wall with the Turkish and Dutch flags. Ugur is part of the Second Generation, one of the hundreds thousands sons and daughters of immigrants which came in The Netherlands many years ago to find a job and better living conditions.
“I have a 50-50 feeling, I love both countries and I feel totally integrated in Turkey as in The Netherlands, I speak Dutch with my daddy and Turkish with my mum and I spend my days studying economics at the University and enjoying the company of my friends here in the mosque”.
The subterranean hall of the mosque is a meeting point for young and old people who want to find a small corner of the culture which is still in their hearts; talking, playing games, drinking tea and watching Turkish television. Most of them are Turkish but there are also some Somali, Pakistani and Moroccan believers because, as Ugur explains, “this place is for everyone, and the Imam is always ready to meet and help everyone”.
Ugur takes care to say that the Turkish community is very moderate.

“We do not recognize radical Islam, we don’t apply Sharia and we are not in touch with those small radical groups who are still existing in this country. But people and the media don’t know Islam and confuse a radical minority with the peaceful majority”, he said.


Muslims in the outskirts of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

The integration paradox

Ugur is the result of the immigration and integration experiment which took place in The Netherlands in the last 30 years, when the number of immigrants from North Africa and the Middle East increased. Some people could call Ugur the exception that confirms the integration paradox, illustrated during an interview by Atef Hamdy - researcher and political scientist of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, specialized in the migration phenomenon.

“Young people of the second generation are those who have more facilities and, at the same time, difficulties to integrate themselves into the society. There are two levels of no integration, one external and one internal. Many Dutch don’t recognize the immigrants as real Dutch citizens and some new citizens don’t considers themselves as Dutch. There is a generation gap between these young new citizens and their parents. Most of the times they speak different languages and even if they all try their best to integrate themselves into the Dutch society, they will walk into the wall of Dutch society”, continued the researcher.

Then 11 September came, opening Pandora’s box. From this moment in The Netherlands being a Muslim started to be a problem. “Many Dutch began to think that maybe the Muslims were too much for a small and peaceful country like The Netherlands; others thought it was too late to resolve the problem because the ‘enemy’ was already within”, said Mr. Hamdy.
Influenced by radical Islamic groups already present in The Netherlands, some lonely unintegrated sons of the second generation became Islamic radicals, answering to the fears of Dutch society. Social conflicts carried out by the economical crises, riots, intimidation and killings - like those of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh - have been characterizing the period from 2001 until now. “But these conflicts gave to the Islamic community the possibility to rethink its position in Dutch society, to understand that instead of the victim feeling, they should consider themselves as an active part of the Dutch society, economically, politically and socially. The white Dutch citizen understood this change", said Atef Hamdy.


Mehmet Yúrek, Imam of the Turkish mosque in Amsterdam

The Turkish Imam and the moderate Islam

With two fingers Ugur hold the small glass and with a final sip finishes his Turkish tea. Mehmet Yúrek, the Imam of the Mosque, has just arrived.
“Radicals are everywhere, in every community and society, in every religion and political ideology, but Islam is a peaceful religion”, says Imam Yúrek, inviting me to go into an old church converted in a mosque many years ago.
“We have isolated radical Islamists. In our mosque and in Dutch society there is not space for them. They are unable to respect the others because they use the Koran to hate and not love the others”, continues the Imam next to the Qibla - the wall which the believers face during prayers.
The Imam is dressing the prayers ceremonial white clothes necessary to pray. In less than one hour hundreds of Muslims people will come here to pray and listen the sermon. “We live together and help each other. In this way every problem is solved and eventually radical ideas are suppressed”, he says.
When I ask how the Dutch society reacted when they converted the church in to a mosque in the centre of Amsterdam, he said that “it was not a problem before, they knew we are peaceful, but maybe today it will be harder to accept”.


Young muslim homeless in the central train station of Amsterdam

Islam: the controversial issue of today

But if September 11 is far, if the Islamic community has began to understand its new role in Dutch society and if white Dutch citizens are happy about this change, why there are always more citizens that are supporting the radical right wing party? Why should converting a church in to a mosque be a problem now?
Richa, a 40-year-old Muslim Algerian economy consultant, says that the economic crisis - as every crisis in every age and country - creates conflicts with those ones who are different from the majority. "This is a very natural human behaviour. What we can do is to fight against ignorance because it generates intolerance”. Taking as an example the Moroccan community in the country, he said that “most of them have a very low education which makes it harder to find a job and integrate in the society”.

[karl]

Pieter

I would never consider my self a technician in the art of social integration nor consider our selves a model to follow by with the failures of the past and present.

Pieter, I do believe you have the best answer though. For yes of course, it is to the good people of the Muslim communities. For they know and understand the issues, for they live this every day.

Some many years past, it was the Turkish people of considerable issue, for then, the Turkish workers were not picky with work opportunities such as with trash and garbage collection. Even though many German fellows would not do that work, they non-the less, complained and made a big issue of Turkish minorities taking their work..

Then it was the Indians {East Indian for our American friends} taking many opportunities in computer programming and operators. What was neglected to say, was the extreme shortage of qualified people in this field.

Now at present, it is the Islamic families immigrating for a better life. This are our new citizens and will in time, be little different then any other German person, other then the colour of their skin and religion.

I do believe though, you have the answer, it is to the good Muslim families and people, to provide the best answer for successful integration of these new citizens into our societies as useful citizens with the similar ideals as of their new country.

A url of France with our similar problem

www.slate.com/id/2254972

A situation that is real and present in Germany, is with the burqa. This in self hides the face entirely. We have those of criminal intent for as most societies must deal with. In this process of hidden features, these people may with criminal intent, involve them selves in a crime, and remain unknown by virtue of non-identity by witness (s) and or camera. For then it is to forensic evidence to link a possible to the crime. {finger prints placed upon the computer data base for comparison and identification}

Karl