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Post by JustJohn or JJ on Aug 17, 2013 6:01:08 GMT -7
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Post by pieter on Aug 18, 2013 3:53:47 GMT -7
John, Political Islam is very powerful, like socialism, communism, liberalism, conservatism, Pan-arabism (Arab nationalism) were in the past. Don't forget that the political islam existed since the beginning of Islam and during it's conquering wars. Every caliphate since In 622 CE, when Abū al-Qāsim Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib ibn Hāshim (Arabic: محمد بن عبد الله بن عبد المطلب; c. 570 – c. 8 June 632), better known as Muhammad, was recognised in his claims to prophethood, and invited to rule the city of Medina, was in fact a sort of Islamism, a power of the political islam. Think about the early Arab Muslim rulers or Caliphs who conquered all the Arab land, Israel/Palestine, Persia (Iran), and the land of Berbers, Tuareg and Black Africans in Northern-Africa, the Maghreb. The Arabization of Northern-Africa by the influx of Arab Muslim worriers from the Arab Peninsula and the Arabization and Islamization of a large part of the Berber populations were early Islamic practices in the early middle ages (the first period of Islam, the conquering years). Some pre-Islamic Berbers were Christians (some evolved their own * Donatist doctrine), some were Jewish, and some adhered to their traditional polytheist religion. * Donatism was a Christian sect within the Roman province of Africa that flourished in the fourth and fifth centuries among Berber Christians. The earlier clashes between Sunni Islam and Shia Islam were in fact medieval clashes between Sunni Islamism and Shia Islamism. Both sides saw their religion, ideology and leaders as the absolute right direction and truth. The the Battle of Karbala in 680 shows one of the first divisions within Islam. ( en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Husayn_ibn_Ali / en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Husayn_ibn_Ali ). Sunni's and Shia's differ about the role of Ali in early Islam ( en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali ) and that disagreement caused discord and a schism in Islam between the Shia (followers of Ali; the minority in Islam) and the Sunni (the majority in Islam: who consider Ali to be the fourth and final of the Rashidun ( rightly guided Caliphs), while Shias regard Ali as the first Imam and consider him and his descendants the rightful successors to Muhammad, all of which are members of the Ahl al-Bayt, the household of Muhammad.) Since the disappointment of the Palestinians in the solidarity of other Arabs and Arab regimes, and the bad treatment of Palestinians in other Arab countries like Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Iraq and the Arab Gulf states, the political Islam or Islamism set foot on the Palestinian territories. Hamas (since 1980. Hamas is an offspring of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood), Islamic Jihad, Salafist ( Al Qaida linked) groups in Gaza and radical Sunni Islamist group Fatah al Islam in the Palestinian refugee camp Nahr al-Bared in northern Lebanon, 16 km from the city of Tripoli. Fatah al Islam fought a fierce battle with the Lebanese army, which destroyed the camp, and forced the Palestinian population of the camp to flee, and damaged the local economy, because the camp had an important market which was frequented by both Palestinians and Lebanese people. Fatah al Islam was and is engaged in a bitter and bloody rivalry with the Shia Hezbollah movement. Despite Egypt, the political Islam is on the move, and gains influence all over the Middle-east and the Muslim world. After the Arab spring Tunesia got an Islamist government, and two secular politicians were murdered there, the Islamists gained power in Morocco and Algeria too (people forget the very vicious and bloody civil war, terrorism and massacres in Algeria during the ninetees). In Saoudi Arabia an ultra-conservative branch of Sunni Islam, Wahhabism, is the official state religion. Saoudi Arabia is one of the main allies of the USA in the Middle-east since almost 63 years now, and yet Saoudi Arabia together with other Gulf states (like Qater) is one of the main causes and distributor of Radical Islam and Islamism in the world. Saoudi Arabia and Qater founded, support and fund Salafist and Wahhabist, ultra-orthodox Sunni Muslim mosques all over the world. And in countries, regions and places where there was a quite tolerant, Sufi or moderate Sunni form of Islam, the influence, funds, advisors and even imams of Saoudi Arabia and other Arab states (who are influenced by them), a radical, fundamentalist, ultra-conservative version of Sunni Islam replaced the moderate, pragmatic and regional form of Sunni Islam which existed there for hundreds of years. That happened in Chechenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Muslim Islands of the Philippines, Thailand, India (Kashmir), Morocco, Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Israel/ Palestine and many other countries. A significant change in the Islamic world was the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924. In the 19th and 20th century, common Islmic political theme has been resistance to Western imperialism and enforcement of Sharia through democratic or militant struggle. The defeat of Arab armies in the Six Day War, the end of Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union with the end of communism as a viable alternative has increased the appeal of Islamic movements such as Islamism, Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic democracy, especially in the context of popular dissatisfaction with secularist ruling regimes in the Muslim world. The Arab street, the Arab people, were disappointed in their Arab regimes, which all were autocratic, despotic regimes, weather they were and are monarchies (the emirs, Sheikhs and kings) or secular regimes. (the presidents of the Baathist Syria and Iraq -until 2003-, the Nasserist leaders of Egypt and the despots of Tunesia and Yemen) Pan-IslamismIn a later repetition of these developments, the pan-Islamic sentiments embodied by the Muslim Brotherhood and other religious movements, would similarly provoke conflict with Palestinian nationalism. About 90% of Palestinians are Sunni Muslims, and while never absent from the rhetoric and thinking of the secularist PLO factions, Islamic political doctrines, or Islamism, didn't become a large part of the Palestinian movement until the 1980s rise of Hamas. By early Islamic thinkers, nationalism had been viewed as an ungodly ideology, substituting " the nation" for God as an object of worship and reverence. The struggle for Palestine was viewed exclusively through a religious prism, as a struggle to retrieve Muslim land and the holy places of Jerusalem. However, later developments, not least as a result of Muslim sympathy with the Palestinian struggle, led to many Islamic movements accepting nationalism as a legitimate ideology. In the case of Hamas - the Palestinian offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood - Palestinian nationalism has almost completely fused with the ideologically pan-Islamic sentiments originally held by the Islamists. This text was a mix of my own writing and a lot of quotes of Wikipedia articles. That is my way of writing on this Forum. Next to that I use encyclopedia Britannica and ofcourse Arab media like Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, who to my surprise are often critical and ballanced in their writing and video's about the Muslim world and Arab countries. In my view the Middle-east and Arab world has four main issues today: (1) First, the old Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the American-Israeli influence and power in the region (and next to that the power and influence of other Global powers like Russia, China, Great-Britain, France, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan in the region); (2) the Arab Spring and the side effects of it; The Arab world is in turmoil, chaos and anarchy. Several Arab states are plagued by division and civil war; Syria, Libiya, Yemen, Egypt, Iraq and Bahrein. (3) The clash and conflict between secular and Islamist forces in the Arab world: Arab nationalists, liberals, secular conservatives, Arab socialists, Nasserists, Baathists and Marxists against theologians, Islamists, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Al Qaida. (4) The influence of new and old powers in the Middle east: Turkey as the offspring of the Old Ottoman power which ruled many Arab and North-African countries has gained influence in the Old Ottoman territories. The Turks were and are close with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hamas in Gaza, the Muslim Brotherhood and Sunni Muslims in Syria; the moderate Islamist Ennahda Movement, the government party in Tunisia of Prime Minister Ali Laarayedh, the Lebanese Sunni Muslims and their political parties, Jordan, Algeria, Somalia, and the former Sovjet Republics with Turkish speaking or Muslim populations; Turkmenistan ( Turkic language culture), Uzbekistan ( Turkic language culture), Kyrgyzstan ( Turkic language culture), Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. Next to that you have the The Uyghurs, a Turkic ethnic group living in Eastern and Central Asia. On Turkish TV chanals you often see Turkish politicians or leaders visiting Turkic countries and you feel or see the effort of the Turks to built a Turkish influence sphere and some sort of union or organisation of Turkic languages. In the same time Turkey wants to have influence and to be a dominant power in the Arab world. Especially in the Levant (Lebanon and Syria), Egypt and Northern-Africa (Former Ottoman empire colonies) Turkey is ruled by an Islamist party, the AK party. Turkey is important in the world of the political Islam. But in the same time there is animosity and deep mistrust between Turks and Arab people. It's comparable to the rivalry between the Persian-Iranians and the Gulf Arabs in the Gulf region and between the Iraqi Kurds, and Iraqi Sunni Arabs in Iraq. Uyghur identity remains fragmented, as some support a Pan-Islamic vision, exemplified by the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, while others support a Pan-Turkic vision, such as the East Turkestan Liberation Organization. A third group would like a " Uyghurstan" state, such as the East Turkestan independence movement. As a result, " [n]o Uyghur or East Turkestan group speaks for all Uyghurs, although it might claim to", and Uyghurs in each of these camps have committed violence against other Uyghurs who they think are too assimilated to Chinese or Russian society or are not religious enough. ( en.wikipedia.org/wiki/July_2009_Ürümqi_riots ) Watch this link: www.politicalislam.com/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_aspects_of_IslamArab secular ideologies: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pan-Arabismen.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_socialismen.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baathismen.wikipedia.org/wiki/NasseristCheers, Pieter
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Post by JustJohn or JJ on Aug 19, 2013 7:40:13 GMT -7
Hosni Mubarak Free? Ousted Egyptian President To Be Released From Prison This Week, Sources SayReuters | Posted: 08/19/2013 7:38 am EDT | Updated: 08/19/2013 9:35 am EDT CAIRO, Aug 19 (Reuters) - Egypt's disgraced former President Hosni Mubarak will be released from jail soon, after prosecutors cleared him in a corruption case, his lawyer said on Monday, dropping a new bombshell on a nation in turmoil. The most populous Arab country is already enduring the bloodiest internal conflict in its modern history as the army, which deposed President Mohamed Morsi on July 3 after huge protests against him, cracks down on his Muslim Brotherhood. Mubarak, 85, was arrested after a popular uprising overthrew him on Feb. 11, 2011 as unrest spread across the Arab world. In scenes that mesmerised Arabs, the ex-strongman appeared in a court-room cage during his trial on charges that ranged from corruption to complicity in the murder of protesters. More than a year on, the only legal grounds for Mubarak's continued detention rest on another corruption case which his lawyer, Fareed el-Deeb, said would be settled swiftly. "All we have left is a simple administrative procedure that should take no more than 48 hours. He should be freed by the end of the week," Deeb told Reuters. Without confirming that Mubarak would be freed, a judicial source said the former leader would spend another two weeks behind bars before judicial authorities made a final decision in the outstanding case against him. Mubarak, along with his interior minister, was convicted and sentenced to life in prison last year for failing to stop the killing of protesters in the revolt that swept him from power. He still faces a retrial in that case after appeals from the prosecution and defence, but this would not necessarily require him to stay in jail. Mubarak did not appear at a hearing in the case on Saturday. He was also absent from Monday's proceedings. He is being held at Tora prison on the southern outskirts of Cairo, the same facility where senior Brotherhood members have been detained in a clampdown that followed Morsi's ouster. Mubarak's eventual release could stir more political tension in Egypt, where at least 850 people, including 70 policemen and soldiers, have been killed since the army-backed government forcibly dispersed Brotherhood sit-ins in Cairo on Wednesday. DEADLY SINAI ATTACK In separate violence, suspected Islamist militants killed at least 24 policemen on Monday in the Sinai peninsula, where attacks on security forces have multiplied since Morsi's ouster. Three policemen were also wounded in the grenade and machinegun attack near the north Sinai town of Rafah on the border with Israel, medical and security sources said. Photos circulated on social media and purporting to show the aftermath of the attack showed victims lying with their hands tied behind them, apparently shot execution-style. They were not in uniform. The photos could not be immediately verified. The assault underlined the challenges facing Egypt's new rulers, who portray their campaign as a fight against terrorism. One policeman was also shot dead by a sniper in the Sinai city of El Arish, the state news agency reported, quoting a security source. The Brotherhood renounced violence decades ago and denies any links with armed militants, including those in Sinai who have gained strength since Mubarak's overthrow. Mounting insecurity in Sinai also worries the United States because the desert peninsula lies next to Israel and the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip, as well as the Suez Canal. At least 36 Islamists died in government custody on Sunday, in an incident that the Brotherhood described as "murder" and the authorities said was a thwarted jailbreak. "The murders show the violations and abuses that political detainees who oppose the July 3 coup get subjected to," said the Brotherhood, which has called for an independent, non-Egyptian investigation into the incident. The Interior Ministry said 36 Brotherhood detainees had been suffocated by tear gas during an attempted prison breakout near Cairo. A legal source said 38 men had died from asphyxiation in the back of a crammed police van. DISCORD OVER AID Egypt's upheaval is causing global jitters, but no consensus on how to respond has emerged in the West or the Arab world. European Union diplomats were due to meet in Brussels to review how best to leverage some 5 billion euros ($6.7 billion) of promised grants and loans, looking to apply pressure on Cairo's army-backed government to find a compromise. A senior EU official who asked not to be identified said the United States, Europe and Gulf Arab states had only limited influence on the generals now calling the shots in Egypt. The United States, an ally of Egypt since it made peace with Israel in 1979, has postponed delivery of four F-16 fighters and scrapped a joint military exercise, but has not halted its $1.55 billion in annual aid, spent mostly on U.S.-made arms supplies. However, Republican and Democrat U.S. lawmakers, some of them reversing the stances they had espoused before last week's crackdown in Egypt, said on Sunday the aid should be suspended. "For us to sit by and watch this happen is a violation of everything that we stood for," said Senator John McCain, a former Republican presidential nominee. Saudi Arabia, another U.S. ally, urged Washington and Europe not to penalise Cairo for its drive to crush the Muslim Brotherhood, whose political ambitions arouse mistrust in several Gulf Arab states, with the exception of Qatar. Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy sought to pre-empt any attempt to use aid flows as a lever by saying he would look at all such assistance to see "what aid is being used to pressure Egypt and whether this aid has good intentions and credibility". In his first public comments since hundreds of people were killed when security forces cleared two pro-Morsi camps in Cairo on Wednesday, army chief Abdel Fattah el-Sisi said he would not "stand by silently watching the destruction of the country". Interim Prime Minister Hazem el-Beblawi has proposed disbanding the 85-year-old Brotherhood, which has won all of the five votes held in Egypt since Mubarak's overthrow. Dozens of churches and other Christian properties have been looted and burned across Egypt since security forces violently broke up pro-Morsi sit-ins in Cairo last week. In Minya, south of Cairo, the remains of a Christian-run orphanage were still smouldering late on Sunday. Two churches and several Christian-run shops in the city had been sacked. A doctor, who declined to give his name for fear of reprisals, showed a brick he said Islamist protesters had thrown through his clinic window last week. "They are terrorists," he said, his voice quivering with anger. The Muslim Brotherhood has condemned attacks on Christians and denies that it has instigated them. (Additional reporting by Lin Noueihed and Tom Perry in Cairo and Alex Dziadosz in Minya; Editing by Michael Georgy)
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Post by karl on Aug 19, 2013 11:09:33 GMT -7
I think perhaps Mr. Mubarak knows his 15 minutes of fame has been used up and so far has survived the goverment change over. Perhaps it is time for him to hop upon a flight out of the country to enjoy a quite life in a Swiss villia.
Withen the confines of reality in reguards to the Brotherhood, it is natural and timely for their spokes people of abhoring violence with non-envolvement of recent and curant street violence. For it is quite apparant they are cognasent of growing displeasure of The Saudies with their brand of violence. With this, the Arab Spring actions of over throw of standing goverments to replace with their brand of Islam.
The Saudies as usuala re tolerant in as long as the violence stays out of their front yard. Other wise, it is out with the worry beads and to the Cheque book to buy off those with thoughts of incursion upon their part of the desert.
Karl
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Post by Jaga on Aug 19, 2013 18:33:43 GMT -7
Pieter and all,
I do not know what is going to happen in Muslim countries. It seems that the change was just so rapid from almost feudal system to a modern cell-phone world. I did not see any deepere analysis and solutions for Egypt/Syria problems....if you know about any good analysis and prognosis let me know.
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Post by karl on Aug 19, 2013 20:09:06 GMT -7
Pieter and all, I do not know what is going to happen in Muslim countries. It seems that the change was just so rapid from almost feudal system to a modern cell-phone world. I did not see any deepere analysis and solutions for Egypt/Syria problems....if you know about any good analysis and prognosis let me know. Jaga If perhaps to have a crystal ball, my self would be quite happy to provide a meaningful prognosis, but not to be. what only may I provide is perhaps a bit of insight into the Arab world of today, but not much different then centuries in past. Yes, cell phones, autos, modern conveniences such as television and such are present today. But these are only objects, objects will come and then they will go. The Saudies know this, but the remainder have not so much of clue. Once the oil resources are depleted from the sweet crude of the present, so be it to the tar sands and heavy crude, then to very little. These people of the present and the family kingdomes know quite very well, they have but perhaps some years yet to enjoy the winds of prosperity from the oil money. They are not worried, for their manner of mindset and living has not changed from the old ways, once the oil runs out, they will continue as they have always. With such progressive nations as Syria/Iran/Israel, they have developed their industries in such manner as in short/long future, it is a matter of the proper treaties to be implaced. Life will continue in reciepical international trade. Hopefully, Iraq will recover from war damage to rebuild their industries to be competative as simular. Once Iran has in operation their nuclear power generation facilties, electrical energy should be very suffiecent for use in coming years, with surplus for export through Turkey to Europe. At present, it is the non-sense of such issues created by such people as the currant Muslim Brother Hood that are creating the situational issues we see at present. The Saudies are a patient people, but with such organizatins tossing a spanner into the gear box of progress. They {Saudies} are organizing in manner that has been very well described in the previous presentations of Pieters. Withen the reasonable future, the situation will be stablized in Syria as well. The above not by the West {Europe} or the Americans, but by the Saudies. Upon this foundation of issues, will be to the Palistiniens to sort out their business with Israel. The lands of the middle east has for centuries seen armies come, armies go, and rulers florish, then disappear to be replaced by another people. It is the Middle East. Time evolves, and developes, and changes replace the old with the new. Perhaps the Canadians and Americans will be the new oil producing nations with the Russian Federation close by. The Russians have the oil sands, and the production methodology, but most important, have not developed a viable transporation system in the back lands of Siberia. If it is not viable to ship in by land transportation in spring and fall, it is not viable to ship out. Currant rail transport is highly unrealiable and simply not respondant to various locations of time essential service. The above,,,,if the cyrstle ball was in my possession to use. Now, if the darn spell check would be implaced, my spelling would be the respondant of correct. Karl
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Post by Jaga on Aug 19, 2013 22:20:55 GMT -7
Karl, thanks for interesting analysis and insight since you know the Middle East. I never visited this region, although I met here and there different people from there. Arabs I met were usually very educated, gentle, very well behaved towards women. Referring to cell-phones, thanks to the digital world they know how different people live in other countries with no dynasties, no regimes - neither political or cultural. Many young muslim men cannot find good jobs. AS for the petroleum, it brings money but it also brings problems. Many wars were caused because of precious oil - for instance Kuwait was attacked because of its petroleum. Besides, money helps to keep some regimes - like Saudi Arabia. You mention this problems also
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Post by pieter on Aug 20, 2013 14:39:13 GMT -7
Jaga, Karl with his experiance in Syria very well described the situations of the middle eastern from his perspective. We have a very limited view and knowledge from looking from the West to the Middle east. You probably met these Arabs in Poland (I believe that during the peoples republic of Poland there were Arabs in Poland. Maybe your academical parents had contacts with or invited Arabs to their home?), or in Western-Europe on one of your travels or in the USA. The extraction and refining of oil and gas are the major industrial activities in the Arabian Peninsula. The region also has an active construction sector, with many cities reflecting the wealth generated by the oil industry. The service sector is dominated by financial and technical institutions, which, like the construction sector, mainly serve the oil industry. Traditional handicrafts such as carpet-weaving are found in rural areas. Fueled by enormous revenues from oil exports, the Saoudi economy boomed during the 1970s and ’80s. Unlike most developing countries, Saudi Arabia had an abundance of capital, and vast development projects sprung up that turned the once underdeveloped country into a modern state. During that time, unemployment was all but nonexistent—large numbers of foreign workers were imported to do the most menial and the most highly technical tasks—and per capita income and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita were among the highest in the non-Western world. EgyptEgypt’s economy began to become more resilient during the eightees, primarily because of new oil and natural gas discoveries but also because Western aid increased. In the late 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century, Egypt’s per capita gross domestic product (GDP) rose markedly, as the government sought to raise domestic production and foreign trade. However, the economy has continued to face many hurdles. The general standard of living in Egypt remains rather low, and in relation to the size of its population, its economic resources are limited. Land remains its main source of natural wealth, but the amount of productive land is insufficient to support the population adequately. Increases in population have put pressure on resources, producing chronic underemployment, and many Egyptians have sought employment abroad. Political uncertainty in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising that toppled Pres. Ḥosnī Mubārak had a negative effect on most sectors of the economy, with the worst impacts being felt in tourism, construction, and manufacturing. By the beginning of the 21st century, most large manufacturing enterprises were still owned or operated by the state, although the government had begun to sell substantial holdings to the private sector. Major manufactures included chemicals of all sorts (including pharmaceuticals), food products, textiles and garments, cement and other building materials, and paper products as well as derivatives of hydrocarbons (including fuel oil, gasoline, lubricants, jet fuel, and asphalt). Iron, steel, and automobiles were of growing importance to the Egyptian economy. In 1980 Egypt’s first international bank since the revolution was opened and a national investment bank was established. Islamic banks have been set up in Egypt, paying dividends to their investors instead of interest, which is proscribed under Islamic law. In 1992 the stock exchanges at Cairo (1903) and Alexandria (1881), which had been closed since the early 1960s, were reopened, and in 1997 they were fully merged as the Cairo and Alexandria Stock Exchange. The supply of money has, in general, followed the development of the economy; the authorities have aimed at tolerable increases in the price level, although some prices soared during the 1970s and ’80s. Long pegged to the U.S. dollar, the pound was allowed to float in January 2003. Egypt is a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Egypts tradeThe value of imports into Egypt is usually equal to about one-third and exports about one-tenth of the GDP. The large visible trade deficit was partially offset by transfers from abroad, such as aid from Western governments and remittances from Egyptians working in other countries. Nearly two-fifths of imports consist of raw materials, mineral and chemical products, and capital goods (machinery, electrical apparatuses, and transport equipment), some one-fifth are foodstuffs, and the remainder are other consumer goods. Roughly half of the exports by value consist of petroleum and petroleum products, followed by raw cotton, cotton yarn, and fabrics. Raw materials, mineral and chemical products, and capital goods are also exported. Among agricultural exports are rice, onions, garlic, and citrus fruit. Egypt’s most important trading partners include the United States, Italy, Germany, and France. Constitutional frameworkLike its predecessors, the suspended 2012 constitution proclaims the Arab Republic of Egypt to be a democratic state with Islam as its state religion and Arabic as its national language. It recognizes public and private ownership and guarantees the equality of all Egyptians before the law and their protection against arbitrary intervention by the state in the legal process. It also affirms the people’s right to peaceful assembly and the right to organize into associations or unions and to vote. Egypt maintains one of the largest and strongest military forces in the region. Roughly three-fourths of its overall military strength is in the army. The remainder is divided between the air force (including the air defense command) and navy. The army is equipped with large numbers of state-of-the-art main battle tanks along with field artillery and other armoured equipment. The air force has several hundred high-performance combat aircraft, and the navy has a small fleet composed mostly of coastal patrol craft, but that also includes frigates, destroyers, and submarines. Most importantly, the country is one of the few in the region with its own military industrial complex. Egyptian firms connected with the government manufacture light armoured vehicles and missiles (short and medium range) and assemble some of their heavy armoured vehicles under contracts with foreign firms. The officer corps has traditionally played a prominent role in politics. As part of the peace process with Israel, the United States has provided the country with large amounts of military aid. Transition to an elected governmentBeginning in November 2011, Egypt held its first elections of the post-Mubārak era, with three rounds of voting for the members of the People’s Assembly. When voting was concluded in January, it was clear that the elections had been dominated by Egypt’s Islamist groups: the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party won about 47 percent of the seats in the assembly, and the hard-line Nūr Party won about 25 percent. The presidential race began in February with the announcement that elections would be held in May 2012, with a runoff in June 2012 if necessary. The first in a series of surprise legal and procedural reversals came in April, when the election commission disqualified nearly a dozen candidates, including two of the most prominent: Omar Suleiman, Mubārak’s former intelligence chief, and Khairat al-Shater, a Muslim Brotherhood leader. When the first round of voting was held in May, Ahmed Shafiq, a former minister in the Mubārak administration, and Mohammed Morsi, the head of the Freedom and Justice Party, received the highest totals and advanced to the runoff. Khairat al-Shater, Muslim Brotherhood leaderEgyptian politics were shaken up again in June by a series of developments denounced by Islamists and political liberals as a “soft coup” carried out by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to retain power and prevent Islamists from gaining control of the legislative and executive branches of government. Just days before the presidential runoff on June 16 and 17, the Supreme Constitutional Court unexpectedly invalidated the results of the legislative elections held in 2011 and 2012, forcing dissolution of the Islamist-dominated People’s Assembly. The action was followed on June 17 by a surprise constitutional declaration by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces expanding its authority and placing new restrictions on the powers of the incoming president. On June 24 Mohammed Morsi was declared the winner of the presidential election, and he took office at the end of the month. Although Morsi began his presidency in a state of apparent subordination to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, he moved to take the upper hand in mid-August, announcing the retirement of several senior members of the council and revoking the constitutional declaration of June 17. The process of writing a new constitution became the focus of bitter contention between the Islamists and a loose opposition comprising liberal, secular, and Christian factions. The Islamists’ strong performance in parliamentary elections had allowed them to gain a dominant position in the first Constituent Assembly, a 100-member body tasked with drafting the constitution. Opposition members of the assembly, fearing that the Islamists’ dominance in that body would result in a constitution that ignored non-Islamists’ concerns, staged walkouts and filed lawsuits challenging the legality of the assembly. In April an Egyptian court had dissolved the assembly on procedural grounds, but a new Constituent Assembly formed in June met with the same complaints from the opposition, and boycotts continued. On November 22, 2012, Morsi moved to address his contentious relations with Egypt’s judiciary and to sidestep legal challenges to the legitimacy of the Constituent Assembly by issuing an edict exempting himself from judicial oversight and removing the courts’ power to dissolve the Constituent Assembly. Although Morsi defended the edict as a necessary measure to protect Egypt’s transition to democracy, mass demonstrations were held against what many saw as a seizure of dictatorial powers. On November 30 the Constituent Assembly approved a draft constitution without the input of the boycotting Christian and secularist members. Morsi called for a referendum on the draft to be held on December 15. Both opponents and supporters of Morsi staged rallies around the country, resulting in some of the largest demonstrations since 2011. Crowds demanding Morsi’s ouster gathered at the presidential palace and ransacked several Muslim Brotherhood offices. As protests continued in early December, Morsi bowed to public anger and rescinded parts of his constitutional decree but retained the article preventing the courts from dissolving the Constituent Assembly. He declared martial law on December 9, authorizing the military to make arrests and keep order until the constitutional referendum could be held. The draft constitution was approved by voters and took effect in late December. Sporadic violent protests against Morsi’s rule continued into early 2013. Worsening economic conditions, deteriorating public services, and a string of sectarian incidents exacerbated political polarization in mid-2013. Calls for Morsi’s resignation increased, led by a loose coalition including liberals, religious minorities, and Egyptians angered by high rates of unemployment and inflation. Clashes between Morsi’s supporters and critics in late June 2013 culminated in massive anti-Morsi protests around the country on June 30, the first anniversary of his inauguration. More than a dozen people were killed, and many more were injured. On July 1, with Egypt seemingly on the brink of a major crisis, the head of the Egyptian Armed Forces, Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, declared that the military was ready to intervene to prevent chaos in the country if the two sides were unable to resolve their differences within two days. Morsi responded to the protests by offering negotiations with the opposition but refused to step down. Protests continued, and on July 3 the military made good on its ultimatum, temporarily suspending the constitution, removing Morsi from the presidency, and creating a new interim administration to be led by the head of the Supreme Constitutional Court, Adly Mansour. A number of the Muslim Brotherhood’s leaders, including Morsi, were placed under arrest, and television stations affiliated with the organization were shut down. While senior military officials worked to assemble a transitional cabinet, enraged members of the Muslim Brotherhood held demonstrations around the country to protest Morsi’s removal. Tensions erupted into violence on July 8 when Egyptian security forces opened fire on a crowd of Morsi supporters outside a military base in Cairo, killing at least 50 people and wounding hundreds more. The Muslim Brotherhood condemned the incident as an unprovoked massacre, whereas the military maintained that guards had opened fire to defend the base against armed attackers in the crowd. A similar attack on July 28 killed nearly 100 protesters. On August 14 security forces took action to break up Muslim Brotherhood sit-ins in Cairo, killing more than 500 while descending on protesters’ encampments. The Muslim Brotherhood again accused the new administration of using indiscriminate and excessive force to defend what they described as an illegitimate seizure of power. In the aftermath of the attack, Egyptian authorities declared a state of emergency, an action seen by many as restoring the military authoritarianism of the Mubārak era. Causes tensions between Egyptian military regime and Muslim BroterhoodGamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970), army officer, prime minister (1954–56), president (1956–70) of Egypt and leader of the Arab worldGamal Abdel Nasser military carreer started in the thirtees with an army officer training at the Egyptian Royal Military Academy. He was an instructor at the Cairo Royal Military Academy since May 1943. In May 1948, after the end of the British withdrawal, King Farouk sent the Egyptian army into Palestine, with Nasser serving in the 6th Infantry Battalion. After the Arab–Israeli War, he returned to his job as an instructor at the Royal Military Academy. He sent emissaries to forge an alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood in October 1948, but soon concluded that the agenda of the Brotherhood was not compatible with his nationalism, and began a struggle to prevent the Brotherhood's influence over his activities. The Muslim Brotherhood boycotted the 1950 parliamentary elections. On July 23, 1952, Nasser and 89 other Free Officers staged an almost bloodless coup d’état, ousting the monarchy. Sādāt favoured the immediate public execution of King Farouk I and some members of the establishment, but Nasser vetoed the idea and permitted Farouk and others to go into exile. The country was taken over by a Revolutionary Command Council of 11 officers controlled by Nasser, with Major General Muḥammad Naguib as the puppet head of state. For more than a year Nasser kept his real role so well hidden that astute foreign correspondents were unaware of his existence, but in the spring of 1954, in a complicated series of intrigues, Naguib was deposed and placed under house arrest, and Nasser emerged from the shadows and named himself prime minister. On 26 October 1954, Muslim Brotherhood member Mohammed Abdel Latif attempted to assassinate Nasser while he was delivering a speech in Alexandria to celebrate the British military withdrawal. The speech was broadcast to the Arab world via radio. The gunman was 25 feet (7.6 m) away from him and fired eight shots, but all missed Nasser. Panic broke out in the mass audience, but Nasser maintained his posture and raised his voice to appeal for calm. With great emotion he exclaimed the following: " My countrymen, my blood spills for you and for Egypt. I will live for your sake and die for the sake of your freedom and honor. Let them kill me; it does not concern me so long as I have instilled pride, honor, and freedom in you. If Gamal Abdel Nasser should die, each of you shall be Gamal Abdel Nasser ... Gamal Abdel Nasser is of you and from you and he is willing to sacrifice his life for the nation." The crowd roared in approval and Arab audiences were electrified. The assassination attempt backfired, quickly playing into Nasser's hands. Upon returning to Cairo, he ordered one of the largest political crackdowns in the modern history of Egypt, with the arrests of thousands of dissenters, mostly members of the Brotherhood, but also communists, and the dismissal of 140 officers loyal to Naguib. Eight Brotherhood leaders were sentenced to death, although the sentence of its chief ideologue, Sayyed Qutb, was commuted to a 15-year imprisonment. President Naguib was removed from the presidency and put under house arrest, but was never tried or sentenced, and no one in the army rose to defend him. With his rivals neutralized, Nasser became the undisputed leader of Egypt. Sayyed Qutb, the Muslim Brotherhood ideologue in an Egyptian prisonIn January 1956 Nasser announced the promulgation of a constitution under which Egypt became a socialist Arab state with a one-party political system and with Islam as the official religion. In June, 99.948 percent of the five million Egyptians voting marked their ballots for Nasser, the only candidate, for president. The constitution was approved by 99.8 percent. 1962 saw an increase in domestic repression, with thousands of Islamists imprisoned, including dozens of military officers. In 1961, Nasser sought to firmly establish Egypt as the leader of the Arab world and to promote a second revolution in Egypt with the purpose of merging Islamic and socialist thinking to satisfy the will of the general populace. To achieve this, he initiated several reforms to modernize the Al-Azhar University, centre of Islamic learning, the Qur'an and Islamic law, which serves as the de facto leading authority in Sunni Islam, and to ensure its prominence over the Muslim Brotherhood and the more conservative Wahhabism promoted by Saudi Arabia. During the 1964 presidential referendum in Egypt, Nasser was re-elected to a second six-year term as the United Arab Republic president and took his oath on 25 March 1965. He was the only candidate for the position, with virtually all of his political opponents forbidden from running for office by law and his fellow party members reduced to mere followers. That same year, Nasser had the Muslim Brotherhood chief ideologue Sayyed Qutb imprisoned. Qutb was charged and found guilty by the court of plotting to assassinate Nasser and was executed in 1966. Sayyed QutbEgyptian Nasser opponents accused him of being a dictator who thwarted democratic progress, led a repressive administration responsible for numerous human rights violations, and imprisoned thousands of Egyptians in opposition, including communists and members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Islamists in Egypt, particularly members of the Brotherhood, viewed Nasser's political persecution as oppressive, tyrannical, and demonic. Anwar el-SādātAnwar el-Sādāt (1918-1981), Egyptian army officer and politician who was president of Egypt from 1970 until his assassination in 1981.After the October (Yom Kippur) War of 1973, Egypt's president Anwar el-Sādāt (1918 -1981) began to work toward peace in the Middle East. He made a historic visit to Israel (Nov. 19–20, 1977), during which he traveled to Jerusalem to place his plan for a peace settlement before the Israeli Knesset (parliament). This initiated a series of diplomatic efforts that Sādāt continued despite strong opposition from most of the Arab world and the Soviet Union. U.S. Pres. Jimmy Carter mediated the negotiations between Sādāt and Begin that resulted in the Camp David Accords ( Sept. 17, 1978), a preliminary peace agreement between Egypt and Israel. Sādāt and Begin were awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1978, and their continued political negotiations resulted in the signing on March 26, 1979, of a treaty of peace between Egypt and Israel—the first between the latter and any Arab country. While Sādāt’s popularity rose in the West, it fell dramatically in Egypt because of internal opposition to the treaty, a worsening economic crisis, and Sādāt’s suppression of the resulting public dissent. In September 1981 he ordered a massive police strike against his opponents, jailing more than 1,500 people from across the political spectrum. The following month Sādāt was assassinated by Muslim extremists during the Armed Forces Day military parade commemorating the Yom Kippur War. Muslim BrotherhoodIn the 1980s the Muslim Brotherhood experienced a renewal as part of the general upsurge of religious activity in Islamic countries. The Brotherhood’s new adherents aimed to reorganize society and government according to Islamic doctrines, and they were vehemently anti-Western. An uprising by the Brotherhood in the Syrian city of Ḥamāh in February 1982 was crushed by the government of Ḥafiz al-Assad at a cost of perhaps 25,000 lives. The Brotherhood revived in Egypt and Jordan in the same period, and, beginning in the late 1980s, it emerged to compete in legislative elections in those countries. In Egypt the participation of the Muslim Brotherhood in parliamentary elections there in the 1980s was followed by its boycott of the elections of 1990, when it joined most of the country’s opposition in protesting electoral strictures. Although the group itself remained formally banned, in the 2000 elections Brotherhood supporters running as independent candidates were able to win 17 seats, making it the largest opposition bloc in the parliament. In 2005, again running as independents, the Brotherhood and its supporters captured 88 seats in spite of efforts by Pres. Ḥosnī Mubārak’s administration to restrict voting in the group’s strongholds. Its unexpected success in 2005 was met with additional restrictions and arrests, and the Brotherhood opted to boycott the 2008 local elections. In the 2010 parliamentary elections the Mubārak administration continued to restrict the Muslim Brotherhood by arresting members and barring voters in areas where the organization had strong support. After Mubārak’s National Democratic Party won 209 out of 211 seats in the first round of voting, effectively eliminating the Muslim Brotherhood from the parliament, the organization boycotted the second round. In January 2011 a nonreligious youth protest movement against the Mubārak regime appeared in Egypt. After hesitating briefly, the Muslim Brotherhood’s senior leadership endorsed the movement and called on its members to participate in demonstrations. The protests soon forced Mubārak to step down as president in February, clearing the way for the Muslim Brotherhood’s open participation in Egyptian politics. Brotherhood leaders outlined a cautious political strategy for the group, stating that they would not seek a majority in the legislature or nominate a candidate for president. In May, however, a senior member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh, announced his intention to run for president; he was later expelled from the organization. Former Muslim Brotherhood presidential candidate Abdel-Moneim Abul-FotouhIn late April 2011 the Muslim Brotherhood founded a political party called the Freedom and Justice Party and applied for official recognition from the Egyptian interim government. Leaders of the Freedom and Justice Party stated that the party’s policies would be grounded in Islamic principles but that the party, whose members included women and Christians, would be nonconfessional. The party received official recognition in June, allowing it to enter candidates in upcoming elections. The Freedom and Justice Party soon achieved considerable success, winning about 47 percent of seats in elections held between November 2011 and January 2012 for the People’s Assembly, the lower house of the Egyptian parliament. The ultraconservative Islamist Nūr Party came in second with around 30 percent of the seats. The strong results for Freedom and Justice and Nūr allowed Islamists to dominate the selection process for the 100-member Constituent Assembly, a body tasked with writing a new constitution. The issue of fielding a presidential candidate arose again in March 2012 when the Muslim Brotherhood announced that Khairat al-Shater, a businessman and senior member of the organization, would run for president as the nominee of the Freedom and Justice Party, thus contradicting earlier assurances that the organization would not seek the presidency in 2012. In April 2012 Shater, who had been imprisoned under the Mubārak regime in 2008 for funding the Muslim Brotherhood, was disqualified from running by Egypt’s election commission under a rule banning candidates with prior criminal convictions. Mohammed Morsi, the head of the Freedom and Justice Party, entered the race as Shater’s replacement. Former Egyptian president Mohammed MorsiMorsi won the largest total in the first round of voting in May and defeated Ahmed Shafiq, a former prime minister under Mubārak, in a runoff held on June 16 and 17. Exuberance over Morsi’s victory was tempered by the ongoing outcry over the June 14 ruling by the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court calling for the dissolution of the Muslim Brotherhood-led People’s Assembly on the grounds that legislative elections held between November 2011 and January 2012 failed to follow procedures requiring that one-third of the seats be reserved for independent candidates. The Islamist-dominated Constituent Assembly remained intact. On November 30, 2012, the Constituent Assembly approved a draft constitution written by Islamists without the input of boycotting Christian and secularist members. Morsi called for a referendum on the draft to be held on December 15. Critics accused Morsi of using his power to force through a constitution favourable to the Muslim Brotherhood; crowds demanding Morsi’s ouster gathered at the presidential palace and ransacked several Muslim Brotherhood offices. The draft constitution was approved by voters and took effect in late December, but anti-Morsi protests continued. Morsi’s administration faced increasingly vocal opposition in 2013, led by activists who accused the incumbents of inaction regarding Egypt’s weak economy, failing public services, and deteriorating security situation. A massive protest calling for Morsi’s resignation was held on June 30, 2013, the first anniversary of his inauguration. On July 1 the head of the Egyptian Armed Forces, Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, issued an ultimatum declaring that the military would intervene if Morsi was unable to placate the protesters. Morsi responded by offering negotiations with the opposition but refused to step down. On July 3 the military made good on its ultimatum, suspending the constitution, removing Morsi from the presidency, and appointing a new transitional administration. Morsi and several other Muslim Brotherhood figures were placed under arrest, and television stations associated with the Muslim Brotherhood were shut down. While Morsi’s opponents celebrated, enraged supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood took to the streets to denounce the removal of a democratically elected leader. Tensions erupted into violence on July 8 when Egyptian security forces opened fire on a crowd of Muslim Brotherhood supporters outside a military base in Cairo, killing at least 50 people and wounding hundreds more. Sources:
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Post by pieter on Aug 20, 2013 16:39:01 GMT -7
Egyptians workEgypt industrial zoneNearly one-fourth of the Egyptian population derives its living from agriculture, although a growing proportion of the labour force—more than one-tenth—is engaged in manufacturing and mining. Most of the rest of the working population is employed in the service, trade, finance, and transportation sectors. Because of the shortage of land, labour underemployment began to be manifest in agriculture early in the 20th century. Since then the development of nonagricultural jobs has failed to keep pace with a rapidly growing labour force, and unemployment grew during the 1990s as the government shed large numbers of unproductive positions from the bureaucracy as part of a fiscal austerity policy. Farmers in Minya El Qamh in the Nile Delta governorate of Sharqiya, the largest wheat producer in Egypt (Photo: Deya Abaza)The rural population, especially landless agricultural labourers, has the lowest standard of living in the country. The salaries of professional groups are also low. Industrial and urban workers enjoy, on the whole, a higher standard. The highest wages are earned in petroleum, manufacturing, and other industries, where many workers receive additional benefits of social insurance and extra health and housing facilities. To some extent, low wages had been partly offset by the low cost of living, but since the late 1970s this advantage has been neutralized by persistent high inflation rates. Souvenirs are displayed for sale as vendors wait for tourists at the Giza pyramids in Egypt in October 2012. (photographer :Khaled Desouki/AFP/Getty)With the majority of the population earning very low incomes, direct taxation falls on the few wealthy; income-tax rates are made sharply progressive in an attempt to achieve a degree of equality in income distribution. Nevertheless, the income gap between rich and poor Egyptians has widened noticeably since the 1960s. Direct taxes on income, mostly levied on businesses, account for about one-fourth of governmental revenue. Sales taxes also generate about one-fourth of revenue, and customs duties (including fees from the Suez Canal) raise another one-seventh. A view shows the Egyptian Stock Exchange in Cairo in June 2011 (photographer :Asmaa Waguih/Courtesy Reuters).Resources and powerCompared with the physical size of the country and the level of its population, Egypt has scanty mineral resources. The search for petroleum began earlier in Egypt than elsewhere in the Middle East, and production on a small scale began as early as 1908, but it was not until the mid-1970s that significant results were achieved, notably in the Gulf of Suez and portions of the Western Desert. By the early 1980s Egypt had become an important oil producer, although total production was relatively small by Middle Eastern standards. Dana Petroleum PLC, a unit of Korea National Oil Corp., has a joint venture with Egyptian General Petroleum Corp in the Gulf of Suez in Egypt.The bulk of Egypt’s petroleum comes from the Morgan, Ramadan, and July fields (both onshore and offshore) in the Gulf of Suez, which are operated by t he Gulf of Suez Petroleum Company (commonly known as Gupco), and from the Abū Rudays area of the Sinai on the Gulf of Suez. Egypt also extracts oil from fields at Al-ʿAlamayn (El-Alamein) and Razzāq in the Western Desert. Active drilling for oil, involving several international interests, including those of the United States and several European countries, has continued in both the Eastern and the Western deserts, with marked success during the 1990s and early 21st century. In the process of searching for oil, some significant natural gas deposits have been located, including substantial deposits in the delta and in the Western Desert, as well as offshore under the Mediterranean Sea. Wells have been established in the Abū Qīr area, northeast of Alexandria. A joint Egyptian-Italian gas discovery was made in the north delta near Abū Māḍī in 1970; this was developed partly to supply a fertilizer plant and partly to fuel the industrial centres in the north and northwest delta. In 1974 Abū Māḍī became the first Egyptian gas field to begin production. Other natural gas fields are located in the Western Desert, the delta, the Mediterranean shelf, and the Gulf of Suez, and by the early 21st century natural gas production had begun to rival that of oil, both as a source for domestic consumption and as a commodity for export. Abū Qīr areaEgypt has several oil refineries, two of which are located at Suez. The first of Egypt’s twin crude pipelines, linking the Gulf of Suez to the Mediterranean Sea near Alexandria, was opened in 1977. This Suez-Mediterranean pipeline, known as Sumed, has the capacity to transmit some 2.5 million barrels of oil per day. The Sumed pipeline was financed by a consortium of Arab countries, primarily Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt. In 1981 a crude oil pipeline was opened to link Raʾs Shukhayr, on the Red Sea coast, with the refinery at Musṭurud, north of Cairo. Additional oil pipelines link Musṭurud with Alexandria, and fields near Hurghada to terminals on the Red Sea. The Sumed pipeline, Suez-Mediterranean pipelineSeveral of Egypt’s major known phosphate deposits are mined at Isnā, Ḥamrāwayn, and Safājah. Coal deposits are located in the partially developed Maghārah mines in the Sinai Peninsula. Mines located in the Eastern Desert have been the primary source for manganese production since 1967, and there are also reserves of manganese on the Sinai Peninsula. Iron ore is extracted from deposits at Aswān, and development work has continued at Al-Baḥriyyah Oasis. Chromium, uranium, and gold deposits are also found in Egypt. The Nile constitutes an incomparable source of hydroelectric energy. Before the completion of the Aswān High Dam power station in 1970, only a small volume of Egyptian electricity was generated by hydropower, with thermal plants burning diesel fuel or coal being the principal producers. For several years after the High Dam station went into operation, most of the country’s electricity was generated there. Its original 12 turbines have a generating capacity of about 2 million kilowatts; the Aswan II hydroelectric power station (completed 1986) has added another 270,000 kilowatts of capacity to the system. Actual power production from the High Dam has been limited, however, by the need to reconcile demands for power with the demands for irrigation water. Moreover, Egypt’s booming population and growing need for energy has forced the government to construct additional thermal plants, many of them fueled by the country’s abundant reserves of natural gas. Thermal plants now generate some four-fifths of the country’s electricity. The Aswān High Dam power stationAswan II hydroelectric power stationSource: Encyclopaedia Britannica
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Post by Jaga on Aug 20, 2013 23:47:25 GMT -7
Pieter, very interesting info about Egyptian life
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Post by pieter on Aug 21, 2013 4:39:13 GMT -7
The History of SyriaAleppo CitadelA souq in AleppoA beautiful street in Aleppo befor the civil warAt the beginning of the 19th century, Syria had some islands of prosperity: Aleppo and Damascus (each with roughly 100,000 inhabitants), Mount Lebanon, and certain other secluded districts. In general, however, the country was in decay, the small towns subsisting on local trade and the villagers receding in face of the Bedouin. The Ottoman hold on the country was at its weakest. In Damascus and Aleppo the governors were scarcely able to control the population of city or countryside. The prince of Lebanon, Bashīr II (1788–1840), who had been installed by al-Jazzār and remained quiet while al-Jazzār was alive, gradually extended his control over districts beyond Lebanon. In 1810 the Wahhābīs from central Arabia threatened Damascus. Wahhabist Saoudi warriers wo threatened Damascus in 1810EGYPTIAN DOMINATIONIn 1831 the ruler of Egypt, Muḥammad ʿAlī, sent his son Ibrāhīm Pasha at the head of his modern army into Palestine. Helped by Bashīr and other local leaders, Ibrāhīm conquered the country and advanced into Asia Minor. He ruled Syria for almost 10 years. The whole country was controlled from Damascus. There and in the provincial centres the governors were Egyptians, but they were assisted by councils representing the population. In political matters Ibrāhīm relied largely on Bashīr. New taxes were introduced and strictly collected, agriculture was encouraged, and the Bedouin pushed back. After an abortive attempt to introduce trade monopolies, Ibrāhīm encouraged European traders by maintaining better security. The Christian and Jewish populations were treated with consideration. I brāhīm Pasha, Egyptian militairy leader and ruler of Syria for 10 yearsA bedouin with a riffle, 19th centuryAfter a time, Ibrāhīm’s rule became unpopular because his taxes were heavy and because he tried to disarm and conscript the population. The European powers (except France) also objected to Egyptian rule in Syria because it was a threat to the Ottoman Empire, the weakness or disintegration of which might cause a European crisis. In 1839 war broke out between Muḥammad ʿAlī and his suzerain, the sultan. Ibrāhīm defeated the Ottoman army, but in 1840 the European powers intervened. After an ultimatum, a British, Ottoman, and Austrian force landed on the Syrian coast; the British encouraged a local insurrection, and the Egyptians were forced to withdraw from Syria, which reverted to the sultan’s government. OTTOMAN RULE RESTOREDThe next 20 years were a period of mounting crises. Lebanon became the scene of a struggle for power between Druzes and Maronites, with undertones of social conflict. In Syria an attempt was made to apply the new Ottoman administrative system. But the new system of taxation and conscription caused unrest. This situation was worsened by the growth of European influence; the Muslim majority became aware of Ottoman vulnerability to European aggression, and the connection of France with the Catholics and of Russia with the Orthodox both encouraged the minorities to hope for a more favourable position and focused on them the hostility of their Muslim compatriots. There was also economic unrest. European goods flooded the market and replaced some of the products of local craftsmen. This diminished the prosperity of the artisan class, largely Muslim, but increased that of the import merchants, mainly Christians and Jews. The tension thus generated burst forth in 1860 when a civil war of Druzes and Maronites in Lebanon touched off a massacre of Christians by Muslims in Damascus. The Ottoman government sent a special commissioner to punish the guilty and suppress disorder, and to firmly establish Istanbul’s authority. France sent an expeditionary force, and a European commission discussed the future of the country, coming to the conclusion that Lebanon (the mountain itself but not the coastal towns) should be an autonomous district (mutaṣarrifiyyah) but that no change should be made in Syria. From then until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Syria continued to be governed as a group of Ottoman provinces. From 1888 there were three: Damascus, Aleppo, and Beirut. The new administrative and legal system was more carefully applied, and a new type of educated official gradually raised its standards. The introduction of railways and telegraphs made possible a stricter control. A French-built railway linked Beirut and Damascus, with a later extension running north to Aleppo, and in 1908 the Hejaz Railway was opened to take pilgrims from Damascus to Medina. Railways and better security encouraged agriculture. Aleppo (population about 200,000) and Damascus (250,000) both had a flourishing trade, but the crafts declined, and the desert routes suffered from the opening of the Suez Canal. In the cities there was a considerable change in social life. The upper and middle classes adopted the clothes and social customs of western Europe, and Western-style schools flourished. In 1866 the American Protestant Mission opened in Beirut the Syrian Protestant College (later the American University of Beirut), and in 1881 the French Jesuits opened the Université Saint-Joseph in the same town. The Ottoman government opened schools, and young men of the great Arab families of the towns began to attend the higher schools in Constantinople and to go on to civil or military service. Under Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876–1909) the Muslim Arabs of Syria were reasonably content. Syrian Arabs played a leading part at the sultan’s court and Abdülhamid lavished patronage on Sufi orders. His emphasis on Islamic solidarity fostered obedience to the sultan as a religious duty. There also appeared a dissident current of Salafi Islamic reform allied to the Ottoman constitutional movement. The Salafis favoured a return to pristine Islam as a way to purify ritual and allow flexible adaptation to modern political and technological advances. After the Young Turk revolution of 1908, relations between Arabs and Turks grew worse. Power fell into the hands of a Turkish military group whose policy stimulated the growth of opposition. Arab nationalist and Syrian patriotic feeling became more conscious, and political parties, both open and secret, were organized by Syrians in Cairo, Constantinople, and Paris, as well as in Syria itself. WORLD WAR IWhen the Ottoman Empire entered World War I in 1914, Syria became a military base. In 1915 an Ottoman army under German command attacked the British position on the Suez Canal, and from 1916 a British and imperial force based in Egypt, with a French contingent, undertook the invasion of Palestine. By the end of 1917 Gen. Sir Edmund (later Field Marshal Viscount) Allenby had occupied Jerusalem, and by November 1918 his troops had taken Syria. Most Christians and Jews welcomed the occupation; among the Muslims a large proportion had remained loyal to the empire, as being all that was left of the political independence of Islam, but the nationalist societies had made common cause with the ruler of the Hejaz, Sharīf Ḥusayn, forming an alliance with Britain against their Turkish suzerain. An Arab army under the command of Ḥusayn’s son Fayṣal was formed in the Hejaz, with Syrian and other Arab officers and British help led by T.E. Lawrence. It took part, under Allenby’s general command, in the Syrian campaign helping to capture Damascus. The Arabs entered Damascus as victors (Arab Revolt) in October 1918.T.E. LawrenceWhen the war ended, Allenby installed an Arab military administration, under Fayṣal, in Damascus and the interior. The French took over the coast, with Beirut as their centre, and the British took over Palestine. There followed several unsettled years while the fate of Syria was being decided. During the war the British government had made promises, to Ḥusayn and other Arab leaders, that the Arabs would be independent in those countries that they helped to liberate, subject to certain reservations, the precise extent of which has never been clear. Then, in November 1918, Britain and France declared their intention of establishing in Syria and Iraq “ national governments drawing their authority from the initiative and free choice of the native populations.” By the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, France was to be free to establish its administration in Lebanon and on the coast and to provide advice and assistance to whatever regime existed in the interior. In March 1920 a Syrian Congress meeting in Damascus elected Fayṣal king of a united Syria including Palestine; but in April the Allied Conference of San Remo decided that both should be placed under the new mandate system and that France should have the mandate for Syria. The French mandateIn June 1920 a French ultimatum demanding Syrian recognition of the mandate was followed by a French occupation and the expulsion in July of Fayṣal. In July 1922 the League of Nations approved the texts of the French Mandate for Syria and Lebanon. Lebanon had already, in August 1920, been declared a separate state, with the addition of Beirut, Tripoli, and certain other districts, to the prewar autonomous province. Politically, “ Syria” henceforth acquired a narrower meaning; it referred to what was left of geographical Syria once Transjordan, Lebanon, and Palestine had been detached from it. The mandate placed on France the responsibility of creating and controlling an administration, of developing the resources of the country, and of preparing it for self-government. A number of local governments were set up: one for the Al-Anṣariyyah Mountains region, where the majority belonged to the ʿAlawite sect, one for the Jabal al-Durūz region, where most of the inhabitants were Druzes, and eventually one for the rest of Syria, with its capital at Damascus. The French mandatory administration carried out much constructive work. Roads were built; town planning was carried out and urban amenities were improved; land tenure was reformed in some districts; and agriculture was encouraged, particularly in the fertile Al-Jazīrah. The University of Damascus was established, with its teaching being mainly in Arabic. It was more difficult to prepare Syria for self-government because of the difference between French and Syrian conceptions of what was implied. Most French officials and statesmen thought in terms of a long period of control. Further, they did not wish to hand over power to the Muslim majority in a way that might persuade their Christian protégés that they were giving up France’s traditional policy of protecting the Christians of the Levant. In Syria, many members of the minorities and a smaller proportion of the majority wanted the French to remain as a help in constructing a modern society and government. The greater part of the urban population, however, and in particular the educated elite, wanted Syria to be independent and to include Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan, if possible, and certainly the Druze and ʿAlawite districts. The first crisis in Franco-Syrian relations came in 1925, when a revolt in Jabal Al-Durūz, sparked by local grievances, led to an alliance between the Druze rebels and the nationalists of Damascus, newly organized in the People’s Party. For a time the rebels controlled much of the countryside. In October 1925, bands entered the city of Damascus itself, and this led to a two-day bombardment by the French (see Druze revolt). The revolt did not subside completely until 1927, but even before the end of 1925 the French had started a policy of conciliation. In 1928 elections were held for a Constituent Assembly. The nationalists won the election and took office in a new government. The assembly drafted a constitution, but their draft was not wholly acceptable to the high commissioner, because it spoke of the unity of geographical Syria and did not explicitly safeguard the French position of control. In May 1930 the high commissioner dissolved the assembly and enacted the constitution with certain changes. There followed unsuccessful negotiations for a Franco-Syrian treaty, but in 1936 the advent of the Popular Front government in France changed the situation. Negotiations took place with the nationalists, now organized in the National Bloc. A treaty was signed in September 1936. It provided for Syrian independence, Franco-Syrian consultation on foreign policy, French priority in advice and assistance, and the retention by France of two military bases. The Druze and ʿAlawite districts were to be incorporated into Syria but not Lebanon, with which France signed a similar treaty in November. A Parliament was elected; the leader of the Bloc, Hāshim al-ʿAtāsī, was chosen as president of the republic; and a nationalist government took office. The Syrian government ratified the treaty before the end of 1936, but France never did so. When Turkey put forward claims to Alexandretta, where Turks were the largest element in the mixed population, France found it advisable, for strategic reasons, to yield to its demands. In 1937 the district (later given the Turkish name of Hatay) was granted an autonomous status; in 1939 it was incorporated into Turkey. By the end of 1938 it was clear that the French government had no intention of ratifying the treaty. In July 1939 the president and government resigned, and the constitution was suspended. World War II and independenceIn June 1940, after the Franco-German armistice, the French in Syria announced that they would cease hostilities against Germany and Italy and recognize the Vichy government. Political uncertainty and the growing scarcity of goods and rising prices caused unrest, which was led by one of the prominent nationalists, Shukri al-Quwatli. In May 1941 the Vichy government allowed German aircraft to land and refuel en route to Iraq, and in June, British, Commonwealth, and Free French forces invaded Syria. French troops resisted for a month, but Damascus was occupied on June 21, and hostilities ceased at midnight on July 11–12. From then until 1946, Syria was jointly occupied by British and French forces. At the moment of invasion, the Free French had proclaimed Syrian and Lebanese independence, and this was underwritten by the British government, which recognized French predominance in Syria and Lebanon, provided France carry out its promise of independence. In the interests of its Arab policy, Britain used its position of strength to persuade the Free French to carry out their undertaking. Elections held in 1943 resulted in a nationalist victory, and Shukri al-Quwatli became president of the republic. There followed two years of disagreement about the transfer of authority from the French administration to the Syrian and Lebanese governments. A crisis took place in 1945, when the French refusal to transfer control of the local armed forces led to disorders, culminating in a French bombardment of Damascus and British intervention. After long negotiations and discussion in the UN Security Council, agreement was reached on simultaneous British and French withdrawal from Syria and Lebanon. Withdrawal from Syria was completed by April 1946. Syria had already become a founder member of the UN and of the Arab League. Early years of independenceThe humiliating failure of the Arab intervention in Palestine against the newly created State of Israel in May 1948 brought serious discredit to the governments of the Arab countries involved, but nowhere more than in Syria. Fundamental to the Syrian problem was the ethnically, religiously, and socially heterogeneous nature of the emerging republic. The new state united the ʿAlawite and Druze territories, which had formerly enjoyed separate status, with the predominantly Sunni regions of Damascus, Homs, Ḥamāh, and Aleppo. The ʿAlawites and Druzes formed compact communities in their respective regions. Throughout the country, and particularly in the cities, there were large communities of Christians. In addition to this religious heterogeneity, there was an equally important social heterogeneity; the population of Syria was composed of townspeople, peasants, and nomads, three groups with little in common. Economic differences added further complexity; in the cities the ostentatious wealth of the notables contrasted sharply with the poverty of the masses. Those same notables were also the owners of large agricultural estates on which the peasants were practically serfs. It was the Sunni landowning notables who led the resistance to the French. When Syria achieved independence, they took power and endeavoured to forge a unitary state. They proved unequal to the task. By 1949 the small but rising middle class, among which new social ideas were developing, and minorities, who resented the growing threat to their particularism, were increasingly opposed to the government. The rulers, having tasted power after so long a struggle for independence, refused those concessions that might have saved them. Moreover, they appeared to be more devoted to achieving Pan-Arab goals than to solving the problems closer to home. In the years immediately following World War II, Iraq and Saudi Arabia were making rival bids for Pan-Arab leadership. The ruling National Bloc in Syria readily divided into two new parties: a National Party headed by Shukri al-Quwatli, which represented the business interests of the Damascus notables and supported Saudi Arabia; and a resuscitated People’s Party, which represented the interests of the Aleppo notables and supported Iraq. The socialist and secular Arab nationalist Baʿth Party was recruiting followers among students and army officers, winning support particularly among the ʿAlawite and other minorities that were strongly represented among the younger officers of the army. THE COLONELSThe end of the short-lived civilian order in Syria came in March 1949, when Col. Husni al-Zaʿim overthrew the Quwatli government in a bloodless coup. Zaʿim was himself overthrown in August by Col. Sami al-Hinnawi. A third coup, led by Col. Adib al-Shishakli, followed in December; in November 1951 Shishakli removed his associates by a fourth coup. The military dictators of Syria were officers of no particular ideological commitment, and the regimes they led may be described as conservative. All ruled in association with veteran politicians. Among the politically minded army officers at the time, many were Pan-Arabist Baʿth Socialists. Opposing the Baʿth officers were officers of a radically different political persuasion, who followed the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP; the Parti Populaire Syrien), an authoritarian party devoted to the establishment of a Pan-Syrian national state. Shishakli was overthrown in February 1954 by a military coup led by Col. Faysal al-Atasi, and Parliament was restored. The SSNP forthwith lost its influence in Syrian politics and in the following year was suppressed in the army. From that time the Baʿthists in the army had no serious rival. Changes in agriculture took place in the 1950s, separate from the struggle for control of the state, and they had an important effect on the lives of many people. Capital-intensive cotton production grew rapidly in the newly planted lands of the northeast. THE UNION WITH EGYPT, 1958–61The years that followed the overthrow of Shishakli in Syria saw the rise of Pres. Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt to leadership of the Pan-Arab unity movement. The coalition regime in Syria turned more and more to Egypt for support and also established the first friendly contacts with the communist countries. In February 1958 Syria, under the leadership of the Baʿth Party, gave up its sovereignty to become, for the next three and a half years, the “Northern Province” of the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.), of which Nasser was president. The union of Syria with Egypt proved a bitter disappointment, for the Egyptians tended to treat the Syrians as subordinates. Tensions were heightened when drought damaged Syria’s economy. In September 1961 a coup led by Syrian army officers reestablished Syria as an independent state. THE “SECESSIONIST” REGIME, 1961–63The coup of 1961 paved the way for a return of the old class of notables to power as parliamentary elections were held. The “secessionist” regime, though civilian at the surface, was still under army control, and in the army the Baʿth was powerful. The regime made hardly any concessions to the socialism of the Baʿth and the pro-Nasser Pan-Arabists. The secessionist regime set out quickly to undo the socialist measures introduced under the union with Egypt (such as land reforms and the nationalization of large business enterprises), thus playing into the hands of the Baʿth. In March 1963 Baʿthist supporters in the army seized power. Baʿthist Syria after 1963EMERGENCE AND FRACTURE OF THE SYRIAN BAʿTHA month before the Baʿth coup in Syria, the Iraqi branch of the party had seized power in Baghdad. A Baʿthist union between Syria and Iraq seemed imminent, but it was opposed by the pro-Nasser Arab unionists in Damascus and Baghdad. The Baʿth leaders of Iraq and Syria flew to Cairo for unity talks with President Nasser, but Nasser would agree to a union only on his own terms, and the talks failed. In Syria the pro-Nasser Arab unionists were expelled from the coalition, and an exclusively Baʿth regime was established. The Baʿthists in Syria were soon faced with a serious problem. Although their party in Syria was led by Syrians, it also promoted Pan-Arabism and had branches in Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan. The continued subordination of the Syrian branch of the party to the Pan-Arab central committee gave non-Syrian Baʿthists a say in Syrian affairs. As a result, the Syrian Baʿthists established their own Pan-Arab central committee, thereby creating a deadly rivalry with the Iraqi Baʿthists, as each claimed to be the legitimate leader of the Pan-Arab nationalist cause. With ʿAlawite military officers in control, the Syrian Baʿth Party crushed domestic opposition by setting up a police state and by appealing to the middle- and lower-class residents of small towns and villages, who had long resented the power of the politicians and large landowners in Damascus and Aleppo. Rivalry within the Baʿth Party led to a coup d’état in February 1966 that installed a faction headed by Col. Salah al-Jadid. The neo-Baʿth regime pursued more radical foreign and domestic policies. By 1969 the party was divided between a mostly civilian wing, led by Jadid, and a mostly military wing, led by Gen. Ḥafiz al-Assad. The latter seized power in November 1970 and was sworn in as president on March 14, 1971; he was subsequently reelected with no opposition on several occasions, including a referendum on Dec. 2, 1991. Colonel Salah al-JadidBaʿthist authoritarian rule enjoyed some popularity because it enacted policies that favoured economic development, land reform, promotion of education, strengthening of the military, and vehement opposition to Israel. As these policies took effect, nationalists, peasants, and workers came to support the Assad regime. In contrast to the chaos of political life from 1945 to 1963, Syria experienced remarkable stability based on the alliance between the Baʿth Party, the military, and the bureaucracy, which was led by the shrewd and tenacious President Assad and supported by a predominantly ʿAlawite network of officials and officers, many of whom repressed their opponents by harsh methods. The opponents of the Baʿth-military-ʿAlawite system were found especially among the Sunni majority of the population, in the cities outside Damascus, and inside merchant groups. Government troops in 1982 suppressed an uprising of the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood in the city of Ḥamāh; the conflict left the city centre destroyed and thousands dead (estimates of civilian casualties range from 5,000 to 10,000). IDEOLOGY AND FOREIGN POLICY TO 1990Under Baʿth rule the country’s foreign policy was driven by the Arab-Israeli dispute, which resulted in a number of Syrian military defeats. In the June War ( 1967), t he Golan Heights of Syria came under Israeli occupation, and in the October War ( 1973), despite initial successes, Syria lost even more territory (see Arab-Israeli wars). Syria’s Pan-Arab credentials and its alliance with the Soviet Union were strained by Syria’s support of non-Arab Iran against Iraq—motivated in part by the long-standing rivalry between the Iraqi and Syrian Baʿthists, competing goals for regional dominance, and personal animosity between Ḥafiz al-Assad and Iraqi president Ṣaddām Ḥussein—during the Iran-Iraq War. The two arch-rivals at an Arab meeting, Ṣaddām Ḥussein and Ḥafiz al-AssadSyrian involvement in Lebanon also influenced its foreign policy. In 1976 Syria intervened militarily in the Lebanese civil war, leading to a brief but damaging clash with Israel in 1982; after 1985 Assad slowly reestablished limited Syrian control in Lebanon. Following the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1990, Syria and Lebanon signed a series of treaties that granted special privileges to Syria by establishing joint institutions in the fields of defense, foreign policy, and economic matters. The Syrian army invaded LebaononArab nationalism also played a major role in Syrian culture under the Baʿthists. Novels, poems, short stories, plays, and paintings often emphasized historical themes, the Palestinian problem, Socialist Realism, folk art, and opposition to foreign imperialism. The Baʿthist governments tried to bring these ideas to both the countryside and the cities through building cultural centres, sponsoring films, and promoting television and radio. Despite growing revenues from oil exports and increased irrigation resulting from the Euphrates Dam (completed in the mid-1970s), Syria’s economy began to stagnate in the 1980s. Rapid population increase hindered economic growth, while the intensification of agriculture ran into natural barriers, such as the limited availability of fresh water and the high cost of desalination. Industrial development was slowed by bottlenecks in production. Inflation, government corruption, smuggling, foreign debts, a stifling bureaucracy, and only very limited success in encouraging private sector investments also posed severe economic problems, as did spending on the military and on the intervention in Lebanon. Assad hoped to overcome some of these economic difficulties by obtaining aid from the rich oil states of the Middle East. As the Soviet Union disintegrated, Syria turned to China for military supplies.
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Post by Jaga on Aug 21, 2013 8:57:25 GMT -7
Pieter,
thanks for the history of Syria and Islam. What is happening right now with Arab countries may change it forever.
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Post by pieter on Aug 21, 2013 10:16:38 GMT -7
The Syrian economySocialism became the official economic policy in 1963. Since then the trend has been toward socialist transformation and industrialization. In commerce, state control is mainly restricted to foreign-exchange operations. Small private businesses and cooperatives are still in operation, and the retail trade is still part of the private sector, despite competition from consumer cooperatives in the large cities. The government controls the most vital sectors of the country’s economy and regulates private business. The state operates the oil refineries, the large electricity plants, the railways, and various manufacturing plants. The government encourages private savings by paying higher rates of interest on deposits and by guaranteeing investment by citizens of other Arab countries. There are severe restrictions on all luxury imports. At the same time, strenuous efforts are made to mobilize economic potential, combat underemployment, and discourage emigration. Despite modest steps toward privatization since 1990, the Syrian government has been largely hesitant to pursue economic liberalization, wary of its potential to endanger political stability. Agriculture, forestry, and fishingAgriculture constitutes an important source of income. It provides work for about one-fourth of the population, including a significant proportion of townspeople. Wheat is the most important food crop, although its production is constantly subject to great fluctuations in rainfall; sugar beet production is also significant. Barley, corn (maize), and millet are the other important grains. Cotton is the largest and most reliable export crop. Lentils are a major domestic food, but they also are exported. Other fruits and vegetables include tomatoes, potatoes, melons, and onions. Olives, grapes, and apples are grown at high altitudes, while citrus fruits are cultivated along the coast. High-grade tobacco is grown in the area around Latakia. Raising livestock, including sheep, cattle, camels, and poultry, is also an important agricultural activity. Forests make up a very small percentage of the country’s total area. Most of the country’s timber has to be imported. Syria’s small number of fishermen use small and medium-size boats. The annual fish catch includes sardines, tuna, groupers, tunny, and both red and gray mullet. The fishing boats of Tartous, SyriaResources and powerSyria’s principal limestone quarries are located north and west of Damascus, especially near the city of Aleppo, which itself is built of limestone. Basalt, used for road pavement, is quarried in areas such as those near Homs and Aleppo. Marl is used in the cement industry; the main quarries are in the vicinity of Damascus and Aleppo and at Al-Rastan. Phosphate ore is mined in areas near Palmyra, and rock salt is extracted from the mid-Euphrates region. Asphalt and gypsum are also mined, and table salt is produced from the salt lakes. Syria has scattered reserves of chrome and manganese. Petroleum in commercial quantities was first discovered in the northeast in 1956. Among the most important oil fields are those of Suwaydiyyah, Qaratshūk, and Rumaylān, near Dayr al-Zawr. The fields are a natural extension of the Iraqi fields of Mosul and Kirkūk. Petroleum became Syria’s leading natural resource and chief export after 1974; production peaked in the mid-1990s, however, before beginning a steady decline. Natural gas was discovered at the field of Jbessa in 1940. Since that time natural gas production in Syria has expanded to form an important energy export; in addition, some of the country’s oil-fired power stations have been converted to run on natural gas, freeing more Syrian petroleum for export. Raw phosphates were discovered in 1962; some of the richest beds are located at Khunayfis, Ghadīr al-Jamal, and Wadi Al-Rakhim. Iron ore is found in the Zabadānī region. Asphalt has been found northeast of Latakia and west of Dayr al-Zawr. Syria’s primary source of power is derived from local oil supplies, and domestic natural gas reserves are becoming an increasingly important resource as well. Electricity is largely generated by thermal stations fired by natural gas or oil. With the exception of the Euphrates River, rivers flowing through Syria produce only small amounts of hydroelectric power. There are small hydroelectric stations, such as those on the Orontes and Baradā rivers, and a larger hydroelectric development at the Euphrates Dam at Ṭabaqah (inaugurated in 1978). However, insufficient dam maintenance, coupled with Turkish usage upstream and unpredictable precipitation, have decreased productivity. Owing in part to the increasing industrialization initiatives of the late 20th century, Syria’s electricity supply struggled to meet demand. In the early 21st century, several new thermal power stations were completed, largely alleviating shortages. In light of increasing demand, further expansion of the infrastructure continued to be needed, though Syria was able to export electricity to some of its neighbours, including Iraq and Lebanon. ManufacturingWool, cotton, and nylon textiles are Syria’s most important manufactures, and mills are mainly in Aleppo, Damascus, Homs, and Ḥamāh; natural silk is also produced. Also of importance are the technical engineering industries, most of which are located in Damascus. Chemical and industrial engineering products include cement; glass panes, bottles, and utensils; pharmaceuticals; plywood; and batteries. The food-processing industry produces salt, vegetable oils, cotton cake, canned fruit and vegetables, tobacco, and a variety of dairy products. Other industries include the preparation of superphosphates and urea and petroleum refining. Most of the traditional handmade manufactures—damask steel, swords and blades, brass and copper work, wood engravings, gold and silver ornaments, mother-of-pearl inlays, silk brocades—have decreased since the introduction of industrial processing. FinanceThe Central Bank of Syria issues the national currency, the Syrian pound, and exercises control over all other banks that operate in the country. The Commercial Bank of Syria finances trade, markets agricultural products, and carries out foreign-exchange operations. The Real Estate Bank finances the building industry and carries out all ordinary banking operations. An industrial development bank finances the private industrial sector, while an agricultural bank extends loans to farmers and agricultural cooperatives. The Popular Credit Bank makes loans to small manufacturers, artisans, and production cooperatives. There is a nationalized insurance company. Since 2000 a number of small private banks have been established as part of the gradual approach toward liberal economic reform. A stock exchange, the Damascus Securities Exchange, formally opened for trading in Damascus in 2009. The Central Bank of Syria During the Cold War, Syria was offered financial and technical assistance free or at minimum interest rates from socialist countries such as China, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union, and it has continued to receive aid at favourable conditions from China into the 21st century. At the end of the 20th century, Syria received substantial sums from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for its support in the Persian Gulf War (1990–91); aid with more-stringent conditions has been sought from France and other Western countries. TradeSyria has an unfavourable balance of trade, a deficit that is offset by revenues from tourism, transit trade returns, foreign aid, and earnings of Syrians overseas. Goods from the European Union (EU), China, and Turkey account for the bulk of Syria’s imports. Major import items include industrial and agricultural machinery, motor vehicles and accessories, drugs, food, and fabric. The EU consumes a significant proportion of Syrian exports, which include petroleum, phosphates, ginned cotton, cotton seeds, barley, lentils, cotton and woolen fabrics, dried fruit, vegetables, skins, and raw wool. Other major purchasers of exports include the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. Foreign trade is regulated by the state. ServicesSyria’s service sector contributes heavily to the country’s overall income, and at the beginning of the 21st century the sector employed about half of the country’s workforce. Syria attracts tourism with a rich treasure trove of historical attractions that includes ancient and Classical ruins, Muslim and Christian religious sites, and Crusader and medieval Islamic architecture; some of these have been designated UNESCO World Heritage sites. Most tourists come from Arab countries, Iran, and Turkey, attracted to Syria’s relatively mild summer climate and popular entertainment. A much smaller proportion of tourists come from Europe and the United States. Privatization of the tourism sector stimulated growth in revenues during the 1990s. Since the early 2000s, privatization in the areas of real estate, insurance, and trade has played a greater role in stimulating growth. Labour and taxationThe General Federation of Workers was founded in 1938 and has grown tremendously in power and scope. Composed only of industrial employees, it is represented on industrial boards and is responsible for a wide range of social services. There is also a federation for artisans and vocational workers, and there are associations for the professions and a General Federation of Farmers. Trade unions are obliged to organize under the Baʿth-controlled General Federation of Trade Unions. Labour legislation establishes minimum-wage limits, prohibits child labour, and organizes relations between workers and employers. But economic and social conditions as well as the extent of unemployment make rigorous enforcement impractical. Employees in heavy industry receive the highest industrial wages, textile workers the lowest. State employees have more job security. The major portion of the average salary is generally spent on housing and food. Tax income accounts for more than one-third of governmental revenue. Indirect taxes, which produce the most tax revenue, are levied on industrial products, customs, exports, and state domains. Direct taxes are levied on wages, circulating capital, livestock, and the transfer of property. TransportationSyria’s road network is the chief means of transporting goods and passengers. Major roads include the highway between Damascus and Aleppo and the road between Damascus and Baghdad. Syria’s railways are well developed. A northern line runs northeastward from Aleppo into Turkey and then east along the border to Al-Qāmishlī, where it crosses the northeastern extremity of Syria en route to Baghdad. The Hejaz Railway runs from Damascus to Amman, and another runs from Aleppo to Tripoli. Aleppo and Damascus are also linked by rail. Smaller lines run between Homs and Rīyāq (Lebanon) and between Beirut and Damascus. A railway also runs from Latakia to Aleppo, Al-Ḥasakah (passing by the Euphrates Dam), and Al-Qāmishlī. Another line extends northwest from Aleppo to the Turkish border at Maydān Ikbiz. From Homs a line runs west to the port of Ṭarṭūs, and a line also runs east to the phosphate mines near Tadmur, opening up the desert interior to the Mediterranean. The country’s chief ports, Latakia and Ṭarṭūs, were built after independence. Latakia has two main jetties, as well as wharves and warehouses. Port commerce was dampened by the closure of the Syrian border with Iraq in the early 1980s, although with the border’s reopening in the late 1990s, shipments to Iraq as part of the United Nations (UN) oil for food program boosted the Syrian shipping industry. Syria has international airports at Damascus and Aleppo, and several domestic airports are located throughout the country, including those at Al-Qāmishlī, Latakia, Dayr al-Zawr, and Tadmur. International services connect Syria with Arab, other Asian, and European countries. Domestic and international services are provided by Syrian Arab Airlines.
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Post by pieter on Aug 21, 2013 13:14:56 GMT -7
Karl, thanks for interesting analysis and insight since you know the Middle East. I never visited this region, although I met here and there different people from there. Arabs I met were usually very educated, gentle, very well behaved towards women. Referring to cell-phones, thanks to the digital world they know how different people live in other countries with no dynasties, no regimes - neither political or cultural. Many young muslim men cannot find good jobs. AS for the petroleum, it brings money but it also brings problems. Many wars were caused because of precious oil - for instance Kuwait was attacked because of its petroleum. Besides, money helps to keep some regimes - like Saudi Arabia. You mention this problems also Jaga, From what I know from people of the Middle-east who are in the West. The Iraqi Kurds (who speak both Arabic and Kurd, and who know and visited Bagdad, Damascus, Istanbul, Casablanca and Rabat in Morocco, Toronto, Krakow and Lwow/Lviv; my former colleage and friend, and Iraqi Kurd visited those places, and knew everyhting about the Arab world, Iran, Turkey and the Kurd regions. He had been in Kurd, Arab and Turkish regions.), my Afghan colleage (fellow cameraman and editor), and Iranians, Palestinians, Algerians, Syrians and Tunesians I met in the Netherlands simply want peace, stability, a quiet and cosy family life (family is very important in the Kurd and Arab cultures, families live in clans), economical progress, good education, healthcare and (future) jobs for their children and safety, health and care for their elders (the grandparents of their children). Most of these people I met despised Terrorism, extremism, bloodshed, oppression, the loss of innocent human lives and etc. Unfortunately Jaga, Karl, John and the others, I met since I started studying in Amsterdam damaged people, hurt people, people with mental scars and PTSD following a traumatic event in their lives. Their emotional condition is bad and out of ballance due to traumatic events in the countries they came from. They were threatened by death or serious bodily injury to themselves or others and that created intense feelings of fear, helplessness, or horror. Many of these people I spoked witnessed killing, destruction, brutality and shelling in civil wars or wars. In a former job I had an Iraqi Kurd colleage (he was a security guard at the nursing home) fought in the Iran-Iraq war and was a tank commander. He saw waves of young Iranian boys and young men with red bandana's around their head, coming towards him. His tanks, and the Iraqi heavy machine guns and artillery slaughered these kids and young men. He told me that at night he dreams about them, and that he sees the Iranian boys coming towards him, screaming, with their fanatical faces and rifles. These were trained suicide worriers of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, they were told that they would be martyrs for the Islamic revolution and that they would go straight to paradise. The first victim of PTSD I met in the student home of my first serious love relationship with my Amsterdam girlfriend back then in 1991. A half Lebanese girl with a Lebanese father and a Dutch mother. She was Lebanese, because she had a Lebanese and a Dutch passport and had lived in Beirut during the bloody civil war during the eightees. When I stayed and slept in the room of my girlfriend (we had a LAT relationship) often I woke up at night and heard the Lebanese student screaming. She had nightmares of the civil war in Beirut. She told me that during these dreams she was back in Beirut during heavy clashes between Maronite Christian and Muslim militias near the Green line where she lived. She told me that the civilians were terrorized by day and night (24 hours) artillery shelling, heavy machine gun fire, ordinary militiamen with Kalashnikovs, sniper fire, car bombs and sectarian killings. My Afghan colleage has the same sort Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. He witnessed sick things in Afghanistan. During the civil war between warlords before the Taliban, who destroyed Kabul and murdered a lot of civilians, during the Taliban and etc. Being a journalist, cameraman in Afghanistan meant that he was a target for killing. A lot of journalists are eliminated there. Their throats are cut, they are blown up by suicide bombers or simply shot by pistols or kalashnikovs. He moved to the Netherlands, first because he want a future with education for his daughters, secondly, he wants safety for his wife and daughters and thirdly that normality returns to Afghanistan. Foreign arms trade has to be stopped in his view, and the Pakistani have to stop interfearing in Afghan internal matters. Form him I learned that Afghans are very pessimistic and negative about the Pakistani influence in Afghanistan. And next to that all global powers play a bad role in Afhanistan, because everyone pumps arms into Afghanistan. Arms traders urn a lot of money there. Everybody; the Pakistani's, the Chinese, the Iranians, the Americans, the Russians and even the Israeli's (yes, there are Israeli arms there too. Israel is the mortal enemy of the Islam and Muslims in the eyes of Muslims, but Israeli weapons are good, so Muslims use them in Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Libiya) If I look at the Middle-east I am sad about the Syrian, Libyan, Afghan, Lebanese, Palestinian and last but not least Kurd people who suffer from civil war, oppression by neighbors or majorities and terrorism. I am also sad about the Israeli, Egyptian and Turkish people who have to live in fear for terrorism. You can criticize the Israeli's for their policies, but you can't blame new generations of Israeli's who are born and raised Hebrew for the mistakes their parents and politicians made and make on one side, and the mistakes the Palestinians made and make on the other side, and the mistakes the international community made and makes. The United Nations continues to treat the Palestinians in Gaza, the Westbank, the Palestinian camps in Libanon, Syria and Iraq as refugees. They have to stop that, and the Palestinians in those Arab states must be given the same rights and possibilities as the Arab citizens of the country they reside in. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict can't continue for ever. There is incredible wealth in the Gulf Arab states. If they are smart they will invest in new energy resources like solar energy, water energy, and making drinkable water out of salt water. They should develop parts of their deserts for agricultural purposes and the Arab food industry. They can stil innovate their petro-chemical industry, invest in recycle industries, in education, health care, Arab culture and art, Arab literature, poetry and science. Traditional Arab values were modified in the 20th century by the pressures of urbanization, industrialization, detribalization, and Western influence. Nearly half of Muslim Arabs live in cities and towns, where family and tribal ties tend to break down, where women, as well as men, have greater educational and employment opportunity, and where the newly emerging middle class of technicians, professionals, and bureaucrats has gained influence. If the diverse Arab pan-ethnicity is regarded as a single ethnic group, then it constitutes one of the world's largest after Han Chinese. There are about 422 million Arab people living in the world today. Map of the Arab worldThe majority of Arabs continue to live in small, isolated farming villages, where traditional values and occupations prevail, including the subservience and home seclusion (purdah) of women. While urban Arabs tend to identify themselves more by nationality than by tribe, village farmers venerate the pastoral nomad’s way of life and claim kinship ties with the great desert tribes of the past and present. Nationalism and the change in standards of living that have been made possible by the expanded oil industry, however, have radically altered the nomadic life. The pastoral desert nomad, the traditional ideal of Arab culture, makes up barely 5 percent of the modern Arab population. Many of the remaining nomads have given up full-time subsistence pastoralism to become village agriculturists or stock breeders, or to find employment with oil companies or other employers in the towns and cities. I know this is not popular what I am going to say, but in contrast with what my compatriot Geert Wilders says, Islam is a great culture and civilization, which brought health care and medicine innovation and progress to the world in the middle ages, contributed to the world in scientific, cultural, architecture, math, astrology, philosophy and theology. Unfortunately we have seen a development towards backwardness, isolationalism, narrow doctrinal thought and ultra-orthodox movements, which want the Islamic world to go back 1400 years. Every religion in the world has it's fanatics, fundamentalists, lunatics and extremists. Next to the Sunni Muslim Salafists and Wahhabists; the Takfiris in Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libiya, Yemen, Saoudi Arabia, Algeria, Western-European countries and Chechenia and the the Shia Islamist extremists in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Iran, Sudan, Pakistan and Afghanistan you have extremist, violent and terrorist Hindu extremists in India and Srilanka, Sikh extremists, Buddhist fanatics, the Roman-Catholic and Protestant extremists in Northern-Ireland, and Fanatic Serb Orthodox christians and Croat Roman-Catholic christians who murdered Bosnian-Muslim former fellow Yugoslavs. (Many of these Bosnian muslims were secular or moderate Muslims, who before the civil war of the ninetees peacefully coexisted with their Serb, Croat, Jewish and Gypsy neigbhors. A Bosnian muslim lady from Serajevo told me that in her city the mosque stood next to a Roman-Catholic church, a Serb Orthodox church and a sinagogue on one square next to eachother, without a problem) The problem is that there is a problem coming from the Muslim world, and that problem threatens everybody; muslims, christians, jews, hindu's, buddhists, sikhs, animists, atheists/secular humanists, democrats and republicans, Europeans and Americans. And that is the radical Islam which is growing due to Saoudi, Egyptian, Gazan, Lebanese, Syrian, Iraqi, Pakistani, Afghan, Chechen and European Islamist influence. The largest danger in my point of view comes from the Takfiris, the extremist, ultra-conservative, ultra-orthodox, radical, Sunni Islam based Salafist and Wahhabist fanatics. They are more dangerous than the radicals of the Shia Islam, because there are less Shia Muslims in the world and it is a fact that less terror comes from the Shia Muslim side than the Sunni Muslims side. Iran stays a thread, the Shia militia in Iraq pose a thread to Iraqs and Syria's stability (nex to Al Qaida in Iraq), and Hezbollah is a problem for Lebanon, Israel and Syria (the Sunni Muslim population there). But far more dangerous than Hezbollah are the rebel fighters who do not belong to the Free Syrian Army. The extremists of Jabhat al-Nusra, a Sunni Muslim extremist rebel group trying to topple the regime of President Bashar al-Assad that recently swore fealty to al Qaeda's leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, as the local al Qaida affiliate is known, has fast been expanding its influence across virtually all rebel-held areas in northern Syria. It’s fighting alongside its ideological ally, the Nusra Front. Both the al Qaida and Nusra groups are led by veterans of the Iraqi insurgency, and both have flirted with the tactics that ultimately alienated them among Sunnis in that country who ultimately turned against them. Read more here: www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/08/19/199720/presence-of-al-qaida-linked-groups.html#.UhUyOeDTy9Q#storylink=cpyFighters from Iraq’s Islamist Shi’ite militias celebrate before departing to Syria from Baghdad, June 11, 2013Members of the Lebanese pro-Syrian Popular Committees pose for a photograph at the Lebanon-Syria border, near the northeastern Lebanese town of al-Qasr, Lebanon on Friday, April 12, 2013 (AP Photo/Bilal Hussein)In this November 12, 2010 file photo, Hezbollah fighters hold their party flags, as they parade during the opening of new cemetery for colleagues who died in fighting against Israel, in a southern suburb of Beirut, Lebanon.Hezbollah militants during a military paradewww.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22369609english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/04/15/Footage-showing-Lebanese-Hezbollah-fighting-in-Syria.htmlLike the jews the Arabs are trade people, merchants. Look at the Lebanese people, you see Lebanese people all over the Middle-east, in Turkey, in Europe, all over Africa, in Southern-America, Asia and Northern-America. They are merchants, business people, bankers and entrepreneurs. In a lot of African and Soutern-American countries you see Lebanese middle class in cities and towns. The Lebanese own shops, grocery stores, supermarkets, greengrocers, barber shops, restaurants, pubs, jewelry shops and banks there. The Lebanese have the entrepreneural spirit in their genes. They always have been known as the businessmen and bankers of the Middle-east. Lebanon and Beirut, it's capital were seen as the Switzerland and the Paris of the Middle east. Next to this Arabs are great craftsmen, they are good in making products of leather (jackets, bags, shows, belts and etc.) and good Blacksmiths, goldsmiths and metalworkers. They are the champions in camel and horse trade. Everybody knows that the Arabic horses are the best race horses. With their enormous wealth the Arabs of Saoudi Arabia, Qater, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait have influence in the West via their petrol dollars and investments and real estate propperty in the large Western financial centres; New York, London, LA, Paris, Berlin, Frankfurt am Main and probably Madrid, Barcelona and Rome too. The financial and economical influence of Saoudi Arabia in the worldSaudi Arabia plays a prominent role in the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and Arab and Islamic financial and development assistance institutions. One of the largest aid donors in the world, it still gives some aid to a number of Arab, African, and Asian countries. Jeddah is the headquarters of the Secretariat of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and its subsidiary organization, the Islamic Development Bank, founded in 1969. The Saudi Arabian policy is focused on co-operation with the Gulf states, the unity of the Arab world, solidarity with Muslim countries, and support for the United Nations (UN). In practice, the main concerns in recent years have been relations with the US, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, Iraq, the perceived threat from Iran, the effect of oil pricing, and increasing the influence in the Muslim world of the Wahhabi form of Islam through overseas donations. Additionally, relations with the West have been complicated by the perception that Saudi Arabia is a source of Islamist terrorism. Saudi Arabia plays a prominent role in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and in 2005 joined the World Trade Organisation. As announced at the 2009 Arab League summit, Saudi Arabia is intending to participate in the Arab Customs Union to be established in 2015 and an Arab common market to be established by 2020. The World Bank headquarters in Washington, DCWith a sum total of investments exceeding EGP71 billion, Saudi Arabia occupies first place on the list of Arab countries investing in Egypt, second on the list of non-Arab countries. The volume of Egyptian-Saudi inter-trade was estimated at $7.4 billion in 2008. Trade exchange between the two countries reached $4.4 billion in 2008. Egyptian exports to Saudi Arabia, put at 3.1 billion, include: iron and steel products; furniture; foodstuffs; raw materials; cereals, vegetables and fruits; and electric and medical equipment. Egyptian imports, put at $1.3 billion, include: gasoline, butane, oil products; mineral oils and fuel; plastic and rubber products; and machines and equipment. Saudi investors have contributed a sum total of EGP1.20 billion in issued capital to 2355 companies in Egypt. Of these 50% has been established over the past 5 years. Meanwhile, Egyptian investors have contributed a sum total of $221 million to 302 companies in Saudi Arabia. The number of Egyptian expatriates working in Saudi Arabia has multiplied and is currently set at 900 thousand. Saudi investments in Egypt are concentrated in a) the services sector (transport and logistics health, education and counselling); b) the industrial sector; c) the agricultural sector; d) the tourism sector ($500 million annually); e) the communications sector; and f) the financial sector. Former Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohammed Kamel-Amr and Saudi-Arabia's Prince Saud al-FaisalSaudi Arabia is the one of largest suppliers of oil to India. India's booming Construction industry also receives that added fillip and rising affluence has created greater demand for goods and services thereby boosting Indian industrial growth. Saudi Arabia has contributed aid to India after the Gujarat earthquake in 1990s. Riyadh Chamber of Commerce Chairman Abdulrahman Al Jeraisy, (R) with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (L) and other leaders after a meeting with Saudi and Indian businessmen at the Council of Saudi Chambers in Riyadh. (Feb 28, 2010)Japan is a major trading partner for Saudi Arabia. In 2006, Japan exported $5.103 million worth of goods to the Kingdom, primarily automobiles, machinery and equipment, and metals. In the same year, Saudi Arabia exported $33.624 million worth of goods to Japan, primarily crude oil and petroleum products. Japan imported 1.3 million barrels a day of Saudi crude in 2006, 31% of the nation's total supply. Riyadh Chamber chief Abdul Rahman Al-Jeraisy shakes hands with Japanese Ambassador Jiro Kodera in the presence of Japanese delegation leader Hiroshi Saito, right, and Asharqia Chamber Secretary-General Abdul Rahman Al-Wabel in Dammam Chinese-Saudi diplomatic and economic relations grew closer in the 2000s. In 2008, Sino-Saudi bilateral trade was worth €32,500,000,000, making Saudi Arabia China's largest trading partner in Western Asia. In the first quarter of 2010, Saudi oil export to China has reached over 1,000,000 barrels (160,000 m3), exceeding export to USA. Visiting Chinese President Hu Jintao (L) talks with Saudi Arabian King Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz during their meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Feb. 10, 2009. After the Cold War the US-Saudi relations were improving. The US and US companies were actively engaged and paid handsomely for preparing and administrating the rebuilding of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia transferred $100 billion (US) to the United States for administration, construction, weapons, and in the 1970s and 1980s higher education scholarships to the US ( Kaiser & Ottaway 2002). During that era the US built and administrated numerous military academies, navy ports, and Air Force airfields. Many of these military facilities were influenced by the US, with the needs of cold war aircraft and deployment strategies in mind. Also the Saudis purchased a great deal of weapons that varied from F-16 war planes to main battle tanks that later proved useful during the Gulf War (Kaiser & Ottaway 2002). The US pursued a policy of building up and training the Saudi military as a counterweight to Shiite extremism and revolution following the revolution in Iran. The US provided top of the line equipment and training, and consulted the Saudi government frequently, acknowledging them as the most important Islamic leader in that part of the world, and key player in the US security strategy. Saudi Arabia is Canada's largest trade partner among the seven countries of the Arabian Peninsula, totalling more than $2 billion in trade in 2005, nearly double its value in 2002. Canada chiefly imports petroleum and oil from Saudi Arabia, while exporting manufactured goods such as aircraft, cars, machinery and optical instruments. Ed Fast, Canada's Minister of International Trade and Minister for the Asia-Pacific Gateway, Maria Barrados, Chair of the Board for Accreditation Canada International, and Dr. Khaled Al-Sebaiay, CEO, Specialized Medical Centre Hospital in Saudi Arabia.There are more than 150 joint ventures between British and Saudi Companies and some 30,000 British nationals are living and working in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is the United Kingdom's primary trading partner in the Middle East. In 2005 the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia agreed a military agreement, where the UK would equip Saudi Arabia with Eurofighter Typhoons. A Eurofighter Typhoon jet, part of the Saudi Air ForceSource: Wikipedia and Encyclopedia Britannica
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Post by karl on Aug 21, 2013 15:51:14 GMT -7
Pieter
You most certainally do have my sincer thanks in presenting is a most through and professional manner, the currant situation and life in the Middle East. It is a great tribute to your skill in journalisum and presentation utilizing digital technology.
There is very little for my self to offer of any extra light upon the subject other then a few comments along the road of informative information.. It was very good of you with presentation of some street scenes of the old city of Aleppo, it is as it is, a very old city from an almost forgotten past. Untill the present situation of destruction, the modern city with suburben neighbourhoods, are/were as modern as most in the western world.
Thank you
Karl
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