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Post by pieter on Jul 30, 2023 8:03:35 GMT -7
Armed members of Fatah (PLO) patrol the streets of the largest Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon, Ain al-Hilweh, images of the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) (from 1969 to 2004) and President of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), Yasser Arafat and Yellow Fatah flags above their heads. NOS News30 july 2023 15:00 European Dutch TimeKilled and injured in violence in Palestinian refugee camp LebanonRiots at Lebanon's largest Palestinian refugee camp left five people dead and seven injured, Palestinian and local officials say. It concerns the Ein el-Hilweh camp, near the southern city of Sidon. There are more irregularities.
The AP news agency reports that the unrest arose when an armed man wanted to kill an Islamist militant. Instead, a companion of his was killed.
Later, a Palestinian general was reportedly killed by Islamist militants, along with three of his guards. The various groups used firearms and grenade launchers in the crowded camp. Several residents fled.About 50,000 people live in the Ain al-Hilweh refugee campLawlessnessAccording to the Lebanese state news agency, the violence stopped this morning but has flared up again after the death of the Palestinian general and his guards.
The Ein el-Hilweh camp is notorious for lawlessness and violence. In 2017, Palestinian factions clashed for nearly a week with a militant organization linked to the Islamic State terror group. According to the United Nations, there are about 55,000 people in the camp.A Palestinian gunman from the Fatah movement holds his weapon as he stands next to a charred car during clashes between Fatah and Islamic groups in the Ein el-Hilweh refugee camp, in the southern port city of Sidon, Lebanon, Tuesday, Feb 28, 2017. (AP Photo/Mohammed Zaatari)
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Post by pieter on Jul 30, 2023 8:32:05 GMT -7
Ain al-HilwehAin al-Hilweh (Arabic: عين الحلوة, lit. meaning "sweet natural spring"), also spelled as Ayn al-Hilweh and Ein al-Hilweh, is the largest Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon. It had a population of over 70,000 Palestinian refugees but swelled to nearly 120,000, as a result of influx of refugees from Syria since 2011. The camp is located west of the village Miye ou Miye and the Mieh Mieh refugee camp, southeast of the port city of Sidon and north of Darb Es Sim.
Ain al-Hilweh was established near the city of Sidon in 1948 by the International Committee of the Red Cross to accommodate refugees from Amqa, Saffuriya, Sha'ab, Taitaba, Manshieh, al-Simireh, al-Nahr, Safsaf, Hittin, al-Ras al-Ahmar, al-Tira and Tarshiha in northern Palestine. Ain Al-Hilweh is located on land owned by landowners from Miye ou Miye, Darb Es Sim and Sidon. Because Lebanese Armed Forces are not allowed to enter the camp Ain al-Hilweh has been called a "zone of unlaw" by the Lebanese media. Many people wanted by the Lebanese government are believed to have taken refuge in the camp as a result of the lack of Lebanese authority.EtymologyThe direct translation of Ain al-Hilweh is "sweet water spring". People believe that the camp was named after a natural water spring that existed in the present-day Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp. In actuality, the Ain al-Hilweh spring was located at the corner of the valley between Miye ou Miye village and Darb es Seem. The water flowed from the spring westward 500 meters towards a manmade dam. The dam was erected at the crossroad between Mieh Mieh and present day Seyroub neighborhood in Darb es Seem. The Palestinian camp is located between 1000 m to 1500 m to the west, away from the natural spring.
Emir Fakhr-al-Din II, (Fakhr-al-Din Ibn Mann, Fakhr-al-Din al Maani), was given the title "emir" or "prince" in Arabic because the Maan dynasty reigned over Lebanon at that time. Lebanon was divided into several emirates (the state or jurisdiction of an emir). So, there was an emirate out of several called, “Emirate of Ain al-Hilweh” and had an emir. The emirate stretched northwest from the Ain al-Hilweh spring, looped around the bottom of Mieh Mieh village along present-day Officers’ Military Club straight north to the Barghout Creek (between Mieh Mieh and Haret Saida) and west to the Mediterranean Sea. From the south, the emirate stretched straight west to the Mediterranean Sea. So the present-day Palestinian refugee camp got its name from the Emirate Ain al-Hilweh.HistoryEstablishmentIt was established in 1948 on private Lebanese land owners. The Ain al-Hilweh Palestinian camp is spread out on private properties owned by villagers from: Miye ou Miye, Darb es Sim and Sidon. The size of the Ain al-Hilweh camp in the early 1990s was around 290 dunams (72 acres). Today, the size of the camp increased by 2.35 times to 686 dunams (170 acres). The proportion of the land of Ain al-Hilwe camp located in the above towns is as follows: Miye ou Miye (22%), Darb Es Sim (4%) and Sidon (74%).
On 20 June 1974, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) attacked the camp, killing 11 people and injuring 32, according to the Lebanese Army. 1982 fighting
During the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) landed north of Sidon and the city was subjected to a heavy aerial bombing, causing heavy casualties among the civilian population. Dov Yermiya was to later liken the bombardment used on the refugee camp of Ain al-Hilweh as of an intensity which recalled the quantity of bombs used in World War 2 and described the destruction as 100%. There was prolonged fighting in Ain al-Hilweh, culminating with the Palestinian defenders making a last stand at a mosque which was thereupon blown up by the IDF. Israeli historian Gil'ad Be'eri gives the following account; (...) The Refugee camps were heavily fortified, full of bunkers and fire positions. The Palestinian defence at Ein El Hilweh and other refugee camps was based on hand-carried anti-tank weapons such as the RPG (Rocket propelled grenade). (...) The IDF was not prepared for this kind of fighting, having at hand mainly armoured forces intended for use in open areas. The built-up area inhibited long-range weapons, created an equality between the tank and the RPG (often wielded by 13- or 14-year-old boys), and increased the number of Israeli casualties. (...) Palestinian resistance seriously disrupted the timetable of the planned rapid advance to Beirut. It took eight days before the final crushing of resistance in Ein El Hilweh. The method adopted by the army was to use loud-speakers to call upon the civilian population to move away, search the houses one by one, surround points of remaining active resistance and subdue them by overwhelming fire.Aftermath of Israeli withdrawalFollowing the Israeli retreat from Beirut in 1985 Ain al-Hilweh was outside the Israeli security zone.
During the War of the Camps Ain al-Hilweh received over 8,000 Palestinians fleeing Amal gunmen and the siege of Rashidieh Camp in Tyre. Amal had little political support in Sidon. On 24 November 1986 a coalition of fighters from all of the main factions in the camp launched an offensive against Amal positions in the strategic village of Maghdouché overlooking Sidon. After a week of fighting they gained control of most of the village.The War of the CampsIsraeli Air Force airstrikes, 6 & 8 May 1987, on a residential area of Ain al-Hilweh killed fifteen people, wounded fifty and destroyed twenty houses. Four months later, 6 September, another air raid on a militants headquarters in Ain al-Hilweh killed fifty-six people and wounded one hundred and ninety. According to UNRWA nine women were amongst the dead and twenty-one of the injured were women and children.
On 2 January 1988 night-time Israeli airstrikes on PFLP-GC positions in Ain al-Hilweh and PSP positions along the coast North of Sidon killed around twenty people, including seven children and one woman. Three members of PFLP-GC and three from PSP were also amongst those killed. It was reported that the raids were retaliation for the 25 November 1987 PFLP-GC hang-glider attack in which six IDF soldiers were killed. In the previous two years there had been about forty Israeli air strikes on Lebanon.Fatah takeover of 1990In the 1980s, most Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon were dominated by Syrian-backed Palestinian groups. In the late 1980s, members of Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement, after being ousted in other refugee camps moved on to Ain al-Hilweh. On 7 September 1990, after a three-day conflict with the Abu Nidal Organization, Fatah members were able to establish dominance in Ain al-Hilweh. Sixty-eight people were killed in the fighting and around 300 wounded. It left Fatah in control of an area from the eastern suburbs of Sidon to Iqlim al-Kharrub.
On 4 July 1991, following the failure of disarmament negotiations, as required by the Taif agreement, the Lebanese Army attacked Palestinian positions in Southern Lebanon. The offensive, involving 10,000 troops against an estimated 5,000 militia, lasted 3 days and ended with the Army taking all the Palestinian positions around Sidon. In the agreement that followed all heavy weapons were surrendered and infantry weapons only allowed in the two refugee camps, Ain al-Hilweh and Mieh Mieh. 73 people were killed in the fighting, and 200 wounded, mostly Palestinian.
By 1993, another group led by Fatah's top military commander in the camp, Col. Mounir Maqdahhad known as the Black September 13 Brigade, with support from Hezbollah and Iran, gained dominance over mainstream Fatah members in the camp. On 25 November 1994 fighting broke out which left ten people dead and resulted in the Fatah loyalists being expelled from the camp. At the time the camp had a population of around 70,000. The following June there was a further two days of fighting between Fatah factions in which ten people were killed and about thirty wounded. Maqdahhad's dominance was short-lived as he rejoined Fatah in 1998 after the Palestinian Authority began funding the camp again. In 1999 a Lebanese court convicted the leader of Fatah in Lebanon, Sultan Abu al-Aynayn, of "forming an armed gang" and sentenced him in absentia to death.2003 Fatah and Osbat al-Nour conflictIn May 2003, fighting broke out between members of Osbat al-Nour and Fatah militia members in Ain al-Hilweh after the near-fatal shooting of Osbat al-Nour leader Abdullah Shraidi on 17 May, in which one of Abdullah's bodyguards and a bystander were killed. The shooting occurred while returning from the funeral of a Fatah member and family relative, Ibrahim Shraidi who was gunned down by an unknown assailant. Roughly 200 Osbat al-Nour fundamentalist fighters attacked Fatah offices. Eight people were killed and 25 wounded in the fighting at Ain al-Hilweh. Schools in Ain al-Hilweh were shut and most stores kept their shutters down at the height of the fighting, which provoked an exodus by hundreds of camp residents. Fatah agreed to a ceasefire after failing to defeat the fundamentalists in the camp. Two months after the ambush Abdullah Shraidi died from wounds received during the attack.2005 arrestsIn July 2005 four members of the Islamic Liberation Party were arrested. The Lebanese authorities claimed that the group had connections with Syria and that the group has participated in terrorist attacks in various Arab countries. Palestinian sources described the moves as a step toward the disarmament of their factions, in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559.Clashes during the 2007 Lebanon conflictOn 3 June 2007, Jund al-Sham fired a rocket-propelled grenade at a Lebanese Army checkpoint near Sidon, prompting a response from the Lebanese Army leading to clashes in the camp. These clashes follow a tense three weeks in Lebanon's north, where the Lebanese Army has been battling militant group Fatah al-Islam at the Palestinian refugee camp Nahr al-Bared. Fatah al-Islam emerged in 2006, but came to prominence in 2007Islamist militants in Ain al-Hilweh2008 clashesIn March 2008, fighting broke out between members of the Fatah faction and the Islamist group Jund al-Sham.Two main armed factions are in Ain al-Hilweh - the Palestinian nationalist Fatah movement and an armed religious group led by the al-Qaeda-linked Jund al-Sham (AFP)Influx of refugees from SyriaThe conditions in the camp have been exacerbated by an influx of previously Syrian-based Palestinian refugees, as a result of the Syrian Civil War. As a result of this influx, the camp's population has swelled from 70,000 to as much as 120,000.
As of 2014, the camp suspected of being a popular destination for jihadist rebels fleeing neighbouring Syria, particularly after the Syrian Army, backed by the Shia Lebanese militia Hezbollah, regained control of Yabroud from the rebels in March 2014.A Syrian family rest in a room where they are residing in the Shatila Palestinian refugee camp on the southern outskirts of the Lebanese capital, Beirut. Syrian Palestian refugees live under the same conditions in Ain al-HilwehAin Al Hilweh, the Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon's south considered a "hotbed" for militants, fears a possible armed sectarian clash with Hezbollah forces due to the latter's politics at home and in Syria (Courtesy of the Guardian)Walling of campIn 2016 Lebanese authorities began constructing a concrete wall with watch towers around the camp. The wall has faced some criticism, being called "racist" by some and supposedly labeling residents as terrorists or islamists. As of May 2017 the wall construction is nearly complete.Notable residents- Naji al-Ali, cartoonist who moved to Ain al-Hilweh with his family after the 1948 Palestinian exodus ( en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naji_al-Ali ) - Imad Fayez Mughniyeh (Arabic: عماد فايز مغنية; 7 December 1962 – 12 February 2008), alias al-Hajj Radwan (الحاج رضوان), was the founding member of Lebanon's Islamic Jihad Organization and number two in Hezbollah's leadership. Information about Mughniyeh is limited, but he is believed to have been Hezbollah's chief of staff and understood to have overseen Hezbollah's military, intelligence, and security apparatuses. He was one of the main founders of Hezbollah in the 1980s. He has been described as "a brilliant military tactician and very elusive". He was often referred to as an ‘untraceable ghost’. ( en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imad_Mughniyeh ) Naji Salim Hussain al-Ali (Arabic: ناجي سليم العلي Nājī Salīm al-‘Alī; born c. 1938 – 29 August 1987) was a Palestinian cartoonist, noted for the political criticism of the Arab regimes and Israel in his works. He has been described as the greatest Palestinian cartoonist and probably the best-known cartoonist in the Arab world.Al-Hajj Radwan (Imad Fayez Mughniyeh)
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Post by karl on Jul 30, 2023 13:01:54 GMT -7
Pieter
As only an observation, it most always appears the Arab Palestinians have difficulty in policing themselves, but yet resent the Israeli IDF doing it for them. For each situation is different, but yet has the common situation of other Arab groups take over with strong arming the population for power or other gain.
Karl
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Post by pieter on Jul 30, 2023 14:58:19 GMT -7
Karl,
The Palestinians were and are not only part of the Arab world, but also of the Islamic world and the former Communist/Socialist world of Socialist Peoples Republics (The Eastblock, Warsaw Pact & Comecon countries(. First of all the Palestinians wrestle with a reality and fact many Arab nations wrestle with, the tribal and clan rivalries and conflicts, second the Palestinians are politically divided in various Secular Nationalist and Islamist Fractions and groups.
images.app.goo.gl/oxzPdXoe4YvjxbS66
The secular Fatah, the secular Peoples Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Third Way (Arabic: الطريق الثالث aṭ-Ṭarīq ath-Thālith), Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the secular Palestinian National Initiative (Arabic: المبادرة الوطنية الفلسطينية al-Mubādara al-Waṭaniyya al-Filasṭīniyya) of Dr. Mustafa Barghouti and the secular Far left Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP; Arabic: الجبهة الديموقراطية لتحرير فلسطين, al-Jabha al-Dīmūqrāṭiyya li-Taḥrīr Filasṭīn) of Nayef Hawatmeh.
Other Palestinian political groups and movements are the militant Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) in the Gaza Strip, made of primarily ex-Fatah fighters and Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades members. The ideology of is made of the elements Anti-Zionism, Palestinian nationalism, Palestinianism, Armed struggle and Islamic Fundamentalism and the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF). Next to the PFLP you have the Pro-Syrian (Ba'ath) Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (Arabic: الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين – القيادة العامة) or PFLP-GC, a Palestinian nationalist militant organisation based in Syria. FamilyFamily is the most important aspect of life for Palestinians. An individual's family is thought to encompass not only their (i.e. parents and children), but also their extended family (e.g. grandparents, aunts, uncles and cousins). A Palestinian’s family represents the deepest connection to their origin, heritage and identity. This is especially important for the , who may seek to maintain these links outside of Palestine. Many Palestinians take deep pride in their family’s reputation and honour.
Much social behaviour is traditionally influenced by Palestinians’ awareness of their personal honour. In this sense, ‘honour’ encompasses an individual’s reputation, prestige and worth. Preservation of honour and community opinion is often at the forefront of people’s minds (although this differs across geographical and demographic contexts). It influences people to behave conservatively in accordance with social expectations, to avoid drawing attention to themselves or risk doing something perceived to be dishonourable. Palestinian familyA person’s honour is determined by their personal actions as well as the behaviour of those they are associated with (i.e. their family, community or any 'group' they belong to). Therefore, if an individual does something dishonourable, their origins (e.g. family) may be implicated as the cause. In this way, there is a cultural pressure on individuals to protect their personal reputation and the image of those around them. This may require people to emphasise their positive qualities, family members’ achievements and adherence to social expectations in order to give a public impression of dignity and integrity.
Palestinian culture is , whereby strong loyalty is shown to one’s extended family and friends, the community, and the broader collective of Palestinian people. People’s relationships with their neighbours and community are generally closer than that experienced by many in the English-speaking West. Friends are often very loyal, performing favours for each other on a regular basis. This is important in the Palestinian Territories where a shortage of resources and underfunded social services are often unable to meet basic needs. It is common to call on personal contacts for support, opportunities and assistance in navigating life under occupation.Clan SystemsPalestinian Arab society is characterised by an extended family system, traditionally known as a Clan or ‘hamula’. Membership to a Clan is determined by shared ancestry through the father’s male lineage that generally connects multiple extended families. Women who marry outside of their Clan will become members of their husband’s Clan – as do children of the marriage. Some Palestinians have more fluid ideas of Clan inclusion, stemming from widespread dispossession and exile. For example, Palestinian refugees residing in camps have been known to recreate Clan identities with one another based on their place of origin (rather than bloodline) in order to form the support systems needed.
About 80 members of the Abu Amshah extended family came to live in one home in a safer area of the Gaza Strip amid the fighting between Hamas militants and Israel. Many gathered on the back patio. (Carolyn Cole / Los Angeles Times)
Clans provide a strong source of individual and family security. Clan members generally share a sense of solidarity and loyalty to protect one another from outside harm. Traditionally, men share a code of honour (mithaq al-sharaf) based on the idea that an attack or threat to one member constitutes an insult to the entire Clan. This could be a physical attack, or something honour-based (see Honour). Today, Clans often play an important role and have considerable local influence in conditions where the government cannot provide reliable protection or support.70 For example, they have become particularly strong under the conditions of Israeli occupation. Members will often manage and distribute finances among the Clan to offer crucial support to households suffering from lack of employment. This is especially noticeable in Gaza, where economic conditions are dire and unemployment is a chronic problem.
The Clan system is present throughout all social classes in the Palestinian Territories; professionals are just as likely to have Clan identities as unskilled labourers. However, Palestinians are generally less likely to maintain such Clan identities when living under stable governments with strong civil societies. For example, since the Palestinian Authority established further rule of law and governmental institutions in the West Bank, the influences of the tribal system and blood relations have weakened. Moreover, this specific Kinship system does not play a very active role in the lives of those resettled in Western countries. While many of those living overseas (particularly second- or third-generation Palestinians) may not be familiar with “Clan” identities per se, they usually continue to place emphasis on extended family support systems.Personal Connections (Wasta) A Palestinian’s status or influence is often determined by their personal connections. Prominent family names continue to carry social capital, even if the family itself is no longer particularly ‘wealthy’. Affiliation to a particular political party can also confer a certain social status or class. Relationships and reputations play an important role in completing professional, personal and social tasks. This is understood through the concept of ‘wasta’ (loosely translating to ‘who you know’), which refers to utilising one’s connections and/or influence in order to get things done.68 This can be observed when people turn to a close friend or relative for help instead of an institution (for example, getting hired or waiving a fine).
Wasta and nepotism are considered to be legitimate ways of gaining opportunities and completing transactions. However, it also manifests as preference based on who one knows. Therefore, one’s social mobility is often tied to their personal networks or family name. This is most noticeable in job opportunities, whereby members of notable families are more likely to secure better jobs. Meanwhile, those in disadvantaged positions often lack such contacts. This is one of the largest indicators of privilege amongst Palestinians, frequently manifesting in a rural-urban divide.Bedouin TribesThere are several Palestinian Bedouin groups that live across the Palestinian Territories and Israel who share a lineage distinct from the majority of Palestinian Arab Clans. They mainly identify as “Palestinian”, but use the term “Bedouin” to refer to their tribal heritage and culture. Traditionally, Bedouins were semi-nomadic tribes that traversed the desert throughout the region without state interference. However, Israeli restrictions on freedom of movement in the Palestinian Territories and Israel have limited their nomadic-herder lifestyle.73 Thousands have been displaced from desert homelands in present-day Israel and relocated mostly to the West Bank. The vast majority of Palestinian Bedouins are no longer nomadic.
A Palestinian Bedouin man sits on mattresses in the village of Khirbet Humsah which was razed by Israeli forces, in Jordan Valley in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, Feb. 3, 2021. REUTERS/Adel Abu Nimeh
It is estimated around 40,000 Bedouins live in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, mostly in towns or cities. Their families are generally socioeconomically disadvantaged and often have less access to adequate infrastructure, education and healthcare than the majority Palestinian population. Those that remain in Israel live in some of the poorest conditions (mostly in the Negev desert), often with the constant threat of eviction or home demolition.
While tribal life has been heavily impacted by occupation, several Palestinian Bedouin groups continue to maintain aspects of traditional tribal Arab culture. This is particularly evident in family structures and marriage patterns. Bedouins typically live in extended Patriarchal family groups that have a very strong Collectivist social organisation, typified by adherence to family solidarity and honour. Tribes are customarily headed by a sheikh who functions as the tribe advisor and mediator in Clan and family disputes.
The Israeli authorities demolished the Bedouin village of al-Araqib in the Negev Desert. The the Naqab desert in Arabic.
Pieter
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Post by pieter on Jul 30, 2023 16:07:53 GMT -7
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Post by pieter on Jul 30, 2023 16:12:33 GMT -7
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Post by pieter on Jul 30, 2023 16:13:46 GMT -7
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Post by pieter on Jul 30, 2023 16:16:17 GMT -7
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Post by pieter on Jul 30, 2023 16:17:25 GMT -7
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Post by pieter on Jul 30, 2023 16:20:41 GMT -7
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Post by pieter on Jul 30, 2023 16:24:35 GMT -7
2 jul 2020 #FreePalestine A new Spoken Word Piece by activist Leanne Mohamad on Palestine discussing the aftermath of the 1948 Nakba (The Catastrophe) in which followed the 1967 Naksa (The Setback) all leading up to today’s 2020 illegal annexation plans.
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Post by pieter on Jul 30, 2023 16:33:59 GMT -7
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Post by pieter on Jul 30, 2023 16:37:10 GMT -7
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Post by pieter on Jul 30, 2023 16:41:09 GMT -7
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Post by pieter on Jul 30, 2023 16:54:38 GMT -7
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