george
Cosmopolitan
Posts: 568
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Post by george on Aug 18, 2007 13:59:38 GMT -7
Rdy..... Not sure what your getting at but i'll take a guess. Were not talking about something that not happened 400 years ago! Were talking about someting that happened about 62 years ago. Ryd!! Imagine, just imagine if the same happened to America what happened to Poland, 62 years ago. Do you think we would let bygones be bygones? I will let you digest that for a while and then let me know.
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Post by hollister on Aug 18, 2007 15:37:19 GMT -7
George, I think Rdy was agreeing with you about the dangers of revisionism.
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george
Cosmopolitan
Posts: 568
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Post by george on Aug 20, 2007 14:06:21 GMT -7
Ooops, sorry Ryd......I no us upstaters stick together
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Post by freetobe on Sept 23, 2007 18:58:54 GMT -7
Funny how times have changed on this website.
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Post by bescheid on Sept 23, 2007 19:19:00 GMT -7
Funny how times have changed on this website. Please Explain? Charles
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Post by pieter on Sept 23, 2007 23:40:35 GMT -7
People will always be on differant sides, because of their backgrounds, their nationality and the interests of their people. I know very much Germans who regret German history and the fact that a ordinairy, Austrian Corporal lead there country more than sixty years ago and brought shame on their country, which had a great history, culture, sciences, composers and philosophers. That's why most Germans are moderate today, concentrate themselves on their economy and internal politics, and try to have good relations with their European neigbours, because they believe in a Democratic Europe and International cooperation. Subjectively I am a son of direct victims of German war and extreme ideological agression, and of families who lost persons in that war. For decades that made hard feelings towards Germany possible, for many years Germany was hated in Europe for that and Germans were a sort of pariah in other European countries (not all, but many). Today Germany has become a big or great European nation again, a nation with an Army that cooperates with it's former enemies in Peace keeping missions. And the German chancler is again a respected politician amongst the other World leaders. In Germany the past is very well recorded and remembered. And Europe and the world know the past very well, not the revisionist past, but the true past. The fact that we are an open Forum reveals that past! That is the benefit of our free and democratic world.
Pieter
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Post by bescheid on Sept 24, 2007 9:13:20 GMT -7
Pieter
Your analysis is very knowledgeable and very accurate! You know us very well indeed. {I am very sorry for the past your family had endured}.
I have though, been very remiss in leaving a considerable amount of foreign affairs that are currant and present my country is active in conduction of activities.
Our entry into the Middle East is no accident nor is it currently new. But, extends by far, a good many years previous to the 1st war. Most was in Syria/Iran/Palestine {war time negotiations with the Jewish leadership at that time}Iraq and of course, a long time relationship both militarily and exchange with Turkey.
For this was very long time before the petroleum rush was on. The relationships was for foreign exchange in politics/economics/education in bring up out of the previous tribal confusions between the Arab families/Farsie {Iranian} and modernizing of Syria to face the new world with new tools fitting for a sovereign nation.
For some unknown reason I have no idea of why for. The Americans are a dynamic people, excellent resources and very smart.
But--they some how fail to meet the ship of opportunity at the slip for departure. They seem to miss the boat on most occasions in The Middle East and Africa. We seem to not make that mistake, but instead are building the roads of progress with the future as the horizon of success.
Friends are made, but, enemies are created.
Charles
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Post by pieter on Sept 24, 2007 15:06:49 GMT -7
Charles,
I agree with you on the Americans, in the fact that I do not understand the American intelligence community, the American foreign policy, the American militairy strategy and the American politics in general? Today the famous New York Times journalist Tim Weiner was on Dutch television in the News program 1 Vandaag (One Today), in which he talked about the total failure of the CIA in gathering intelligence information, and how disastrous that was and is for America, and in the same time the desastrous foreign policy and militairy strategy of the USA in large parts of the world. Next to that the American diplomacy is very weakened and almost invisable in the world, especially in Africa and the Middle-east. He was exhausted after writing a book where he did research for decades for, and he was very pessimistic about the direct future, saying that it did not matter who will win the next presidential elections, because the weakened and exhausted American Army will have to stay in Iraq, probably for decades. Because a weak army can't leave a country where it did not finish it's job. He predicted that the American would stay as a militairy occupation force or a semi-colonial power.
He also said that the Americans only have sixty years of experiance with the Intelligence work, from the Office of Strategic Services (1942-1945), Central Intelligence Group (CIG, 1946) and CIA (1946-....). The Europeans have a long history of Intelligence.
Great-Brittain:
The Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), commonly known as MI6 (Military Intelligence, Section 6), the Service is derived from the Secret Service Bureau, which was founded in 1909. It was a joint initiative of the Admiralty and the War Office to control secret intelligence operations in the UK and overseas, particularly concentrating on the activities of the Imperial German government. The Bureau was split into naval and army sections which, over time, specialised in foreign espionage and internal counter-espionage activities respectively.
In the immediate post-war years under Sir Mansfield Smith-Cumming and throughout most of the 1920s, the SIS was focused on Communism- in particular, Russian Bolshevism. Examples include a thwarted operation to overthrow the Bolshevik government in 1918 by SIS agents Sidney George Reilly and Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, as well as more orthodox espionage efforts within early Soviet Russia headed by Captain George Hill.
In Great-Brittain the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) was founded in 1936 as a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence. The Committee of Imperial Defence was effectively an advisory peacetime defence planning system in which formal authority remained with departmental ministers. This ensured not only flexibility, but also its acceptability to ministers.
Poland
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth
Although the first official Polish government service entrusted with espionage, intelligence and counter-intelligence was not formed until 1918, in preceding centuries the Polish state developed a network of informers in surrounding countries. A number of envoys and ambassadors also gathered intelligence information, mostly through bribery. Among such spies was Jan Andrzej Morsztyn, a notable Polish poet of the 17th century. Polish kings and military commanders (hetmans) of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, such as Stanislaw Koniecpolski, had espionage networks. The hetmans were responsible for espionage in the Ottoman Empire, its vassals states, and disputed territories such as Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania, as well as Muscovy and among the restless Cossacks.
1914–1918
In 1914 Józef Pilsudski created the Polish Military Organisation, an intelligence and special ops organization which worked alongside the Polish Legions. As such it was independent of Austria and loyal to Pilsudski (and to a future, independent Poland).
1918–1921
Poland formed its armed forces immediately after becoming an independent nation in 1918. Influenced by the French Military Mission to Poland, the Polish General Staff was divided into several departments, each entrusted with different tasks: Oddzial I [Section I] – Organisation and mobilization; Oddzial II – Intelligence and Counter-intelligence; Oddzialu III – Training and Operations; Oddzial IV – Quartermaster. The Second Department, often called Dwójka (Polish for Number Two), was formed in October of 1918, even before Poland declared its independence. Initially called Information Department of the General Staff, it was divided into "sections": Sekcja I – reconnaissance and close intelligence Sekcja II IIa (East) – offensive intelligence in Bolshevist Russia, Lithuania, Belarusian People's Republic, Ukraine and Galicia IIb (West) – offensive intelligence in Austria, Germany, France and United Kingdom Sekcja III – general intelligence and surveillance abroad (both East and West) Sekcja IV – preparation of a frontline bulletin Sekcja V – contacts with both military and civilian authorities. Sekcja VI – contacts with attaches in Berlin, Vienna, Budapest, Moscow and Kyiv Sekcja VII – Ciphers An extensive network of informers, both domestic and foreign, developed very rapidly. Poland's tragic economic situation, caused by more than a century of foreign occupation, proved to be the key. In the 19th century and early 20th century, the economic and political situation forced hundreds of thousands of Poles to emigrate to almost every country in the world. With the advent of Polish independence many emigrees offered their services to Polish intelligence agencies. Others, most notably Poles living in the former Russian Empire and trying to return home through war-torn Russia, provided priceless information on Russian logistics, order of battle and the status of all parties involved in the Russian Civil War. In Western Europe (most notably Germany, France and Belgium), Polish diaspora often formed the backbone of heavy industry; approximately one million people of Polish descent lived in the Ruhr Valley alone. Many of these provided information on industrial production as well as the economic situation in surrounding countries. After the outbreak of the Polish-Bolshevik War in early 1919, intelligence from the East proved vital to Poland's survival in the war against a far superior enemy. A separate cell within Polish intelligence was formed, taking over most intelligence duties during the war.
The fourth department, Offensive intelligence "C", became the most developed as it carried out all duties connected with "front-line" reconnaissance and intelligence, as well as "long-range" intelligence and surveillance in countries surrounding Bolshevist Russia, including Siberia (still in hands of the White Russians), Turkey, Persia, China, Mongolia and Japan. The third department, Offensive intelligence "B", controlled the intelligence network in European Russia. Additional information was obtained from Russian defectors and POWs, who crossed the Polish lines in their thousands, especially after the Battle of Warsaw of 1920.
1921–1939
After the end of the Polish-Bolshevik War and the Treaty of Riga, the structure and tasks of Polish intelligence had to change in order to cope with new objectives. Although Poland had won most of its border conflicts with surrounding powers (most notably the war with Russia and the Greater Poland Uprising of 1918-19 against Germany), its international position was far from rosy. By mid 1921 a new structure of the Dwójka was introduced, composed of three main departments, each overseeing different offices: Organisation Department: Organisation; Training; People; Finances; Own Ciphers and codes, communication and foreign press. Records Department: East; West; North; South; Statistical Office; Nationalities and minorities; Intelligence Department: Technology of intelligence; Central agents' bureau; Counter-intelligence; Foreign Ciphers (Biuro Szyfrów); Radio surveillance and wire-tapping techniques. Until the late 1930s the Soviet Union was seen as the most likely aggressor and main enemy of Poland. Because of that, the 2nd Department developed an extensive network of agents both within the borders of Poland's eastern neighbour and in other neighbouring countries. Apart from so-called passive intelligence (radio surveillance, press reports and similar activities), in the early 1920s Polish intelligence started to develop a network for offensive intelligence. The Eastern Office (Referat "Wschód" in Polish) had several dozen bureaus, mostly attached to Polish consulates in Moscow, Kiev, Leningrad, Kharkov and Tbilisi. Short-range reconnaissance was carried out by forces from the Border Defence Corps created in 1924. On several occasions soldiers crossed the border disguised as smugglers, partisans, or ordinary bandits. They gathered information on the location of Soviet troops and the morale of the Soviet people. At the same time Soviet forces carried out similar missions on Polish soil. The situation finally stabilized in 1925; however, missions such as these still occurred from time to time. Overall, the efforts of Polish Intelligence in the years between the two World Wars created a useful gauge of the capabilities of Poland's main potential adversaries: Germany and the USSR. Nonetheless this information was largely irrelevant when war came in September, 1939. Good intelligence simply could not offset the overwhelming superiority of the German and Soviet armed forces. The conquest of Poland lasted only a few weeks; too short a time for intelligence services to make a significant contribution. With Poland conquered, Polish Intelligence Services had to remove its command to French and British Allied territories.
1939–1945
Until 1939 Polish intelligence services did not, as a rule, collaborate with the intelligence services of other countries. A partial exception was France, Poland's closest ally: even then cooperation was lukewarm, with neither side sharing their most precious secrets. An important exception was the long-term collaboration between France's Gustave Bertrand and Poland's Cipher Bureau, headed by Gwido Langer. The situation only began to change in 1939, when war appeared certain and Britain and France entered into a formal military alliance with Poland. The most important result of the subsequent information sharing was the transfer of Polish techniques for breaking German Enigma Machine ciphers to France and Britain. The initial break had been made in late 1932 by mathematician Marian Rejewski, working for the Polish General Staff's Cipher Bureau. His work was substantially facilitated by intelligence provided by Bertrand. With the help of fellow mathematicians Henryk Zygalski and Jerzy Ró?ycki, Rejewski developed techniques to decrypt German Enigma-enciphered messages on a regular and timely basis. Six-and-a-half years after the initial Polish decryption of Enigma ciphers, French and British intelligence representatives were briefed on Polish achievements at a trilateral conference held at Cipher Bureau facilities in the Kabaty Woods, just south of Warsaw, on July 25, 1939; barely five weeks before the outbreak of World War II. This formed the basis for early Enigma decryption by the British at Bletchley Park, northwest of London; without the head start provided by Poland, British reading of Enigma encryptions might have been delayed several years, or even have failed. Key Polish Cipher Bureau personnel escaped from Poland on September 17, 1939, on the Soviet Union's entry into eastern Poland, and eventually reached France. There, at "PC Bruno" outside Paris, they resumed cracking Enigma ciphers through the "Phony War" (October 1939—May 1940). Following the fall of northern France to the Germans, the Polish-French-Spanish cryptological organisation, sponsored by French Major Gustave Bertrand, continued its work at "Cadix" in the southern, Vichy "Free Zone" until that too was occupied by German forces in November 1942. After the 1939 Invasion of Poland, practically the entire Second Department command apparatus managed to escape through Romania and soon reached France and Britain. Reactivating agent networks throughout Europe, they immediately began co-operating with British and French intelligence agencies. After the Fall of France the entire Second Department ended up in Britain. At that time Britain was in a difficult situation, badly in need of intelligence from occupied Europe after rapid German advances disrupted its networks and put German forces in areas where Britain had few agents. Following the personal intervention of Churchill and Sikorski in September 1940, co-operation between British and Polish intelligence organisations entered a new era. The Polish Second Department and its networks were put under partial British control and worked under the direct orders and direction of SIS (Secret Intelligence Service) for the rest of the war. Already in the first half of 1941 Polish agents in France supplied Britain with intelligence on U-boat movements from French Atlantic ports. The network in France grew to 1500 members and supplied vital information about the German military in France before and during the course of Operation Overlord. Agents working in Poland in the spring of 1941 supplied extensive intelligence about German preparations for their , invasion of the Soviet Union. Polish spies also supplied extensive information on atrocities at Auschwitz (Report of Witold Pilecki) and German extermination operations in Poland during the Holocaust. Polish Intelligence gave the British crucial information on Germany's secret weapons projects, including the V-1 and V-2 rockets, which allowed Britain to set back the German campaign by bombing the main development facility at Peenemunde in 1943. Overall, Poland's European networks supplied the Allies with information on just about all aspects of the German war effort. Out of 45,770 reports received by British Intelligence during the war, nearly half (22,047) were supplied by Polish agents. The Second Department was officially disbanded on March 15, 1946, its archives taken over by the British. At the time of its dissolution it employed 170 officers and 3500 agents, not including headquarters staff. It is quite likely that at least some of these agents continued to work directly for Britain during the Cold War years. After the war the Polish Intelligence contribution to the British war effort was kept completely secret. This was understandable, as the need for secrecy persisted due to the start of the Cold War. However in later years, as official British histories were released, the role of Polish Intelligence barely rated a mention. Only when knowledge of British decryption of the Enigma code was revealed to the general public in the late 1970s did the Polish contribution come to the fore; even then the first versions of the story, based on partial information, claimed that Polish Intelligence was only able to steal a German Enigma machine. Only gradually was it revealed that the Polish effort had been much more sophisticated, relying primarily on mathematical analysis. Efforts of historians to gain access to documents describing the rest of the Polish Intelligence efforts were met with stonewalling and claims that all pertinent archives had been destroyed. In recent years British and Polish governments have begun efforts to jointly produce an accurate and adequate account of the Polish Intelligence contribution to the British war effort. The key Anglo-Polish Historical Committee Report on the subject, written by leading historians and experts granted unprecedented access to British intelligence archives, was published in July 2005; it concluded that 43 per cent of all reports received by British secret services from continental Europe in 1939-45 came from Polish sources.
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