Post by sciwriter on Jun 22, 2006 11:00:43 GMT -7
www.vor.ru/English/homeland/home_034.html
Our Homeland [The Voice of Russia]
WHY THE “REDS” WON?
By Tatyana Shvetsova
By the end of 1920 the Civil war in Russia was practically won by the Red
Army. There were but individual hotspots putting up a resistance to the
Soviet power on the outskirts of Russia.
So, why did Soviet power win and how can we explain the defeat of its
numerous enemies?
Doctor of History, Professor of Murmansk Pedagogical Institute Alexei
Voronin insists that ‘the Bolsheviks won not so much due to their own
strength, but rather due to the weakness of their enemies’.
“Almost every war changes the social setup of the warring sides, bringing
it closer to the military-socialist type,” Alexei Voronin elaborates. “In
such a society the degree of the authorities’ interference in the life of
its citizens is unlimited. This society is characterized by total
centralization, ruling out the very existence of private property. The
entire organization of such a society, right down to the psychological
portrait of its members is oriented to war and is permeated with
militarism. In other words, war creates the most conducive conditions for
‘socialization of society’. Yet, the question is: who and how makes use of
these conditions. Do they accept these conditions out of forced necessity,
or do they regard them as an imperative precondition for exercising their
policy?
Obviously, the Bolsheviks, if we can say so, coincide maximally with the
conditions of the war period. They felt perfectly at ease in the
conditions of war – something that quite possibly serves as one of the
reasons for their ultimate success.
As for their enemies, quite the opposite, they tended to find oppressive
those ‘military-socialist’ measures they were also forced to apply. In
other words, they conducted the same policy less consistently, with less
austerity, and as a result – to less effect.
The success of the Bolsheviks was achieved in conditions of approximate
equality of the opposing sides in many respects, first and foremost – the
military. So, it is important to understand where exactly lies the reason
for their victory. One could, in all likelihood, define it in the
following way: the Bolsheviks scored a victory not so much due to their
own strength, as due to the weakness of their enemies.
The Civil war of 1917 – 1921 was a de facto implementation of a radical
alternative. This alternative was victorious because the solutions to
outstanding contradictions in the life of Russian society, offered by the
conservatives and liberals, were deficient. It was the failures of the
conservatives and liberals that predetermined the success of the
Bolsheviks.”
Doctor of History Professor Olshtynsky believes that, “the main factor
that determined the victory of the Bolsheviks was the union of workers and
peasants that supported the Soviet power. The second reason lies in the
ideals of national-liberation, pursued by the Civil war. The fusion of
counterrevolution and foreign intervention turned the actions of Soviet
authorities into a struggle for Russia’s independence from foreign
oppression. This was conducive to forming a military-political union of
the Soviet Republics in the course of the Civil war, and became a vitally
important factor in favor of the Soviets.
The third reason can be found in the extremely well-organized and welded
leading political force of Soviet power – the party of Bolsheviks. It was
through its efforts the many-million–strong, battle-worthy Red Army was
founded. The Soviet state managed to transform the country into one
cohesive military camp, where all of society’s forces were mobilized for
armed struggle.
Finally – a factor that contributed to victory was the support of the
International working class. The workers’ movement “Hands off Soviet
Russia” and the upsurge of the revolutionary movement in the armies of the
foreign intervention forced the Entente to withdraw its armed forces from
Russia. Revolutions in Europe were a tremendous moral support for
struggling Soviet Russia, allowing the annulment of the extortionate Brest
Peace accords with Germany, and distracting significant forces of the
foreign intervention.”
Vladimir Lenin announced after the victory in the Civil war:
“Nobody will ever conquer a people whose workers and peasants in their
majority have experienced, seen and felt that they are …fighting for a
cause, victory in which will enable their children to avail themselves of
all the boons of culture, the fruit of man’s labour.”
He also said: “Firstly, we won over from the Entente its workers and
peasants; secondly, we have enlisted the neutrality of those small
peoples, who are its slaves; thirdly, we have started attracting to our
side in the countries of the Entente their educated petite
bourgeoisie…This is our third large victory. It became a victory not only
on a Russian, but on an international-historical scale.”
A historian from the town of Saratov, an expert in the sphere of
conflictology, Assistant Professor at the Civil Service Academy of the
Volga district, Anton Posadsky, is convinced: “…most decisive was the fact
that in the case of the Bolsheviks the scale of their actions was quite
different from that of the ‘whites’. For the ‘reds’ the whole of Russia
was their resource, their bridgehead. The bolshevist elite thought in
terms of world revolution, which was almost a reality. The ‘whites’ were
attempting to revive Russia by turning the country back to the realm of
its own national interests. Moreover, these interests were comprehended
quite differently by various trends of the ‘white’ movement. Such an
approach forced them, for example, to take upon their shoulders the burden
of contradictions from the past life, and this hampered the ‘whites’ from
selecting one clear-cut course of action…
The ‘whites’ didn’t dare to uncompromisingly destroy what was theirs, so
dear to them. The ‘reds’ were stronger in their instrumental approach to
what was formally their own country. They succeeded in finding the most
painful spots in the system and making use of them, never tormented by any
moral doubts or historical considerations.”
Historian Sergey Sbortsev from the capital of Byelorussia Minsk says:
“The main reason for the victory of the Bolsheviks lies in the fact the
‘white’ movement couldn’t find broad support inside the country. It placed
its bet with the privileged classes and failed to enlist the support of
the broad sections of the working population by gaining their interest
with their economic program. The Bolsheviks, quite the opposite, could
fall back on the greatest support of the population, particularly the
poorest sections of it. The tactical strength of the Bolsheviks lay in the
fact they spoke on behalf of the people - something that came to play a
decisive role and brought them in their victory in the Civil war.”
Politologist of left-wing views Sergey Kara-Murza insists that the
Bolsheviks won because: “…the turned out to be the only political force,
that could save Russia from historical nonentity…”
One of the factors that was conducive to bringing about the victory of the
Bolsheviks in the Civil war was the significant number of professional
military exerts from the former Czarist army that went over to their side.
Making a note of this, well-known Russian publicist Vadim Kozhinov cited
information published by the magazine ‘Voprosy Istorii’ (or ‘History
Issues’). It was said there that “the overall number of cadre officers,
who participated in the Civil war within the ranks of the Red Army was
double the number that took part in the war action of the side of the
‘whites’. Commenting this data, the publicist reflects: “…one should first
and foremost realize that whilst serving within the ranks of the Red Army
(at times occupying high and most responsible posts), these officers and
generals never became ‘red’ themselves. There was but the occasional
Bolshevik party member among them. The Revolutionary military Council of
the Republic noted in 1918 that “the higher the rank, the less communists
one could find among them”.
All this testifies to the fact that the Russian officers and generals who
‘opted for the Red Army’, were thus choosing the lesser of the two evils.
These were people who, quite obviously, were well-familiar with their
colleagues in military service from the White Guards. They could see that
standing at its head were ‘unrepentant children of the February
revolution’. While the February revolution was a destructive force for the
Russian state and, first and foremost, for the army.”
As for the reasons why the ‘whites’ suffered a defeat, there are quite a
lot of them. There is the obvious egotism of the higher social circles,
the treachery of the ‘allies’ in the Entente, who favored the Bolsheviks.
British Premiere Lloyd George openly admitted in his memoirs that the
allies “had done everything possible to support the Bolsheviks”. They
acknowledged that the Bolsheviks were de facto the ruling force on the
territory of the former Russian Empire. They certainly had no intention of
lifting a finger to help topple the Bolsheviks. All the “allies” needed
while World War One was still raging was for the Bolsheviks not to destroy
the “White Guard” officers who were prepared to fight alongside the
Entente against Germany. This is why right up until the end of the war,
when the German monarchy was crushed, the Entente, albeit grudgingly,
aided the ‘whites’. However, the moment the war ended with the victory of
the Entente, the latter speedily launched negotiations with the
Bolsheviks.
Well-known Russian publicist and historian Mikhail Nazarov wrote: “The
white movement didn’t score a victory primarily because it relied on force
of weapons, and underestimated the spiritual reasons for the Russian
catastrophe…”
And the main reason for this catastrophe, writes Mikhail Nazarov, was a
rejection of God and the Orthodox Faith. To substantiate this opinion he
quotes from the memoirs of a participant of the White movement baron
Meller-Zakomelsky:
“…We realized too late that socialism-communism was a religious
phenomenon, and victory over it was possible only through a religious
upsurge of the Christian Faith. Humbly deploring our infirmity, in utter
compassion and repentance, in love for our errant brethren, we shall seek
the true road to recovery. It is not a sword forged in hatred and
vengeance, but the Cross - Christ’s pure token – that will lend us the
strength needed for victory.”
Only in emigration, writes Mikhail Nazarov, did the White idea acquire
completeness – after its proponents realized their own mistakes and
assessed the world alignment of forces. On a political level this became a
denunciation of the united global front of destroyers of the Orthodox
Russia. On this front the communist-Bolsheviks and the liberals, who had
masterminded the February revolution, were enemies only outwardly. In
essence, though, they were allies, since both forces sought to destroy the
Orthodox Russian state. The difference between them lay only in WHAT STATE
EXACTLY EACH OF THEM SOUGHT TO BUILD IN PLACE OF THE DESTROYED ORTHODOX
RUSSIAN EMPIRE.
The outcome of the Civil war was terrifying, indeed. In the words of
historian Oleg Platonov: “…the overall number of casualties in the war
comprised no less than 18,7 million people…
Out of this number we should single out those who died of starvation,
illness, epidemics, or were forced to flee from Russia to foreign lands.
In the years of the Civil war some 20 to 25 million people suffered in
epidemics. The typhus epidemic claimed the greatest number of victims.
As for those who died of starvation, the number is estimated at 10,1
million. It was the large cities that suffered the most. Thus, in the
years of the Civil war the population of Petrograd was reduced over
threefold.
A direct outcome of the Civil war was the vast stream of emigration. Some
2 million people left Russia. Significant Russian colonies emerged in many
large towns of the world. But these are only the results of the external
emigration. No less than 10 million Russian people found themselves as if
outside Russia as a result of the country’s partition and its altered
borders. Thus, without changing their place of residence, 91 thousand
residents of Russia suddenly found themselves citizens of Estonia, while
15 thousand Russians were now citizens of Finland.
It was the Russian population that suffered the most in the Civil war. Its
quota in the overall population of the Soviet Russia dropped by three
percent. The country had lost the crème de la crème of the Russian nation,
its golden gene pool. Representatives of the national elite were either
totally wiped out or forced to flee abroad. The entire Russian national
and intellectual infrastructure was destroyed. Thus, around 40 percent of
the Russian professorate and doctors had died.”
However, Russia was weakened and stunned not by human losses alone. The
bolshevist regime had squandered the national heritage, amassed by many
generations of Russian people – for example, a greater part of the Gold
Reserve of the country. As Trotsky later admitted, “…we plundered Russia
to gain victory over the ‘whites’.”
In the words of Byelorussian historian Sergey Sbortsev, “the losses that
the people of Russia incurred in the fratricidal war were to have
far-reaching consequences for all of our subsequent history. The system of
power that saved the country in the period of the Civil war later
transformed into a dictatorship…
The Civil war with its red and white terror became a tragedy for all
peoples living in Russia without exception. The dissociation of political
forces on the question of how the country should develop further resulted
in numerous losses and the establishment of command-administrative methods
of governing the country.”
Doctor of History, Professor of Murmansk Pedagogical Institute Alexei
Voronin wrote: “The political success of the Bolsheviks turned out to be a
Pyrrhic victory. Political effectiveness resulted in economic
ineffectiveness. This, in turn, questioned the political victory itself.
Objective requirements for the advance of the economy came into obvious
conflict with the aims pursued by the communists. Quite naturally, this
cast doubt on the possibility of their retaining power. This threat
manifested itself in the anti-Soviet and antibolshevist protests that were
widespread across all of Russia in the spring of 1921. Practically all
stratum of society expressed their lack of confidence in the Bolsheviks.
Finally, this forced them to reappraise the foundations of the policy they
espoused. Thus, a dramatic about-face at least in their economic policy
became unavoidable.” 1/30/2006
Our Homeland [The Voice of Russia]
WHY THE “REDS” WON?
By Tatyana Shvetsova
By the end of 1920 the Civil war in Russia was practically won by the Red
Army. There were but individual hotspots putting up a resistance to the
Soviet power on the outskirts of Russia.
So, why did Soviet power win and how can we explain the defeat of its
numerous enemies?
Doctor of History, Professor of Murmansk Pedagogical Institute Alexei
Voronin insists that ‘the Bolsheviks won not so much due to their own
strength, but rather due to the weakness of their enemies’.
“Almost every war changes the social setup of the warring sides, bringing
it closer to the military-socialist type,” Alexei Voronin elaborates. “In
such a society the degree of the authorities’ interference in the life of
its citizens is unlimited. This society is characterized by total
centralization, ruling out the very existence of private property. The
entire organization of such a society, right down to the psychological
portrait of its members is oriented to war and is permeated with
militarism. In other words, war creates the most conducive conditions for
‘socialization of society’. Yet, the question is: who and how makes use of
these conditions. Do they accept these conditions out of forced necessity,
or do they regard them as an imperative precondition for exercising their
policy?
Obviously, the Bolsheviks, if we can say so, coincide maximally with the
conditions of the war period. They felt perfectly at ease in the
conditions of war – something that quite possibly serves as one of the
reasons for their ultimate success.
As for their enemies, quite the opposite, they tended to find oppressive
those ‘military-socialist’ measures they were also forced to apply. In
other words, they conducted the same policy less consistently, with less
austerity, and as a result – to less effect.
The success of the Bolsheviks was achieved in conditions of approximate
equality of the opposing sides in many respects, first and foremost – the
military. So, it is important to understand where exactly lies the reason
for their victory. One could, in all likelihood, define it in the
following way: the Bolsheviks scored a victory not so much due to their
own strength, as due to the weakness of their enemies.
The Civil war of 1917 – 1921 was a de facto implementation of a radical
alternative. This alternative was victorious because the solutions to
outstanding contradictions in the life of Russian society, offered by the
conservatives and liberals, were deficient. It was the failures of the
conservatives and liberals that predetermined the success of the
Bolsheviks.”
Doctor of History Professor Olshtynsky believes that, “the main factor
that determined the victory of the Bolsheviks was the union of workers and
peasants that supported the Soviet power. The second reason lies in the
ideals of national-liberation, pursued by the Civil war. The fusion of
counterrevolution and foreign intervention turned the actions of Soviet
authorities into a struggle for Russia’s independence from foreign
oppression. This was conducive to forming a military-political union of
the Soviet Republics in the course of the Civil war, and became a vitally
important factor in favor of the Soviets.
The third reason can be found in the extremely well-organized and welded
leading political force of Soviet power – the party of Bolsheviks. It was
through its efforts the many-million–strong, battle-worthy Red Army was
founded. The Soviet state managed to transform the country into one
cohesive military camp, where all of society’s forces were mobilized for
armed struggle.
Finally – a factor that contributed to victory was the support of the
International working class. The workers’ movement “Hands off Soviet
Russia” and the upsurge of the revolutionary movement in the armies of the
foreign intervention forced the Entente to withdraw its armed forces from
Russia. Revolutions in Europe were a tremendous moral support for
struggling Soviet Russia, allowing the annulment of the extortionate Brest
Peace accords with Germany, and distracting significant forces of the
foreign intervention.”
Vladimir Lenin announced after the victory in the Civil war:
“Nobody will ever conquer a people whose workers and peasants in their
majority have experienced, seen and felt that they are …fighting for a
cause, victory in which will enable their children to avail themselves of
all the boons of culture, the fruit of man’s labour.”
He also said: “Firstly, we won over from the Entente its workers and
peasants; secondly, we have enlisted the neutrality of those small
peoples, who are its slaves; thirdly, we have started attracting to our
side in the countries of the Entente their educated petite
bourgeoisie…This is our third large victory. It became a victory not only
on a Russian, but on an international-historical scale.”
A historian from the town of Saratov, an expert in the sphere of
conflictology, Assistant Professor at the Civil Service Academy of the
Volga district, Anton Posadsky, is convinced: “…most decisive was the fact
that in the case of the Bolsheviks the scale of their actions was quite
different from that of the ‘whites’. For the ‘reds’ the whole of Russia
was their resource, their bridgehead. The bolshevist elite thought in
terms of world revolution, which was almost a reality. The ‘whites’ were
attempting to revive Russia by turning the country back to the realm of
its own national interests. Moreover, these interests were comprehended
quite differently by various trends of the ‘white’ movement. Such an
approach forced them, for example, to take upon their shoulders the burden
of contradictions from the past life, and this hampered the ‘whites’ from
selecting one clear-cut course of action…
The ‘whites’ didn’t dare to uncompromisingly destroy what was theirs, so
dear to them. The ‘reds’ were stronger in their instrumental approach to
what was formally their own country. They succeeded in finding the most
painful spots in the system and making use of them, never tormented by any
moral doubts or historical considerations.”
Historian Sergey Sbortsev from the capital of Byelorussia Minsk says:
“The main reason for the victory of the Bolsheviks lies in the fact the
‘white’ movement couldn’t find broad support inside the country. It placed
its bet with the privileged classes and failed to enlist the support of
the broad sections of the working population by gaining their interest
with their economic program. The Bolsheviks, quite the opposite, could
fall back on the greatest support of the population, particularly the
poorest sections of it. The tactical strength of the Bolsheviks lay in the
fact they spoke on behalf of the people - something that came to play a
decisive role and brought them in their victory in the Civil war.”
Politologist of left-wing views Sergey Kara-Murza insists that the
Bolsheviks won because: “…the turned out to be the only political force,
that could save Russia from historical nonentity…”
One of the factors that was conducive to bringing about the victory of the
Bolsheviks in the Civil war was the significant number of professional
military exerts from the former Czarist army that went over to their side.
Making a note of this, well-known Russian publicist Vadim Kozhinov cited
information published by the magazine ‘Voprosy Istorii’ (or ‘History
Issues’). It was said there that “the overall number of cadre officers,
who participated in the Civil war within the ranks of the Red Army was
double the number that took part in the war action of the side of the
‘whites’. Commenting this data, the publicist reflects: “…one should first
and foremost realize that whilst serving within the ranks of the Red Army
(at times occupying high and most responsible posts), these officers and
generals never became ‘red’ themselves. There was but the occasional
Bolshevik party member among them. The Revolutionary military Council of
the Republic noted in 1918 that “the higher the rank, the less communists
one could find among them”.
All this testifies to the fact that the Russian officers and generals who
‘opted for the Red Army’, were thus choosing the lesser of the two evils.
These were people who, quite obviously, were well-familiar with their
colleagues in military service from the White Guards. They could see that
standing at its head were ‘unrepentant children of the February
revolution’. While the February revolution was a destructive force for the
Russian state and, first and foremost, for the army.”
As for the reasons why the ‘whites’ suffered a defeat, there are quite a
lot of them. There is the obvious egotism of the higher social circles,
the treachery of the ‘allies’ in the Entente, who favored the Bolsheviks.
British Premiere Lloyd George openly admitted in his memoirs that the
allies “had done everything possible to support the Bolsheviks”. They
acknowledged that the Bolsheviks were de facto the ruling force on the
territory of the former Russian Empire. They certainly had no intention of
lifting a finger to help topple the Bolsheviks. All the “allies” needed
while World War One was still raging was for the Bolsheviks not to destroy
the “White Guard” officers who were prepared to fight alongside the
Entente against Germany. This is why right up until the end of the war,
when the German monarchy was crushed, the Entente, albeit grudgingly,
aided the ‘whites’. However, the moment the war ended with the victory of
the Entente, the latter speedily launched negotiations with the
Bolsheviks.
Well-known Russian publicist and historian Mikhail Nazarov wrote: “The
white movement didn’t score a victory primarily because it relied on force
of weapons, and underestimated the spiritual reasons for the Russian
catastrophe…”
And the main reason for this catastrophe, writes Mikhail Nazarov, was a
rejection of God and the Orthodox Faith. To substantiate this opinion he
quotes from the memoirs of a participant of the White movement baron
Meller-Zakomelsky:
“…We realized too late that socialism-communism was a religious
phenomenon, and victory over it was possible only through a religious
upsurge of the Christian Faith. Humbly deploring our infirmity, in utter
compassion and repentance, in love for our errant brethren, we shall seek
the true road to recovery. It is not a sword forged in hatred and
vengeance, but the Cross - Christ’s pure token – that will lend us the
strength needed for victory.”
Only in emigration, writes Mikhail Nazarov, did the White idea acquire
completeness – after its proponents realized their own mistakes and
assessed the world alignment of forces. On a political level this became a
denunciation of the united global front of destroyers of the Orthodox
Russia. On this front the communist-Bolsheviks and the liberals, who had
masterminded the February revolution, were enemies only outwardly. In
essence, though, they were allies, since both forces sought to destroy the
Orthodox Russian state. The difference between them lay only in WHAT STATE
EXACTLY EACH OF THEM SOUGHT TO BUILD IN PLACE OF THE DESTROYED ORTHODOX
RUSSIAN EMPIRE.
The outcome of the Civil war was terrifying, indeed. In the words of
historian Oleg Platonov: “…the overall number of casualties in the war
comprised no less than 18,7 million people…
Out of this number we should single out those who died of starvation,
illness, epidemics, or were forced to flee from Russia to foreign lands.
In the years of the Civil war some 20 to 25 million people suffered in
epidemics. The typhus epidemic claimed the greatest number of victims.
As for those who died of starvation, the number is estimated at 10,1
million. It was the large cities that suffered the most. Thus, in the
years of the Civil war the population of Petrograd was reduced over
threefold.
A direct outcome of the Civil war was the vast stream of emigration. Some
2 million people left Russia. Significant Russian colonies emerged in many
large towns of the world. But these are only the results of the external
emigration. No less than 10 million Russian people found themselves as if
outside Russia as a result of the country’s partition and its altered
borders. Thus, without changing their place of residence, 91 thousand
residents of Russia suddenly found themselves citizens of Estonia, while
15 thousand Russians were now citizens of Finland.
It was the Russian population that suffered the most in the Civil war. Its
quota in the overall population of the Soviet Russia dropped by three
percent. The country had lost the crème de la crème of the Russian nation,
its golden gene pool. Representatives of the national elite were either
totally wiped out or forced to flee abroad. The entire Russian national
and intellectual infrastructure was destroyed. Thus, around 40 percent of
the Russian professorate and doctors had died.”
However, Russia was weakened and stunned not by human losses alone. The
bolshevist regime had squandered the national heritage, amassed by many
generations of Russian people – for example, a greater part of the Gold
Reserve of the country. As Trotsky later admitted, “…we plundered Russia
to gain victory over the ‘whites’.”
In the words of Byelorussian historian Sergey Sbortsev, “the losses that
the people of Russia incurred in the fratricidal war were to have
far-reaching consequences for all of our subsequent history. The system of
power that saved the country in the period of the Civil war later
transformed into a dictatorship…
The Civil war with its red and white terror became a tragedy for all
peoples living in Russia without exception. The dissociation of political
forces on the question of how the country should develop further resulted
in numerous losses and the establishment of command-administrative methods
of governing the country.”
Doctor of History, Professor of Murmansk Pedagogical Institute Alexei
Voronin wrote: “The political success of the Bolsheviks turned out to be a
Pyrrhic victory. Political effectiveness resulted in economic
ineffectiveness. This, in turn, questioned the political victory itself.
Objective requirements for the advance of the economy came into obvious
conflict with the aims pursued by the communists. Quite naturally, this
cast doubt on the possibility of their retaining power. This threat
manifested itself in the anti-Soviet and antibolshevist protests that were
widespread across all of Russia in the spring of 1921. Practically all
stratum of society expressed their lack of confidence in the Bolsheviks.
Finally, this forced them to reappraise the foundations of the policy they
espoused. Thus, a dramatic about-face at least in their economic policy
became unavoidable.” 1/30/2006
